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Abstract 
This study seeks to explore some of the main problems contemporary British 
Muslims encounter from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. In so doing, it 
mainly aims to shed light on the extent Muslims in Britain face problems and 
what impact they might have on their religious identity as well as relationship, 
belonging, and contribution to the wider society. In so doing, the study will strive 
to examine whether existing fiqh (Isalmic jurisprudence) literature is adequate to 
guide contemporary fiqh scholars to deal with such issues effectively and how 
some contemporary answers to such issues are inappropriate. If that is the case, 
what would be the way forward jurists should take to find appropriate solutions? 
Hence, this study will use qualitative methodology to investigate such issues and 
questions and it will lead the study to emphasise the necessity to find answers to 
such problems and a mechanism to handle them, which this study would seek to 
suggest as a jurisprudential approach called fiqh al-aqalliyyāt al-Muslimah 
(Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities) based on values, principles, 
universalities, and higher objectives of Islamic law: maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah 
(Purposes of Islamic Sharī‘ah) presented by revisiting textual sources of Islamic 
law as well as lived examples of early generations of Islam. It will also make 
some suggestions about further studies needed as regards to fiqh for Muslim 
minorities.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Primary objective of this research is to examine definitions, themes, and 
contents of the legal theories of Muslim minority law in Britain:  to examine 
arguments for and against the development of particular Muslim minority law in 
addition to the corpus of Islamic laws are applicable in Muslim and Non-Muslim 
countries. Do Muslim communities live under Non-Muslim political authorities 
need a separate set of Muslim minority law? Why do the Muslim communities in 
Europe in general and   particularly in British context need for such guidance? 
What is the scope and limitation of this minority Muslim law? What are the 
rationales and justification for the development of Muslim minority law within 
European contexts?  Why do Muslim jurist consultants (fuqahā) cannot utilize the 
primary and supplementary sources of Islamic law to solve the challenges and 
problems faced by Muslim minorities in Britain in particular and in Europe in 
general? How does this Minority fiqh differ from traditional fiqhi approach of 
main four schools of Islamic law? Unlike traditional Muslim minorities, who live 
hundreds of years under non-Muslim lands, Muslims in western nations face some 
modern social problems and challenges which are different from those of 
traditional Muslim minorities. Social, religious, cultural, and political problems 
and challenges of people in Europe are unique which considerably differ from the 
problems faced by people in other countries, particularly in Muslim countries.  
There are ever increasing socio-religious, cultural, and legal problems 
encountered by Muslims living in European nations in general and in Britain in 
particular. In traditional Muslim minority countries, Muslim communities have 
identical Islamic judiciary system that helps Muslim communities to come to 
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terms with some religious and legal problems. They have their own marriage and 
divorces laws, laws of inheritance, and some customary laws that help Muslim 
communities in those traditional Muslim minority countries to solve their 
religious issues legally. Muslims in India and Sri Lanka are unique in that sense 
where Muslims have been accommodated with the provision of Muslim personal 
law for centuries, which is a fresh area of Muslim minority law studies.  
Muslim minority communities in Britain and European countries do not 
have a parallel legal system with English laws to solve problems faced by 
Muslims. Moreover, four Islamic legal schools of thought do not always provide 
compatible solutions for the modern problems of Muslim communities in these 
countries. Traditional Islamic scholars, Jurist consultants, and Muslim clerics who 
live in these countries are trained in traditional Islamic teachings with a particular 
school of legal thought. Sometimes their legal verdicts and announcement are not 
compatible with notions of human right concepts in European nations.
1
 Most of 
these imams and Islamic clerics do not have a comprehensive inter cultural 
knowledge of the European communities. They do not have enough skills, 
knowledge, and experience to gauge socio-cultural and legal issues of Muslim 
communities living in European context which has its own legal frameworks.   
Moreover, the general philosophy of Islamic law is instituted to protect 
and preserve some basic rights of Muslim community whether they live in 
Muslim countries or Non-Muslim countries. The Muslim minority law should be 
developed to preserve and protect religious and legal rights of Muslim 
                                                 
1
 Some case studies show that in certain cases brought to Sharia councils operating in Britain, 
Muslim women seeking divorce were wrongly advised by some Official Muslim Advisers in 
complete opposite to the legal provisions provided by British legal system in relation to domestic 
violence: Moore, K.M. The Unfamiliar Abode: Islamic law in the United States and Britain, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 125  
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communities in Britain. Sometimes, there appears to be some contradictions 
between notions of Western human rights concepts and Islamic concept of Human 
rights or Islamic legal verdicts. Therefore, it is imperative that Islamic 
scholars/Muslim clerics thoroughly understand these human rights issues 
comparatively before passing religious verdicts on any issues. In this perspective, 
the development of Muslim minority law becomes very much imperative in 
European contexts.   
The developing of this branch of study will largely help to enhance social 
harmony and co-existence among Muslims and Non-Muslims in this multicultural 
society of Britain. This does not mean that Muslim have their own parallel legal 
system in the UK; rather Muslim minority law should be a supplementary legal 
concession for Muslims to resolve their religious problems and issues. Muslim 
minority community is legally obliged to follow rules of the land. They should 
also have their own legal provisions to solve their religious problems within their 
community. Apart from this, the prospective corpus of law should inform 
Muslims the right way to be part of the host country. This entails the relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, which has become a major concern for not 
only Britain but also whole of Europe and North America.  
The above mentioned rationales and justification would support the 
argument to systematically develop the Muslim minority law in European 
countries. This is a timely needed intellectual endeavour and academic task, 
which Muslim scholars and legal experts should eagerly engage to protect basic 
religious rights of Muslim minority communities in Britain and Europe. That is 
why I have chosen this subject for my research to examine some areas of Muslim 
minority law in British contexts.   
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Today, Muslims live in almost all parts of the world. There are two types 
of Muslim minorities in the world today: one can be described as traditional and 
historical Muslim minority communities. These types of Muslim minorities have 
been living in some countries for centuries. They have become Muslim minorities 
for some historical and political reasons and they live in many countries today 
such as India, Sri Lanka, and China.   
The second types of Muslim minorities are new arrivals of Muslims to 
Western European countries. The historical origin of these Muslim minorities is 
relatively new. After the WW2 (World War 2), Many Muslims came to Western 
European countries for some political and economic reasons in large numbers. 
Many of them were semi-skilled or unskilled who migrated to escape persecution 
in their own countries. In recent decades, Muslim population has dramatically 
increased in numbers. These minority Muslims now live in almost all European 
countries. However, in countries like UK, France, Germany, Australia and USA 
millions of Muslims live as minorities today. Gilliat-Ray notes that their number 
according to 2001 census is 1.54 million in England and Wales, with about 40,000 
in Scotland, which makes the total population of 1.6 million. Constituting 3 
percent of the British population in 2001, Muslims have increased rapidly in 
recent years. As new figures from the Labour Force Survey (Office of National 
Statistics) published in early 2009 show, the population has increased to 4 percent 
and it is estimated around 2.4 million.
2
 
These Muslim minorities in Britain and European nations face many 
socio-political, religious, and legal challenges and problems today. Unlike 
                                                 
2
Gilliat-Ray, S., Muslims in Britain: an Introduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010, p. 117  
 13 
traditional Muslim minorities in the other parts of the world, European Muslim 
minorities, particularly Muslims in Britain have their own challenges and issues. 
These problems and challenges are somewhat different from those of traditional 
Muslims in nature.  
In order to understand the socio-cultural disparities between the 
indigenous British people and newly migrated Muslim minority in Britain, it is 
imperative to know social and cultural background of the minority who came to 
Britain in the post-war period. Most of the Muslims who migrated from the Indian 
sub-continent and other parts of the Muslim world soon after WW2 were 
unskilled and uneducated. They came here to work as factory workers and 
unskilled or semi-skilled labourers. Their purpose of migration was to earn money 
and go back to their own countries in due course. However, that intention was not 
fulfilled in the course of time due to immigration legislation in 1960s. As a result, 
Muslims like other immigrants started to settle down in the UK permanently in 
large numbers with their families. Consequently, Muslim population grew 
gradually but dramatically.  
Moreover, many Muslims who settled down in Britain, particularly the 
first generation who came in 1950s, were still having the ‘myth of return’ as 
expounded by Anwar.
3
 This nostalgic mindset made an impact on their ability to 
see the host society as their home and feel as they are part and parcel of the 
society. This indifferent outlook towards the new social environment made them 
reluctant to change, isolating themselves in enclaves, and non-participating on an 
individual level in British institutions. “Their participation is limited due to both 
the external constraints such as prejudice and discrimination and the internal 
                                                 
3
 Anwar, M. The Myth of Return: Pekistanis in Britain, Heinemann, London, 1979 
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cultural norms and values.”4 Consequently, this withdrawal from participating in 
the wider society can lead to widening the gap between the host society and 
Muslims. If that is the case, seeing each other as the ‘Other’ is unavoidable. 
Moreover, many Imams and clerics who were mostly brought from countries of 
origin in order to cater for the religious needs of immigrants and their children 
were too helpless in guiding them in right direction. It is due to the fact that they 
are unfamiliar with the social, cultural, political landscape of the host society. 
Consequently, their guidance, contributions, and religious opinions, in particular, 
are largely out of context and little relevant in this modern British context. This 
social situation may explain why there should be a new approach appropriate to 
British social, cultural, and political environment in the light of Islamic 
jurisprudence.     
It is undeniable that although British Muslims live in England as a 
minority community, they are a part of international Muslim community (ummah) 
with population of more than 1.6 billion. As noted by Moore, this sense of 
belonging to global Muslim community (ummah) becomes stronger when and 
where Muslims: whether British or American, “have experienced discrimination 
and exclusion at the hands of the dominant society.”5 It appears that her argument 
becomes more relevant in the context of understanding certain crisis that are 
global in nature faced by Muslims in both countries: America, Britain, and their 
wider implications in shaping the relationship between Muslims and the host 
society. Particularly, Muslims would become suspicious of their loyalty towards 
their country of residence. Modood writes, “They have found themselves bearing 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. p. ix 
5
 Moore, K.M. Op.Cit. p. 14 
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the brunt of a new wave of suspicion and hostility, and strongly voiced if 
imprecise doubts are being cast on their loyalty as citizens.”6 
Hence, they have dual collective responsibilities and duties. On the one 
hand, they have some legal, moral, and religious responsibilities and duties in the 
country they live. In this respect, they are obliged to live according to the laws of 
land in Britain and they are legally obliged to follow the rules of land. On the 
other hand, they are religiously obliged to follow Islamic teachings and are 
religiously obliged to fulfil their duties and responsibilities to the global Muslim 
community as well. Sometimes, a conflict of interest could arise when British 
Muslim minority community try to fulfil their moral and religious duties and 
responsibilities. They are religiously obliged to follow the teaching of Islam yet 
legally obliged to follow the rules of land in Britain. This is a dilemma Muslim 
jurists need to focus and address thoroughly.   
         The Rushdi affair in 1989, the riots in Bradford in 2001, September 11, war 
on Afghanistan in 2001, London bombing in 2005, the problems in Palestine, and 
war on Iraq are only a few examples that illustrate this complexity and irony. 
They are supposed to speak out for their brothers in faith in those countries and 
religiously obliged to support and defend them yet they cannot do because of the 
fact that they are obliged to follow the rules of land as well.  This complex 
paradoxical and ironical circumstances and situation compel us to understand the 
many legal and religious concepts such as a loyalty, citizenship, human right 
concepts in order to clarify these complexities and ironies.   
                                                 
6
 Modood, T. ‘Muslims and the Politics of difference’ in Hopkins, P. & Gale, R. (eds.) Muslims in 
Britian: race, place and Identities, Edinburge University Press, 2009, p. 194 
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As a part of my research project, I shall hypothetically propose some 
fundamental questions here in this study. How do the British Muslim Minority 
community reconcile between the notion of religious loyalty in Islam and legal 
loyalty to British law? Does the concept of modern citizenship differ from 
classical notion of settlement in non-Muslim polity?   Do British Muslim minority 
violate their religious loyalty if they are compelled to support British foreign 
policies and legal system? Can we apply pre-Hijra models of migration to the new 
migration trends of Muslim population to Europe today?   
What should be a Muslim’s position, as a citizen of a particular Western 
state, when his or her country goes to war against a Muslim country? The right 
example may be the war in Afghanistan. The loyalty and belonging of Muslims of 
both countries have been on trial and under enormous pressure as to whom they 
are supposed to give their solidarity and where their loyalty belongs to. Are they 
supposed to be loyal to their country of residence or their transnational global 
community of faith? This situation becomes even more complicated, if a Muslim 
happens to be a combatant soldier of the army of his country of residence and 
fights against Muslims of a Muslim country.    
This legal complexity is demonstrated in case of a Muslim chaplain 
serving the USA army who sought fatwa (Islamic legal ruling) from Muslim 
Jurists of the permissibility of going to war in Afghanistan in 2001. The dilemma 
he was confronted with has two folds. On the one hand, he, as a Muslim, is 
prohibited by revelation even to reproach his fellow Muslim let alone fight against 
him, for which he is warned as ending up in the Hellfire. On the other, he is 
obliged, as a citizen, to be loyal to his country of residence and defend it from its 
enemies. What would be his position in this crucial issue? Is this matter left to be 
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decided by him alone as an individual who is free to decide his own destiny or is 
it a matter mostly to be decided collectively by his community of religion? A 
myriad of similar issues arise out of Muslims’ presence in western societies, for 
which they need Islamic guidance.  
Thus, it can be argued that living as a Muslim community today under 
non-Muslim polity is a complicated and complex religious phenomenon in 
Western countries. This justifies the urgent need of Muslim intellectuals to 
scrutinise this new social phenomena in light of general philosophy of Islamic law 
taking into account all new development in geological and social condition of new 
world order. This research is a humble attempt to address some of these issues. It 
can be argued that living as Muslim minority in the Western world today is a 
reality and therefore, it is beyond the control of Muslim minority community in 
the UK and Western nation to live in isolation: whether they like or not Muslim 
minority communities are politically, socially, culturally and legally interacted 
with Western communities of today.  
            It is unimaginable that all Muslim communities will go back to their own 
native countries on the advice of some Muslim cleric of some Muslim countries. 
Practically and politically, such return is not viable today. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of Muslim scholars to address the challenges and religious problems 
that Muslim minorities face in the Western nations in general and in Britain in 
particular.   
It is a postulate of this research to argue that the entire problem faced by 
Muslim minorities in Britain, whether the issues are major or minor, can be 
addressed by Islamic scholarship in the Western countries. This demands one 
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condition. Islamic scholars and jurists should go beyond the literal meaning of the 
primary sources of Islam and the scope of classical legal thought to address these 
issues. They should address political, cultural, and religious problems in light of 
general philosophy of Islamic law. That is the way out for Muslim scholars and 
jurists to find viable and suitable religious verdicts for ever-increasing challenges.  
      Now the question is, are the Muslim scholars and jurist qualified and trained 
enough to visualize and scrutinise these issues in light of the general philosophy 
of Islamic law? Do they understand the culture, norms, and people of the host 
society? Do they have thorough knowledge of the socio-political nature of 
Western society? Do they understand legal frameworks and working culture of 
this society? If Islamic scholars and jurists were not well trained in both Islamic 
and Western sciences it would be a very much difficult task for them to address 
the problems of Muslim minority in the western society today. A team of 
imported Muslim scholars and jurists cannot visualise the scope and magnanimity 
of the problems Muslim minority face today in Britain and western nations.  
     In the context of Muslim minority community in Britain the legal principle of 
al-walā’ wa al-barā’ (allegiance and disassociation) becomes a somewhat 
controversial legal concept. This legal principle demands Muslim community to 
excert its loyalty to Muslim faith locally as well as globally. Literally, following 
this legal principle in the modern time is a vexing issue for Muslims in Western 
nations. It is to say that, to what extent is a Muslim allowed having bond and 
relationship with a non-Muslim even if that non-Muslim happens to be his kith 
and kin. How far can a Muslim be loyal to a non-Muslim state?  
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             The citizenship concept practiced in Western countries gives civic rights 
and freedom for their citizens. In return, these states expect from their citizens to 
legally abide by their rules and regulations and expect to be loyal citizens. 
Moreover, these countries expect from their citizens to contribute economically, 
intellectually, and socially to the wider society. How can a Muslim minority 
contribute and participate in the political, economic and social life of these 
western countries without damaging their identity, religiosity, and loyalty to their 
faith? These questions arise, as there are a number of instructions in the Islamic 
texts: Qur’ān and hadīth that warn Muslims to be cautious against as to whom 
they offer their loyalty and allegiance when they coexist with non-Muslims, 
particularly with Jews and Christians. Now, the question is what would be the 
situation of Muslim citizens who live among Jews and Christians in western 
societies? What is the religious position on these issues? Does Islamic classical 
and contemporary legal thought allow Muslim minority community to co-exist at 
any cost? Can ambiguity of this paradox situation be cleared in light of the general 
philosophy of legal thought?  
 The question of loyalty has been thoroughly examined by classical 
Islamic scholarship. However, the classical Islamic scholarship had examined this 
issue in their social and political contexts. Their understanding of the legal 
concept of loyalty is confined and limited to their social set up. Their opinions and 
viewpoints are probably in most cases not viable and feasible today in the 
Western context. They expressed their views on the concept of loyalty when 
Muslim polity was dominant in the medieval period. Obviously, it was the time 
when Muslims were living as majorities under dominant Islamic rule. Muslims 
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were rulers and the non-Muslims were living as minorities having special status 
called ‘dhimmy’ (protected minorities).  
Moreover, classical Islamic jurists and scholars did divide the world into 
two legal dichotomies in their social contexts: one is the abode of Islam (dār al-
Islam) and the other one is abode of war (dār al-harb). This legal description was 
formulated taking account of medieval socio-political structure of the Muslim 
world in the medieval times. When Muslim Caliphates dominated the large part of 
the world, the classical scholars divided the world in this way. Is it this division 
viable and feasible in the global village of modern world?   
Can anyone say that this historical socio-political situation will not have 
any impact on shaping the outlook of Muslims towards non-Muslims? Does this 
classical legal thought have any relevance in today’s contexts? The influence of 
this thinking is sometimes reflected in the legal proclamation and perception of 
some jurists and scholars.  
      The question arises as to what extent such classical interpretations that have 
been the reflection of a particular historical situation can be drawn on to offer 
solutions to current problems which are peculiar to totally different context? We 
no longer simply depend on classical Islamic legal interpretation to find answers 
to modern day problems. The classical legal interpretation and legal reasoning 
were made by Islamic jurist to meets the needs and demands of their societies. 
These needs and demands have now changed and thus, modern legal 
interpretation is needed in our times to meet the challenges of modern world.   
The defect and deficiency of classical legal thought demand us to devise 
and develop a new legal principle to deal with modern issues and challenges. In 
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this context some scholars are arguing for the formulation of fiqh for Muslim 
Minorities in the West. This new legal theory of Muslim law should be adequate 
enough to respond to the peculiar contexts and concerns of the Muslim minorities 
who live among non-Muslim societies in the West. It is this branch of knowledge 
in the field of fiqh that has come to be known as fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt: The need for 
this new approach has become so imperative, particularly for Muslim minorities 
in the West as a plethora of issues and challenges has been constantly on the rise. 
It is a collective duty and responsibility of Muslim scholars in the West to engage 
and come up with legal theories of Islamic law to facilitate Muslim minority 
communities in Britain. 
It is a collective duty of Islamic jurists and scholars in Britain to identify 
major problems and issues Muslims encounter here. What types of problems 
Muslim minorities are facing in the western societies? If the problems are social, 
political, economical, and educational, how do they resolve these problems 
Islamically? Is the absence of jurisprudential guidance the only obstacle to 
overcome these problems? If so, does the existing body of jurisprudence which is 
classical in its nature and feature and time-bound in its contextual existence 
adequate enough to address these problems? If not, does it necessitate revisiting 
the sources of jurisprudence: Qur’ān and hadīth and other subsidiary sources7 
including principles of jurisprudence in order to formulate a new and fresh 
jurisprudential approach to address these problems? Does it require a new form of 
ijtihād (exerting effort by scholars to extract rules from sources of jurisprudence)? 
This does not mean ignoring the intellectual heritages of classical scholars, rather 
                                                 
7
 Ijmā‘ (consensus of scholars on legal opinion), Qiyās (analogical deduction), Qawl al-sahābi 
(opinion of the Prophet’s companion), Istihsān (juristic preference), Istishāb (presumption of 
continuity), Maslahah al-Mursalah (public interest), Sad al-Dhrā’I‘ (blocking the means), Shara‘u 
mun Qablana (revealed law preceding the shariah of Islam) ‘Urf (custom) 
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we could selectively choose appropriate and suitable opinions of Islamic legal 
scholars: modern and classical. This research is an attempt to draw the attention of 
our scholars and jurist to devise and develop this new theory of Muslim minority 
law taking into account a holistic approach to our modern problem from all 
perspectives.  
 It is high time that Muslim scholars in Britain engage in this area of legal 
studies collectively away from all ideological differences. Yet, only a few 
scholars are involved in this field. Today in Britain, the primary concerns of our 
scholars seem to be to present legal opinions for the problems Muslim masses are 
facing in western societies. The works of these jurists appear to be largely limited 
to a particular school of legal thought. Whereas theoretical analysis and juridical 
reasoning of the subject matter, do not seem to be receiving same level of 
attention. Therefore, this research attempts to contrive and devise some basic 
ideas on the legal theories of Muslim minority law in Britain. I do not claim that 
this a comprehensive and conclusive research on this subject yet, I will try to 
present theatrical and conceptual frame work to this theory of Muslim minority 
law. 
1.1 Book Review on Muslim Minority Law  
I have selectively reviewed some important books and legal treaties in this 
section. Moreover, I have consulted some conference research papers and 
websites on this subject. Most of the books and research papers were written by 
Islamic scholars outside western countries where Muslims live as minorities. Yet 
some of these research papers were written by Muslim and Non-Muslim scholars 
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who live in the western countries and therefore, they do have firsthand knowledge 
of Muslim minority problems.  
The book authored by Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwi titled fi Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-
Muslimah,
8
 Sinaāt al-Fatwā wa Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt authored by Abdullāh Ibn 
Bayyah, Nahwa Ta’sīlin Fiqhiyyin li al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslimah bi al-Mujtamah 
al-Gharbiyyah by Abdul Majīd al-Najjār are few works attempted considerably to 
fill this gap. Yet they were more or less intended to deal with the subject from a 
general perspective without specifying any particular minority in the West or East.  
There are other works too which have contributed to this area of study. Al-
Qaradāwi’s legal rulings in his work Fatāwā Mu‘āsirah (Contemporary legal 
rulings) and his rulings in his website and ‘Islam on line’ web site, and Al-
Alawāni’s article madkhalun ilā fiqh al-aqalliyyāt (An Introduction to 
Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities) are worth noting. While Qaradāwi’s work 
concentrate to a great deal on practical issues of Muslims in the European context, 
Alawāni’s work deals with conceptual theories of fiqh al-aqalliyyāt 
(Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities). In his book Fiqh al-aqalliyyāt al 
Muslimah (Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities) Khālid Abdul Qādir deals with 
issues of Muslim minorities in detail in terms of principles of this fiqh and some 
problems of Muslim minorities. Although this book can be considered to be 
pioneering work in this field, it does not address many contemporary problems of 
Muslim minorities that emerged because of modernity and secularisation, and 
their impact on Muslim minority in the West, particularly in Britain.
9
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In his book Al-Ahkām al-Siyāsiyyah li al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslimah Fī al-
Fiqh al-Islāmiyyi (Muslim Minorities in Islamic Law: The Political Aspect), 
Sulaiman Muhammad, a Jordanian scholar deals with many political issues of 
contemporary Muslim minorities. This work too could be considered as an 
initiative in this field. Nevertheless, it deals with general issues without specifying 
the problems facing contemporary Muslim minorities in the Western societies.
10
 
There are few other works in this field that offer a very sketching and general 
treatment of the issue.
11
 
In this report, Fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, a legal theory for Muslim minorities, 
Shammai Fishman,
12
 expounds the legal theories of T. J. Al-Alwāni and Y. Al-
Qaradāwi on the Muslim minority law. The writer argues that legal theories of 
minority laws are relatively new legal concepts that are devised mainly by Al-
Alwāni and Al-Qaradāwi. He called them as founders of fiqh al-aqalliyyāt. This 
monograph is an introductory work on this subject, which provides an overview 
for the legal theories of Muslim minority law.  
Muslim minorities: fatawas regarding Muslims living as minorities, 
authored by Abdullah Ibn Bāz and Ibn Uthaymīn,13 deals with some fundamental 
questions about Muslims living in non- Muslim countries especially in European 
countries. Both scholars of Saudi origin argue that if Muslims who live in these 
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countries cannot make a living according to Islamic laws, then they should 
migrate to Muslim countries. They argue that preserving faith is the priority of 
Muslims. Therefore, if someone finds it difficult to do that they should migrate to 
a Muslim country. This book deals with many legal issues from a classical and 
orthodox perspective.   
In this lengthy article, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic 
Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the 
Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, on Muslim and Non-Muslims relationship from 
classical perspectives of different schools of Islamic law, Khalid Abou El Fadl
14
 
discusses legal issues of Muslims living under non-Muslim polity. This article is 
very much informative and provides a lot of research materials and references on 
this subject.  
When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United 
States, authored by  Jocelyne Césari,
15
  reviews different academic discourses on 
Muslims presence in Western countries. Particularly, their ability to relate their 
presence to global Muslim community and to maintain their connection with it has 
been discussed thoroughly. According to her, “the power of ummah” remains a 
unifying force.
16
 Hence, the author provides a sociological account of Muslim 
minority communities in Western countries. The writer compares and contrasts 
some basic Islamic teaching with the notion of democracy in western nations and 
its influence on Islam.  
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Hellyer in his book Muslims of Europe: The “Other” Europeans,17 
explores Muslims’ presence in Europe, particularly in Britain and their historical 
roots in Britain. Muslims in Britain are no longer an arrived community, rather an 
indigenous community in the process. He further argues for the need and 
necessity for a minority fiqh. Andrew F March’s book Islam and Liberal 
Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus
18
 is an important work on 
the subject in question. He argues for the viability of Minority law in light of 
liberal concepts such as citizenship. Muslim also can see the proximity in the 
terms of citizenship in plural democracies as reasonable and acceptable. This book 
discusses the issues of Muslim minority with particular reference to Muslim 
minority law. Different legal perspectives on these issues have been analyzed 
drawing on different schools of thought in the Islamic legal tradition as well as 
modern legal opinions.  
Khālid Mas‘ūd’s paper on ‘Being Muslim in a non-Muslim Polity: Three 
Alternate Models’19 is an interesting work on the subject in question. The writer 
compares and contrasts different models of Muslims living under Non-Muslim 
polity in pre-Islamic periods with that modern times. The writer makes a 
distinction between the pre-hijrah Makkah, the post-hijrah Makkah, and the 
Abyssinian/Hudaybiyyah model. Moreover, he compares these situations with 
modern situation. 
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     Following the emergence of these initiative efforts on the formulation of 
this fiqh, several fiqh councils have been established in Europe and America.
20
 To 
cater for the pressing need of Muslim minorities in this part of the world for 
religious guidance, two major pioneering religious bodies have emerged, namely 
European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) and Fiqh Council of North 
America (FCNA). The latter was established in 1986 as an independent fiqh body 
after evolving through various stages since 1960 in order to address, according its 
mission statement, the “needs of the Muslim community (in America) and the 
complexities of the issues they face.”21 The former was founded in London, with 
its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland, in 1997 on the initiative of federation of 
Islamic organizations in Europe. Headed by Yūsuf al-Qaradāwi, the council is 
largely a self-selected body composed by Islamic scholars who are residents in 
Europe and outside of Europe. ECFR has also established two sub-committees for 
fatwa in the UK and France in 1998 in order to respond to as many issues 
submitted as possible. Among its main objectives are, according to its 
constitution, bringing scholars living in Europe under one umbrella in an attempt 
to unify thoughts and views expressed by them on issues related to Muslims in 
Europe, issuing collective fatwas, publishing legal studies and research, and 
guiding Muslims in Europe through legal fatwas in the light of Islamic teachings. 
ECFR has also established a Research and Studies Committee whose main task is 
to publish Council’s periodicals.22    
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Undoubtedly, these efforts of individuals and collective bodies have 
rendered an immense contribution towards guiding the minorities concerned, at 
least to cope with problems and issues they face in their new social situation. But 
they tend to be limited in their purpose and scope as they were initially meant to 
be temporary means to offer short-term solutions as concessions and allowances 
for the problems these minorities face. The ideal example is the fatwa (legal 
ruling) given by European Council for Fatwa and research on the issue of 
mortgage. The use of this fatwa was conditional on non-availability of Islamic 
financial institutions and of course, this was the case when this issue was raised 
nearly ten years ago when Muslims have just begun to realise the necessity of 
having their own property and there was no halal means to fulfil this need. As it 
was a pressing need for Muslims in the western countries and there were no halal 
financial modes of transaction to cater for this need, the council, after long debate 
and discussion over two to three sittings, issued this ruling. Muslims were 
allowed, as an Islamic legal concession, to go ahead with this transaction 
considering their financial capability together with the non-availability of Islamic 
financial institutions.  
A question arises as to whether this fatwa would still be valid when 
Muslims’ situation in the West changes in years or decades to come in terms of 
their financial capability and initiating Islamic financial institutions. Indeed, 
pioneering initiatives are already to be witnessed in the form of banking system 
such as Islamic Bank of Britain. The focus of the scholars now, therefore, has to 
change accordingly and thus has to be directed towards how Muslims can be 
guided through initiating institutions not only in financial sector but also in other 
spheres of the social fabric. Muslim minorities of the West, particularly Muslims 
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in Britain may not be ‘minorities’ any longer and have not thus to be considered 
by scholars of fiqh as minorities who took residence in these societies as transients 
who were to return to their ‘home’ countries once their purpose of migration 
fulfilled. On the contrary, they may be considered not just as ‘Muslims in Britain’ 
rather ‘British Muslims’ as they have become part and parcel of the British 
society, particularly the third generation of Muslim migrants who tend to see 
themselves as British Muslims and see no contradiction in seeing them as such.  
Furthermore, they have been surveyed in a recent opinion poll as being 
more loyal to Britain than natives themselves.
23
 Hence, this paradigm shift poses 
the challenge to Muslim scholars, particularly jurists to look at the situation now, 
differently. What is needed from them is not just ‘rulings’ which have been the 
main concern for them when dealing with Muslim minority issues in 1980s and 
1990s, rather the formulation of ‘Juristic concepts, principles, and maxims’ which 
can serve as guiding lights for Muslim minorities in generations to come. In this 
respect, the paradigm, it seems, has been shifted from being just settlers whose 
situation has been transient and who needed temporary solutions to permanent 
stake holders who need broad guidelines in order for them not only to integrate in 
their respective non-Muslim societies but also to contribute to them. 
The issue in question is, therefore, to cover the problems of Muslim 
minorities on a day-to-day basis providing instant solutions and to identify the 
fundamental principles and maxims of this fiqh on the basis of a sufficient system 
of jurisprudence should be formulated in an effective and comprehensive manner. 
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The formulation of this fiqh in this way needs, therefore, much effort from the part 
of Muslim scholars. This endeavour should be realised and given priority by them 
as these minorities immensely feel the need for such fiqh. This task requires from 
them the proper identification of these problems and presenting sound solutions 
through case studies and research works. It is to stress this inevitable need and the 
contribution towards the accomplishment of this task that I intended to embark on 
this study.  
       Subsequently, the study highlighted the need for further research in this 
field focussing on selected Muslim minorities for which I have selected Muslim 
minority situation in Britain. The idea to study Muslims’ situation in Britain, 
firstly, came to my mind from a little experience I had with the Muslim 
community in Leicester and its multicultural, multi-religious, and multiethnic 
social environment and the experience I gained in dealing with issues and 
challenges Muslims have been facing on a daily basis from the perspective of 
Islamic jurisprudence. The experience and the familiarity in the subject have 
given me enough confidence to embark upon this study. Secondly, the proposed 
study on Muslims in Britain would contribute, I suppose, to bring a new approach 
to handle the problems of this community from Islamic jurisprudential point of 
view as a religious minority so that it may help them to strike a balanced approach 
between the context in which they live and the text in which they believe. The 
objective of this study is, therefore, to stress the pressing need to find an effective 
system of jurisprudence within the purview of the Sharī‘ah to address the 
problems of Muslim minorities in Britain through investigating the identified 
questions mentioned above. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology  
Muslims’ presence in western countries is relatively a new social 
phenomenon in Islamic history and Islamic legal history and has no such a 
historical and legal precedent in Islamic history. Therefore, problems and 
challenges faced by Muslim minorites today are unprecedented. Hence, legal 
solutions for these social and religious issues have to be devised and innovated 
through the mechanism of Islamic legal reasoning in light of primary sources of 
Islamic law. Problems and challenges of Muslim communities in the Western 
countries are unprecedented in Islamic history. Hence, Islamic jurists today cannot 
trace the legal verdicts and legal solution in the Islamic legal heritage of the 
formative period of Islamic history. As a result, Islamic scholars and jurists had to 
allude to rational reasoning mechanisms to find solutions to the modern problems 
of Muslim minorities.  
Nevertheless, research materials, legal research discourses, and legal 
research treatises on this new Muslim minority law are meagre in English. It is 
understandable that this is a new area of legal discussions and Muslim scholars 
and legal jurists have yet to do much research on this area. Social problems and 
religious challenges are ever increasing in the Western nations. It is the duty and 
responsibilities of Muslim intellectuals and academics to find resolutions and 
religious verdicts for those ever-increasing social phenomena.  
I shall mainly utilise research material written in Arabic on this subject: 
IIIT & ECFR have written on this subject yet their researches and discourses are 
in Arabic. I shall use all these materials in my research in Islamic legal subject. In 
my research methodology, I shall utilise a qualitative method in that I shall collect 
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all data of research so far done on this subject. This will include Islamic legal 
manuscripts, legal treaties, legal verdicts, and conferences papers on Muslim 
minority law. I shall initially identify major legal issues and problems that 
Muslims in Britain encountered in the recent time with vast migration of Muslims 
from Muslim countries. 
I shall also prioritise some major Islamic legal issues in my research, as 
they are a large numbers of ever-increasing religious issues. The primary 
objective of this research is to identify some of the most important issues and 
propose some Islamic legal mechanism to solve these Islamic religious issues. It 
would be beyond the scope and time limitation of this research to cover all the 
aspects of Muslim minority law in this research. Therefore, I shall confine my 
research into some important areas. My research methodology shall include 
examination of some main Islamic legal literatures, making comparison between 
legal verdicts of Islamic scholars on particular legal issues, which are common for 
Muslims living in Europe and North America.  
I shall also allude to some historical legal discourse from Muslim history 
to see some comparable legal verdicts in Muslim history. I shall use correlative 
and comparative research methods to understand different Islamic legal verdicts in 
different historical and social contexts. I shall utilise all primary legal sources of 
Islamic law in addition to supplementary sources of Islamic law. They include 
higher objective of Islamic legal philosophy, legal device of common good/public 
interests, legal maxims, common practices, necessities, prevention of harm, laws 
of priorities and similar Islamic legal devices, which were introduced into the 
corpus of Islamic law by the classical scholars as a problem solving mechanism in 
the legal Islamic history. Much of my research methodology will include legal 
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interpretations and observations. I shall interpret legal verdicts of contemporary 
scholars and legal jurists in light of above-mentioned primary or supplementary 
sources of Islamic laws. Moreover, I shall also compare and contrast some of 
Muslim minority laws with that of common laws in the western countries.  
I shall avoid doing any survey or interview in this research simply because 
it is beyond the scope of this research to do so and any such task itself will be an 
exclusive research project. Moreover, Muslim communities are ideologically 
diverse and such research project will be a daunting task within time limits of my 
research.  
This study seeks to investigate, therefore, the plausibility of a proposed 
methodology in Islamic fiqh to address the problems of Contemporary Muslim 
Minority of Britain from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. Within the 
overall attempts taken by the Muslim Community in Britain to address the 
problems it faces in the contemporary British society, this research specifically 
focuses on a particular formulation of fiqh for the British Muslim Minority as a 
means to address their problems from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. To 
undertake a research of this nature, inevitably, requires a sound methodological 
framework. The objective of this chapter is, therefore, to present the 
methodological framework of this particular research. 
2.1 Aims and Objectives of the Study  
This study is an attempt to focus on a new fiqh approach in a broader sense 
applicable to contemporary context of Muslim minority of Britain, which is called 
fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt. The general objective of the study is to critically analyse the 
capability of existing fiqh which is limited in time and specific to a particular 
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context in meeting the challenges of the contemporary British Muslim minority. 
In doing so, the study aims to explore the classical as well as modern approaches 
towards Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) pursued by scholars and jurists in addressing 
the problems of Muslim minorities. Secondly, the study further aims to focus on 
seeking fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt in an effective manner within the purview of the 
Sharī‘ah  to serve as guidance as well as a code of conduct for Muslims in Britain 
and to serve as a model for other Muslim minorities the world over. In order to 
fulfil such an aim, the study will largely focus on the major works and rulings of 
both classical and contemporary scholars and analyse to what extent they have 
attained success out of these works in covering the issue in question. By doing so, 
it is expected to produce the main outcome of the study, which is seeking fiqh al-
Aqalliyyāt in a broader sense to address the problems of contemporary Muslims in 
Britain. As such, the study will be able to emphasise the formation of this fiqh and 
its required nature today, which can serve as an effective mechanism of divine 
guidance for Muslims in Britain so that they can preserve their identity against the 
problems and challenges they face. 
2.2 Research Methodology 
The definition of methodology varies according to the contents and issues 
to be dealt with. Constructing a research design as regards to the methodology 
enables the researcher to carry out an effective and logically sound research. 
According to Cohen and Manion the “methodology is to help us to understand, in 
the broadest possible terms, not to the products of scientific enquiry but the 
process itself.”24 This implies that methodology is the understanding and study of 
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methods and principles and of their application in a given field of academic 
inquiry in a systematic manner.  
The methodology of this study is qualitative research as the study aims to 
find out the mechanism by which the problems of contemporary Muslim 
minorities can be addressed from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. The 
qualitative methodology helps the researcher “rely on complex reasoning that 
moves dialectically between deduction (particularising from the general) and 
induction (generalising from the particular)”25 It “is broad approach to the study 
of social phenomena; its various genres are naturalistic and interpretative, and 
they draw on multiple methods of inquiry”26 The rational of the qualitative 
method is to test hypothesis while referring to the existing body of theoretical 
knowledge, as theory has a crucial role in any social research. 
Within the framework of qualitative research methodology, this research is 
based on studying the literature available on the subject. According to Marshall & 
Rossman, the use of these research tools often entails analytical approach called 
content analysis, which uses written materials. It is “a method for describing and 
interpreting the artefacts of a society or social group”27 As such, this study, by 
analysing and interpreting the current status of Muslims in Britain through various 
written documents including fatwās (legal rulings), aims to stress the necessity of 
finding an effective system of jurisprudence for Muslim minorities (fiqh al-
Aqalliyyāt) within the purview of the Sharī‘ah as a guideline to address their 
problems from a fiqh (jurisprudence) point of view.  
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2.3 Research Methods 
Methodology, as described before, is a systematic procedure for achieving 
a research objective. Method, on the other hand, is described as a “range of 
approaches used in educational research to gather data, which are to be used as a 
basis for inference and interpretation, for explanation and prediction.”28 
According to Kerlinger this procedure is named as “methodology-data collection”, 
and it aims “to tell the reader what was done to solve the problem.”29 Method, in 
other words, has reference to ‘data analysis’ and is defined as ‘analytical 
methods’. As such, it aims to test the hypothesis put forward by the study.  
Analytical methods comprise surveys in terms of interviews and 
questionnaires, systematic observational techniques, content analysis and other 
methods. Analytical methods, thus, help the researcher to assemble primary data 
on the subject matter of the study. The initial method for any research-oriented 
study is survey of the available literature on the subject researched.  
2.3.1 Assembling Secondary Data: Review of Literature 
Academic inquiries usually begin with reviewing relevant literature, which 
can be considered as secondary data, as it attempts to find out the writings and 
research outcomes of other people. “The literature review, therefore, determined 
the relevant concepts and the tentative guiding hypotheses.”30 This study follows 
this tradition. It aims to present a literature survey related to problems of 
contemporary Muslim minority of Britain and the attempts made by contemporary 
Muslim scholars to address such problems from the angle of Islamic 
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jurisprudence. In fulfilling this aim, books, journal articles, research as well as 
conference and seminar papers, and online facilities were utilised. Thus, this study 
will use the published literary sources such as books, periodicals, and journals to 
collect data and information related to the topic. The sources will include 
materials from seminars and conferences as well. In addition, this study will make 
use of research papers and legal rulings of contemporary scholars.   
Secondary data is not only confined to theoretical aspect of the research in 
question, but also refers to the data assembled through other studies, reports and 
research in the same area. Using the research and conference papers which studied 
the current situation of Muslims in Britain would be a useful source in attempting 
to collect data on multifaceted problems and the efforts taken to remedy such 
problems from various aspects. Such data helped the researcher to substantiate the 
strength of the information gathered through literature review and supported the 
primary data gathered through documentary study. 
2.3.2 Assembling Primary Data– Review of Documents 
The study largely concentrates on documentary study through data 
collected. The original data collected through various methods constitute primary 
data, and the analysis of such data demonstrates the originality of the research. 
Review of documents as a method of assembling primary data “is an unobtrusive 
method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting.”31 
This implies that reviewing documents has a particular method of data collection, 
a particular method of data analysis, which is, called content analysis. The choice 
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for this particular method of data collection was made on the ground of the nature 
of the information this study aims to collect. 
The review of documents is a tool, which is “useful in developing an 
understanding of the setting or group studied.”32 As part of the documentary 
study, the use of documents enables the researcher to link the documents gathered 
and analysed to the research questions developed in the conceptual framework for 
the study. This will, in turn, help him to draw conclusions accordingly. 
The strength of content analysis is that it can be carried out without 
disturbing the setting in any way. The researcher determines where the main 
emphasis lies after the data have been gathered and processed through the study. 
As contended by Marshall & Rossman, the content analysis relatively clear to the 
reader. “A potential weakness, however, is the span of inferential reasoning.”33 
This implies that the content analysis of written materials entails interpretation by 
the researcher. “Care should be taken, therefore, in displaying the logic of 
interpretation used in inferring meaning from the artefacts.”34  
2.3.3 Data Analysis Methods 
Analysis of data refers to the process of examining the data in detail to see 
what they mean. The process involves looking for patterns, which exist in order to 
gain a better understanding of the data’s significance. This improved 
understanding develops through constructing and testing of ‘models’ about how 
the world works. 
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The method for analysing data is determined by the nature of the research 
methodology adopted. The objective of the study has a role in defining the data 
analysis methods. The collected data can be categorised into two main categories-
words and numbers, and be analysed by two analytical methods-qualitative 
analysis and quantitative analysis.
35
  
This research utilises mostly qualitative analysis method in analysing the data. 
The major task is to find answers to research question. This has a pressing 
influence on the kinds of analysis needed.   
2.4 Limitations and Difficulties 
The problems of Contemporary Muslim minority in Britain are varied and 
proposed solutions by various sections of stakeholders in the British society are 
diverse in terms of mechanism and perspective. Studying all of them will 
necessitate a comprehensive study and it is beyond the scope of this study. The 
current study will concentrate only on certain issues British Muslims are facing 
that are related to their religiosity. Among the strategies that seek solutions to 
these multifaceted problems, this research focuses on a particular kind of solution 
seeking method, which is called fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt. This is one limitation of this 
study, which focuses only on identifying the problems that need to be addressed 
through a fiqh perspective. Secondly, this research seeks to study major works 
done on the subject and therefore, it will not go into detailed study of secondary 
literatures in terms of Islamic legal rulings, which are available in hundreds and 
thousands if not in millions due to time constraint.   
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Thirdly, the research in question is about a new and growing social 
phenomenon related to the contemporary Muslim minority of Britain, the 
researcher encountered  difficulties in dealing with the research due to lack of 
materials available in English. Even if materials were available, they tend to focus 
on perspectives other than Islamic jurisprudence. Lastly, as most of the available 
materials were in Arabic, which is another difficulty the researcher encountered in 
translating them into English. 
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Chapter 3: The Concepts of Minority and Muslim Minority 
In this chapter of our research we will make an attempt to trace and 
identify the meaning of minority and Muslim minority. In doing so, it mainly 
focuses on different interpretations given by scholars of various fields of studies 
on what it means to be minority and Muslim minority. This chapter also examines 
issues revolving around understanding of religious minority in relation to identity. 
We have divided this part of our research into four sub divisions; firstly, the 
definition of minority; secondly, the definition of Muslim; thirdly, definition of 
Muslim minority; lastly, Muslim minorities of the world today at a glance.  
3.1 Definition of Minority 
The subject of minority has never been discussed as extensively as it is 
today. It has been widely articulated in the academia on both national and 
international level. Nevertheless, a unanimously agreed definition of it is 
farfetched. Although the subject of ‘minority’ has been widely discussed and 
documented in international legal documents there seems to be no universally 
agreed definition available.
36
 One of the possible reasons for the lack of 
universally agreed definition might be that some countries largely prefer to define 
people with strict definitions. In addition, the diversity in claims of minority status 
by several minority groups constitutes another obstacle in formulating a 
universally agreed definition.
37
 This has made the task of International law 
institutions all the more difficult to provide generally accepted guidelines to 
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realise the definition of the minority concept.
38
 However, because of various 
efforts put across by many an international legal experts and bodies, some 
valuable insights into some fundamental aspects, which cannot be ignored when 
forming a definition of ‘minority’ have been in place. Hence, the contribution 
made by Capotorti to come up with a definition is worth noting.
39
  
The Special Rapporteur on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Francesco Capotorti has defined the minority, with the application of 
Article 27 of ICCPR in mind. According to him, a ‘minority’ is “a group 
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members – being nationals of the state - posses ethnic, religious 
or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and 
show, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”40  
In 1985, the Sub-Commission submitted a text to the Commission on 
Human Rights on the definition of ‘minority’ prepared by Jules Deschenes. 
According to this definition, a minority is a group of citizens of a state, consisting 
of a numerical minority and in a non dominant position in that state, endowed 
with ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the 
majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, 
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motivated, if not implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to 
achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.
41
 
Generally speaking, a minority is characterised by five characteristics as 
contended by Feagin. A minority, according to him, is the one:  
1. Who is suffering discrimination and subordination at the hand of majority. 
2.  Who is distinguished form the rest of the society because of physical and 
cultural traits and is disapproved as a result by the society at large. 
3. Who enjoys a shared sense of collective identity and common burden. 
4. Whose socio-political status is determined by socially shared rules, which 
measure citizenship and belonging. 
5.  Who tends to marry within his/her own group.42 
Hence, as the term minority has been treated according to different 
perspectives and diverse viewpoints of relevant fields, it may be said that the 
definition of the term minority is far from being unanimous among the scholars 
who deal with it from their own field of study. Yet, to understand the true nature 
of the ‘Muslim minority’, it is necessary to explore the term of ‘minority’ from 
various perspectives in brief at least in order to highlight the distinct 
characteristics of the ‘Muslim minority’. This will help to understand how it 
differs from other types of minorities and how the problems faced by Muslim 
minority in Britain related, more or less, to the way they are identified. The 
scrutiny of the term in this way in relation to Muslim minorities will largely help 
to underline exact nature and the features of the Muslim minority in Britain.    
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The Oxford dictionary defines minority as “a small group of people 
separated from the rest of the community by a difference in race, religion, 
language.”43 This implies that a minority is a group of people who could easily be 
distinguished based on their identical characteristics such as race, language or 
religion from the majority of the population of any country. According to this 
definition, all nations of the world contain minorities of one kind or the other. 
As defined by Webster’s seventh new Collegiate Dictionary, a minority is 
“a part of a population differing in some characteristics and often subjected to 
differential treatment”. According to this definition, it implies that it is not the 
number that decides a group of people as minority; rather, it is the way in which a 
particular minority is treated by the rest of the society that largely determines 
whether that group of people is a minority or a majority. This definition gives an 
added dimension to the definition of minority in terms of treatment a minority is 
subjected to by a majority in a given socio-political context. Hence, Louis Wirth 
argues that a minority is defined as “…a group of people who, because of their 
physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in 
which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who, therefore, regard 
themselves as objects of collective discrimination.”44 According to this definition 
a minority is: 
1. A group of people who are different from others physically and/ or culturally. 
2. A group of people who receive different and unequal treatment by the society 
they live in. 
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3. A group of people who regard themselves, for receiving such treatment, 
objects of collective discrimination. 
Hasan Zaman argues that a minority can come to existence because of one 
or more of the following general effects: 
1. Minority groups are held in lower esteem and are objects of contempt, 
ridicule, and violence. 
2. They are spatially segregated and socially isolated. 
3. They are victims of unequal access to education, employment, and 
profession. 
4. They may suffer from restricted property rights. 
5. They may be deprived of the right to suffrage and public office.45     
Drawing on above definitions, it can be argued that a status of a minority 
is determined by a combination of factors. One factor or the other can effectively 
make an impact on deciding a group as minority. As a result, a particular minority 
can largely be affected because of its status as a minority who is numerically 
inferior, unequally treated, and collectively discriminated by the rest of the society 
in which they live in. In other words, its interests and expectations are not 
effectively represented in the political, economic and social institutions of 
society.
46
 Given this situation in a society, the majority-minority relation becomes 
problematic and it puts the relationship between minority and majority in 
jeopardy. This may lead to an imbalance in both parties’ relationship and impact 
as a result on interests and ambitions of both groups when this develops to a 
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situation where a minority strives to maintain its distinctive identity and resist 
assimilation in the majority. As a result, the minority may be singled out for 
differential treatment and become an object of discrimination by the majority. If a 
minority is, however, willing to accept majority’s hegemony, it is accepted and 
tolerated. This social situation is where the discourse about integration and 
assimilation is widely debated by social scientists and scholars who are interested 
in studying problems of Muslim minority communities in western societies.      
Overall, for a group of people to face problems by virtue of being a 
minority is not something unusual and it is rather to be expected only because of 
differences in race, language, religion, culture, and country of origin which 
distinguish them from the rest of the community they live in. Hasan Zaman 
maintains “no social group is more vulnerable to oppression than a minority in a 
particular society when the differences that they have from most of the people 
around make them feel outsiders from that society.”47 This situation is more likely 
to happen when the people around this minority are virtually more powerful and 
influential.  
Sometimes, the same power and superiority a group of people enjoy over 
the other will be a key factor to determine the above-mentioned people’s 
dominance over the others despite the latter is numerical status. Indeed, there had 
been minorities in history who had been politically superior yet numerically 
inferior and had enjoyed grater administrative and executive power over majority 
of a particular society. The Mughal of India, for instance, were such a minority in 
recent history who had ruled India for more than 700 years. In this respect, Ali 
Kettani contends, “a group of people might still be a minority even though they 
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have bigger numbers in the population if somehow they are subjected to 
differential treatment by a smaller but a more influential group, having different 
characteristics.”48 Countries like Albania, Lebanon and Ethiopia exemplify this 
type of minorities. The numerical aspect of a group of people is, therefore, not 
always a decisive factor for that group to be counted as a minority. Although 
minorities are generally defined in terms of numbers, some Muslim minorities are 
a part of large populations such as those of China and India. Hence, they can be 
considered as numerically significant communities. Moreover, in terms of their 
population size they exceed many of the Muslim majority nations. Minority 
status, therefore, does not always depend on numbers and does not necessarily 
need to be measured numerically.     
Nevertheless, Kettani argues that a minority, while having featured by 
above-mentioned characteristics, should have achieved any solidarity by realising 
those characteristics, without which “such a group of people can hardly be termed 
a minority merely because of the existence of ‘different characteristics’.”49 It is 
the awareness of their characteristics and safeguarding them against the ‘different 
treatment’ meted out by the majority that lead to the coming of a minority into 
existence.
50
  
According to Kettani’s explanation, a minority cannot come to existence 
unless it is firmly rooted in the majority through realisation of its distinct features. 
An appropriate example can be found in black minority in USA. Kettani argues 
that  “because of the differential treatment meted out by the majority in the United 
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States of America to those who share this characteristic (colour of skin) a black 
minority has come into being.”51 
As such, where a minority is composed of people coming from another 
nation, it is regarded as an ethnic minority. In Kenya, people with Indian or 
English origins, constitute an ethnic minority. In Britain, Australians and 
Pakistanis are both ethnic minorities, but Pakistanis are also a racial as well as a 
religious minority.
52
 However, there is not a generally accepted definition of the 
term minority. “The diversity of historical, economic, and social conditions all 
over the world was perhaps an obstacle to the elaboration of a general concept or 
definition of ‘minority’, as its content varied from region to region and from 
country to country as well as from one historical period to another.”53 
In the light of the above discussions of definitions of the concept of 
‘minority’, it can appropriately be suggested that the term ‘minority’ has become 
a subject of a dynamic discourse among scholars across a number of disciplines 
since the beginning of 20
th 
C. It has attracted a wide range of scholarly discussions 
from multifaceted fields of studies. Scholars of various fields such as sociology, 
law, politics, and religion have defined the term from their respective 
perspectives. Sociologists, for instance, define the term in terms of differential 
treatments and collective discrimination being meted out to a group of people 
because of their physical or cultural characteristics. Political analysts may explore 
the term within the political contexts of a particular country or a state in which a 
group of people deserve to be designated as such because of their socio-political 
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situation in terms of political power and status. Law experts would define it in 
terms of rights and privileges a minority is provided by a majority in a particular 
socio-political context.  
As for a minority who is inherently characterised with its religion, the 
scholars of various disciplines have been at cross roads and face a real challenge 
of defining that minority. Although a minority can be looked at from a range of 
perspectives as we saw in the previous paragraph, a religious minority also can be 
characterised by characteristics mentioned above. Moreover, it can be studied 
under majority/minority dichotomy in term of number as well. Yet, the difficulty 
in understanding such a minority whose special feature is religion and forming a 
straightforward definition out of it, it seems, lies in overlapping nature of its 
identity and dynamic process of its formation due to multifaceted socio-political 
situations. Being characterised by many a markers of identity such as ethnicity, 
race, colour, culture, region…etc, a religious minority with multiple affiliations 
may identify itself by one or more identifiers, either as an action or a reaction to a 
socio-political situation it encounters. In circumstances like this one marker or the 
other will take precedence over other and establish itself as the predominant 
identifier of that particular minority. This interchangeable nature of identity 
formation interplayed with a religious minority may pose a real challenge of 
understanding of it because of its manifold layers of identities.    
It becomes even more difficult when that particular religious minority is 
persistently self-conscious about its religious identity and not ready to scarify it in 
favour of any other allegiances and affiliations which are still considered to be 
important components of its multiple identities yet are deemed to be secondary in 
its view. The displaying of its interchangeable identity might reach its peak, when 
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it faces socio-political issues and problems. Especially, when there is a large-scale 
political crisis exists, for example, between two countries - country of origin 
where a minority migrated from and country of residence where it takes residence 
- the allegiance, loyalty, and belonging of that particular minority will be put to 
test and its belonging will come under severe pressure and scrutiny. A situation 
like this would give a hard time for it to decide where its allegiance belongs to. 
On the other hand, this may also influence majority’s outlook towards, and 
perception of minority community. It may also lead the majority community to 
cast doubt on minority and suspicious of its loyalty. Muslims living as minorities 
in non-Muslim societies are subjected most of the time to this kind of problem.  
This identity crisis and division among citizens of a same county was what 
to be seen at the time of Rushdi affair in 1989, first and second Gulf war in 1991 
and 2003 respectively, Danish cartoon problem in 2005, and problems in Palestine 
for last few decades. Hence, questions will be raised as to where does the loyalty 
of that particular minority belong to? A whole out debate would be triggered off 
around the notion of identity, citizenship, and belonging.     
This dilemma of recognition of a religious minority is, therefore, no less 
manifested anywhere else than in Europe including Britain. The ongoing debate 
among sociologists on a number of issues revolving around minorities, 
particularly religious minorities and related such issues as identity, loyalty, and 
belonging is a testimony of existence of this problem. Moreover, the treatment 
received by religious minorities at the hands of some governments, particularly in 
Europe speaks volumes of this problematic situation. The headscarf ban imposed 
by France in 2005 on Muslim women against their will and various forms of 
racism directed against Muslims in Britain, for instance, has been a clear 
 51 
manifestation of this uncertainty prevailing in understanding Muslims as a 
‘religious minority’ and misrecognising, as a result, the importance of their 
religious identity. 
The underlying reason for this socio-political crisis can be traced and 
located, as argued by Chris Allen,
54
 in the marked shift in discourse on race 
relations in Europe, particularly in Britain. He argues that there is a discernible 
shift from ‘racism’ on ‘Asians’ in Britain to ‘Muslim’ and ‘Muslimness’. Drawing 
on Runnymede Trust’s report on Islamophobia, he draws attention to the 
noticeable shift-taking place in markers of race. He expresses his concerns over 
this shift highlighting the impact it can have on religious minorities, particularly 
Muslim minority in Britain. He throws light on how the markers of race, while 
racism continues on same markers, have been displaced by newer and more 
prevalent ones of a cultural and socio-religious nature and how it affects Muslims 
in Britain as culturally and religiously distinct community. Giving reasons why 
Muslims in Britain are not protected by legislation when they are targeted by 
racist attacks he points out that “while traditional markers of race have been 
afforded legislative protection, the same is not true for religious markers, in 
relation to which protection is restricted to ethnically definable religious 
communities. Despite Muslims being increasingly targeted with newer forms of 
racist prejudice and hatred, as multi-ethnic communities they remain outside the 
writ of current legislation.”55 In Allen’s analysis, the problem mainly lies at the 
roots of anomalies in legislation. He examines how the racist elements like BNP 
are targeting Muslims, particularly after 9/11 using loopholes in the legislation. 
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He concludes drawing on a number of examples from across the media, voices in 
the public domain, and mainstream politics that how post 9/11 Islamophobia has 
impacted upon South Asian communities, particularly Muslims and how it may be 
used as a means to justify racist attitudes and beliefs in future.
56
 
Drawing on Allen’s analysis of the issue in question, it can be argued that 
there is misrecognition of the religious element of the Muslim minority in Britain 
and it is due to anomalies in legislation. The redress as he suggested, therefore, 
should be sought through bringing changes in legislation and for that, Muslims 
also have a responsibility to make it happen. A question arises as to whether 
seeking the solution for this problem largely depends on lobbying the system to 
bring in legislative protection for the Muslim minority in Britain? Does the 
problem end there? It can, of course, be a part of the solution. Indeed, Muslims 
need to be politically active and self-conscious so that that they would be able to 
seek remedies for their political grievances and win over their political rights. It is 
true they should lobby the political system in order to win over their political 
aspirations as suggested by Allen. Yet, how far are Muslims aware of their 
political grievances? How far are they self-conscious of citizenship and identity 
issues as questioned by Ron Geaves?
57
 What stops them from being politically 
active? Is it because they are unable to lobby the system because they are 
politically weak? Alternatively, is there any lack of willingness to take part in 
politics from the part of the Muslim community itself because of ideological 
issues? It seems that among other reasons it is this final issue that needs more 
attention from us and receives little attention by Allen as far as contemporary 
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British Muslim minorities are concerned. Although a detail discussion of this 
issue will be done in the fourth chapter of this study, it deserves some explanation 
here in short.      
Geaves raises a question, while analysing the relationship between Muslim 
identity and British citizenship amongst communities of South Asian origin,  as 
how Muslims have prepared themselves to work within terms of citizenship in 
their new home with its emphasis on democracy, secularism, individual rights, 
and pluralism? Moreover, he questions how are they going to negotiate and 
harmonise that framework in terms of Sharī‘ah and Islamic state discourse? He 
throws light on the real dilemma Muslims are facing when they live in non-
Muslim societies; precisely the problem of how to be a Muslim in a secular 
society and what sort of strategies should Muslims devise when they live as a 
minority in a non-Muslim society. He further notes that “it has been essential to 
reconcile faith-based identity and citizenship, individual rights in an environment 
where the concept of others has dominated, without retreating into isolationism. 
Perhaps above all, they have needed to discover how to participate in a society 
which has no need for Islam in its public life.”58 It is this missing point in Allen’s 
article that this study will be focusing in the fifth chapter of this study.    
Although misrecognition of religion is prevalent in Britain as contended 
by Dilwar Hussein,
59
 compared to France, Britain displays somewhat an inclusive 
approach towards Muslims as a religious minority but not without issues and 
problems pertaining to their social, political, educational, and economical life as 
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individuals, families, and as society. Nevertheless, it is not undeniable that 
Britain, it seems, is slowly taking steps towards recognising Muslims as a 
religious minority. The ample example of it is its inclusion of a question on 
religious affiliation in the 2001 census.
60
 Moreover, the British government’s 
positive step to provide goods, facilities, and services on grounds of religion is 
another example along the line of recognising religion and religious needs of 
religious communities.
61
 Furthermore, the government’s recognition of faith 
schools can be considered as another step forward in acknowledging needs of 
religious communities.
62
  
However, comparing Britain’s colonial past in the Indian subcontinent, 
this slow movement is astonishing. It is a historical incongruity that it was Britain 
who had generously given pre independent, sub continental Muslim minority who 
are now citizens in Britain with their due rights and privileges as a religious 
minority when they were subjects of British Raj. Unlike Algerian Muslims under 
the French colony in Algeria, Muslims in the Indian subcontinent enjoyed near to 
autonomous social structure under British Empire. They were allowed to govern 
themselves according to their religion, particularly in personal, family, and socio-
cultural matters. Therefore, it seems a lot more paradoxical that Britain is now 
surprisingly seen to be reluctant to respond to religious needs and sensitivities of 
the similar Muslim minority who was ones its subjects, particularly South Asian 
Muslims who form a substantial number in the Muslim minority landscape in 
Britain compared to other Muslim minority groups who were given their due 
rights as a religious minority in their country of origin. 
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The recognition of a religious minority mostly depends on how far that 
minority is aware of its distinct characteristics and manifests itself as a ‘religious 
minority’. If a minority, whether it is religious or not, is less conscious about its 
identity and neglectful of its commitment to preserve it, the chances of getting 
dissolved in to the majority are high and its assimilation in the society at large is 
unavoidable. It seems that the lack of this self-awareness is what caused some 
Muslim minorities to loose its identity as a religious minority.  
Yūsuf al-Qaradāwi, while giving a warning to Muslim minorities in the 
West of the consequences of losing its religious identity, notes that the early 
generations of Muslim minorities in Australia who were mostly Afghanis lost 
their identity as Muslims due to their indifferent attitude towards their religion and 
religiosity.
63
 Humayun Ansari argues in light of such theories as assimilation, 
integration, and accommodation that in the earlier phases of migration into Britain 
and settlement, many migrants have lost their identity as Muslims or their 
‘religious observance frequently declined’. He contends that it happened either 
because of their sense of inferiority which led them to ‘absorb British values and 
lifestyles’ or their expectation ‘for integration and upward mobility’ through 
assimilation and abandonment of their unique cultural features. By doing so, he 
further elaborates, they ‘sought to accept the standard of the host society’ and also 
‘to gain self-esteem through social approval’.  Ansari claims that those who did so 
were helped by better education which resulted in ‘access to more secure jobs and 
higher incomes’ and this paved the way for them to ‘disperse from inner-city 
migrant enclaves’ which ‘further facilitated their adoption of the norms of their 
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white counterparts.’64 It becomes clear, therefore, from Ansari’s analysis that not 
only the Muslim minority but also any minority could have easily been 
assimilated by the host society if it were to be indifferent to, and neglectful of the 
uniqueness of its identity.  
Nevertheless, it was not the same fate that befell all those who migrated to 
non-Muslim societies, particularly Western societies. There were those who more 
self-conscious about their religion and religious identity. Ansari maintains that 
‘first-generation post-Second World War Muslim migrants in Britain’ who were 
mostly South Asians managed to maintain their separate identity as Muslims. He 
contends that case studies have shown that these Muslims have somehow 
remained relatively unassimilated and retained ‘their own culture and religion’. 
He further notes, “They were content to remain detached from the wider British 
society. They had come to Britain to raise their living standards, not to change 
their way of life. They were prepared to establish contact with British society only 
to the extent that it impinged on their materiel welfare, but wanted their value 
system left intact. In sustaining a traditional way of life these Muslims were 
encouraged by their Islamic faith through its requirement of certain modes of 
behaviour.”65 Yet, a question arises as to whether the latter was enabled to 
succeed in maintaining their identity due to what was achieved by the former in 
terms of a high life standard and social status; secure jobs, higher incomes, high 
standard life style, and acceptance in the society. According to Ansari, it was not 
the case. They were left behind in many spheres of social life for choosing to live 
their own way of life isolating them from the mainstream in the society. If that is 
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the case, does it imply that Islam encourages isolation or ghetto like life style? 
Whether their choice was influenced by ‘their Islamic faith’ as argued by Ansari? 
Alternatively, was it because of their sole choice influenced by their own socio-
cultural background of their home country where they migrated from? A thorough 
scrutiny into the main sources of Islam namely the Qur’ān and Sunnah of the 
Prophet (the life style of the Prophet) will not suggest the conclusion arrived by 
Ansari. Instead, both sources evidently regard the engagement and intermingling 
in society as a virtuously recommended righteous deed, a notion which will be 
elaborated in detail in the 4
th
 chapter when discussing problems of Muslim 
minority in Britain. Hence, it can be said that there is little evidence; it seems, in 
the main sources of Islamic teachings to support Ansari’s argument.  
However, comparing the two situations of early Muslim migrants in 
Britain, we can arrive at following conclusions: 
Firstly, that it is not important what type of a society or a social context a 
Muslim minority lives in, rather how far it is self-aware of its distinct identity and 
how resilient it is in the middle of a totally different social environment. 
Secondly, neither of the situations is encouraged by the main sources of Islamic 
teachings;  either preferring social isolation in order to preserve religious identity 
or favouring assimilation aiming prosperity in its broader sense at the expense of 
preserving religious identity. Thirdly, social isolation with the hope of preserving 
distinctiveness of identity has been a general social phenomenon mostly 
associated with Muslim minorities not only in the West in the contemporary era 
but also in countries where Muslims live as minorities for centuries like Sri Lanka 
and it has almost become a norm rather than exception. Lastly, striking a balance 
between integration and assimilation or engaging in society while preserving 
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identity has become the most challenging task Muslim minorities confronted with 
and it has been the great concern of modern-day Muslim scholars who deal with 
Muslim minority affaires from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Particularly, Al-Qaradāwi, while exploring aims and objectives of providing 
jurisprudential guidance for Muslim minorities, presents a seemingly viable 
formula for Muslim minorities in the West to establish themselves as a strong 
community which reads “preserving identity without isolation and integrating 
without melting down’ (muhāfazatun bilā inghilāq wa indimājun bilā dhawbān).66  
Similarly, the misrecognition of a group of people as a ‘religious minority’ 
could also be caused by one or more of the following reasons. Firstly, it may be 
because of indifference and negligence showed by majority in accepting them as 
such for deliberate reasons such as suppression inflicted upon them being 
subjugated by a conqueror as it happened in many a Muslim lands in the post 
Ottoman period. This was also the case when South Asian Muslim migrants 
migrated to Britain in post Second World War period as contended by Ansari.
67
 
Secondly, it may be due to some seemingly genuine reasons embedded on 
majority’s inherent outlook in perceiving other people through certain social 
yardsticks such as colour, race, and class. Perhaps, a better manifestation of this 
social situation cannot be found anywhere else than in Europe, particularly in 
Britain. In the 19
th
 C and early 20
th
 C period minorities in Britain were measured 
through scales of colour, ethnicity, and class. Mostly, the minorities were studied 
and looked at as ‘coloured’ in terms of colour and ‘Negros’ in terms of race and 
ethnicity. Sydney Collins, for example, studied ‘Negros’ as ‘coloured people’ 
                                                 
66
 Al-Qaradāwi, Yūsuf, Op. Cit., p. 35 
67
 Ansari, Humayun, Op. Cit., p. 211 
 59 
comparing to Muslims in Tyneside in the years between the two world wars.
68
 
Similarly, Kenneth Little explores minority communities including Muslims in the 
dockland of Cardiff in 1940s as ‘coloured people.’69  
This situation was prevalent until 1990s where minorities were viewed 
within black/white dichotomy as contended by Tufyal Choudhury.70 He argues 
that in 1980s this discourse was criticised and minority communities asserted 
‘more specific ethnic labels’. According to him, the early literature on ethnic 
minority studies tends to examine minority ethnic groups along the line of 
minority/majority dichotomy and it was assumed that there prevails a conflict 
between the two and it gave impetus to the emergence of discourse on 
acculturation and assimilation. As this trend developed, it was also subjected to 
criticism as ignoring the diversity within the categories of White, Black, and 
Asian. Choudhury maintains that ‘It also ignored the possibility of interaction 
between these groups’. Choudhury further argues that “the inclusion of more 
refined ethnic categories in the 1991 Census, including Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
groups, provided the context in moving the research focus from ethnic towards 
religion as a significant category of identity. Using the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
categories as a proxy group, the Asian/British dichotomy was replaced in the 
1990s by a Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy. An early indication of the importance 
of religion to the identity of South Asian Muslims came from the research by 
Hutnik in which Muslim identity was listed by 80 per cent of South Asian 
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Muslims as an important identity item.” Probing into Choudhury’s analysis, it can 
be noticed that a general consensus has never been achieved in relation to a 
generally accepted definition of minority let alone religious minority. This may 
partly explain why minorities of all sorts have more or less been discriminated 
against and treated differently.       
Moreover, this may also partly explain why Muslim minorities in almost 
all over Europe including Britain are facing difficulties in gaining recognition as 
religious minorities, particularly when it comes to engage in the public domain; 
socially, economically, and politically. As a result, identifying a group of people 
as a religious minority has become an issue in the recent past in Western societies, 
particularly in Europe where the notion of ‘religious minority’ has become a 
socio-political dilemma. In this respect, the presence of Muslim minorities in 
these societies has become a new problem for them as they have never 
experienced such a social reality in their midst.  
In short, the sociologists and anthropologists who studied about minorities 
in Western societies in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century have largely focused on 
almost all the characteristics helping to form an identity, of these minorities 
except for their religious identity. It appears that it was the prevalent social trend 
at that time. It may explain thus why most of the sociological and anthropological 
studies of 1940s and 1950s have concentrated more on race, colour, and ethnicity 
of these minorities than their religious identity. This has resulted, most of the 
time, in failure to grasp the true nature of religious minorities and understand 
issues and challenges they have been facing in the societies they live in. Hence, 
the presence of religious minorities in these societies including Britain has posed a 
crucial question to social scientists as to how a group of people whose most 
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important identity is religious than any other markers of identity - ethnicity, 
language, colour, and race - could possibly be identified? Indeed, this dilemma 
has become more problematic when it comes to define the term ‘Muslim 
minority’, as Muslims always tend to prefer to identify themselves by their 
religion above all other identity markers namely ethnicity, language, colour, and 
race. Why does a Muslim minority prefer to be identified by its religion, is a 
notion which will be dealt with later in the chapter.  
3.1.2 Muslim  
Definition what is meant by the term ‘Muslim’ is important in the context 
of discussion on problems faced by a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim society. 
In this section, we will look at the specific meaning of ‘Muslim’ in the minority 
context. It is not the intention of this section, therefore, to go into philosophical 
and theological details of who is defined by ‘Muslim’ (a person who surrenders 
himself to God) and who is meant by ‘Mu’min’ (a person who believes in God), 
rather the objective would be to focus on general understanding of who is 
considered to be Muslim in the light of main sources of Islam, the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah (the Prophetic tradition) with special reference to minority situations in a 
non Muslim social context.  
As a prelude to the discussion on the definition of the term ‘Muslim’, it 
seems appropriate to ask the following question: why should there be a distinction 
between situations or contexts in order to find a definition of who is designated to 
be ‘Muslim’? Answering this question should lead us to find a proper definition to 
the term ‘Muslim’. Before answering this question, it should be noted that 
generally a Muslim is a person who testifies that “there is no deity but God, and 
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that the Prophet Muhammad is His last messenger”, irrespective of the extent to 
which this testimony is interpreted by him in his practical life and be able to live 
up to the ideals of Islam. A Muslim is, however, required to interpret this 
testimony to his utmost capacity wherever he happens to live. He is, undoubtedly, 
obliged to live a life of a Muslim as stipulated in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah (the 
Prophet’s way of life), but it is not expected from him, in doing so, to risk himself 
in putting into practice by exceeding his capacity. A Muslim who lives in a non-
Muslim social context, for instance, is not a Muslim who lives in a majority 
Muslim society. Two societies are different and the rights and duties are, as a 
result, different as well. Nevertheless, it does not mean that a Muslim who lives in 
a minority social context is allowed to give away basic tenets of Islam such as the 
five pillars of Islam, Islamic moral values, and do’s and don’ts of day to day life 
without which his identity as a Muslim would be jeopardised. However, with this 
basic understanding of who is designated to be Muslim and on what basis a person 
becomes Muslim, it becomes important to answer the question raised at the 
beginning of this paragraph in order to understand another dimension of the 
definition of Muslim.    
Islam, as Muslims believe, is a way of life, which encapsulates all human 
situations and provides guidance for the success in this world and in Hereafter. As 
a code of conduct covering all aspects of human life, it takes into consideration 
the human capabilities in leading his or her life according to its teachings. A 
Muslim is not asked for what he is not capable of when he or she is leading his or 
her life under its shade. The first and foremost source of Islam, the Qur’ān 
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stipulates about this as follows: “So fear God as much as ye can,”71 The meaning 
and the implication of this Quranic verse has been repeated in many verses of the 
Qur’ān. The notion of practising Islam to ones ability is an intrinsically 
interwoven nature of Islamic teachings. The same message has been reiterated by 
the prophetic tradition as well. The prophet himself has been an example of this 
tradition in almost all his lifetime. He is reported to have said: “Refrain from what 
I forbid you and do what I command you to the best of your ability and 
capacity.”72 Hence, it is a known fact in Islamic teachings that a person who 
surrenders himself to God is not expected to do beyond his ability. The Qur’ān 
reiterate this fact in several places. It mentions this principle in the form of a 
supplication a believer is making to God as if he is craving for that supplication to 
be answered by God: “Our Lord! Lay not on us a burden like that which Thou 
didst lay on those before us (341); Our Lord! Lay not on us a burden greater than 
we have strength to bear.”73 This analysis of the notion ‘ability’ in the light of 
Qur’ān and the prophetic tradition is paramount important in understanding of a 
situation a Muslim is living in, no matter that Muslim is living in a minority or a 
majority social context. The notion of ability and strength is applicable in either of 
situations as long as its social condition is surrounded with such circumstances 
that strain a Muslim’s ability to practice his religion. An ample example may be 
found in the life of the Prophet and his companions in Makkah.  
Makkan life of the Prophet and his followers as Muslims was constrained 
by social pressure and enmity of their people. The life in Makkah for early 
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Muslims was almost impossible. For thirteen years the Muslim community lived 
in Makkah as a minority undergoing enormous hardships, trial, and turbulence. 
The whole social, political, and economical environment was not conducive for a 
Muslim to live a full Islamic life as expected by Islamic teachings. They lived to 
their ability adhering to basic teachings of Islam in terms of morals, teachings, 
and practices. Although they lived as a community, their adherence to the religion 
was individualistic. Each and everyone of that nascent community were mostly on 
their own facing untold social pressure from their immediate family and the 
society around them. In short, they lived under a non-Muslim social context with 
no legal system or polity to govern them as required by Islam. Yet, their life as 
Muslims under this non-Muslim social condition with all its negative implications 
did not disqualify them as being Muslims. God has not only accepted them but 
also commended them in the Qur’ān as ‘pioneers of Islam’. (wa al-Sābiqūn al-
Sābiqūn: Those foremost (in faith) will be foremost in (the Hereafter) ).74  
This was the first stage of Islam in its normative period. The second and 
the last phase of its formation took shape in Madinah where Muslims had their 
own space, leadership, power, law, and society. Having the Prophet Muhammad 
as their political leader, Muslims lived as a society governing themselves by their 
own social, political, economical, and legal system. They also had a minority 
community comprising Arabs, Jews, and Christians living side by side as one 
community. It took ten years to form this community to its full formation. Hence, 
within 23 years time a model Muslim society was founded through the guidance 
of God’s revelation and its practical model embedded in the Prophet’s lifestyle. It 
                                                 
74
 The Qur’ān, Chapter : al-Wāqi‘ah (The Inevitable), Verse n. 10, Trans. By Abdullāh Yūsuf ‘Ali, 
www.pdf-koran.com  
 65 
is obvious that out of a near quarter of a century, thirteen years has been the 
foundational period of Islam and it was formatted in a non-Muslim social context. 
In other words, it was the Muslim minority situation that laid the foundation stone 
for the full fledged society to exist in ten years time. The important aspect to be 
noticed here in the backdrop of the discussion on definition of ‘Muslim’ within 
the context of Muslim minority situation is the consideration of ‘realities of a 
particular social situation at a particular period of time’. It is this element of 
pragmatism in Islam and its teachings that makes it applicable and adaptable to 
any social circumstances and situations and makes it surpasses time and space in 
terms of its relevance to any period of time and compatibility with any social 
circumstances. Therefore, in the light of above discussion, when defining who is 
designated to be a ‘Muslim’ in specific terms it is always appropriate to take note 
of a person’s social situation in which he or she lives.                
3.1.3 Muslim Minority 
‘Muslim minority’ is a term that was not known in political terminology, 
until the emergence of nation states in the early decades of the 20
th
 century. It was 
only after the First World War that the Muslim community was fragmented into 
several states finding it scattered in given geographical territories as nations of the 
modern world. As a result, it found itself as either majority communities coexist 
with non-Muslim minorities or minority communities coexist with non-Muslim 
majorities. 
According to M. Ali Kettani, the term ‘Muslim minority’ signifies a group 
of Muslims living in a political entity in a state of numerical inferiority in 
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comparison to the non-Muslims.
75
 The same author in a later writing defines a 
Muslim minority as “a part of a population differing in the fact that its members 
are Muslims and is often subjected to differential treatment”. Although there are 
discrepancies in these definitions, they do not convey, however, any contradiction 
in defining the term. The latter adds extra significance in terms of differential 
treatment meted out to the minority by the majority. As mentioned under the 
definition of a minority, the numerical aspect in the former should not be a 
decisive factor in determining a small group of people as minorities, merely 
because of their inferiority in numbers. There are cases in which they might be 
superior politically or socially. In such a case, the group cannot be considered a 
minority. As contented by M. Ali Kettani, it is necessary that those who share the 
‘different characteristic’ of being ‘Muslim’ should be aware of such difference 
and should have attained a degree of solidarity because of it. Otherwise, there can 
be no ‘Muslim minority.’76 
Taking the above discussions on ‘minority’ and ‘Muslim minority’ into 
account, we can define a Muslim minority as a group of Muslims who are 
numerically, politically and socially inferior in comparison to non-Muslims in a 
given social context, and are subjected to differential treatment, while having a 
degree of solidarity within themselves for the preservation of their Islamic identity 
as a religious minority.  
One of the general characteristics of Muslim minorities is that they are 
distinguished from the rest of the population by their adherence to Islam as 
religious minorities. Islam has its own way of life. It has a distinct value system. It 
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has its own social, political, economic, educational, legal and moral values and 
doctrines. Thus, unlike other minorities, a Muslim minority is unique in the sense 
that although it may not be a racial, political, cultural or linguistic minority in its 
country of residence, it remains rather essentially a religious minority. 
Secondly, a given Muslim minority is viewed as a part and parcel of the 
global Muslim community: Muslim ummah. Muslim minority does not view itself 
as a separate entity from the rest of the global Muslim community and vice-versa. 
This element of relationship between Muslim minority and Muslim ummah in 
general is based on faith rather than any other bonds or identifiers. The 
manifestation of this bond and relationship is evidently visible in performing 
major collective rituals such as fasting during Ramadan and making pilgrimage to 
Makkah when performing haj (annual pilgrimage to Makkah). It is this 
relationship between Muslims that many non-Muslims find difficult to 
understand. Particularly, this has become an issue in Britain in the recent history. 
Muslim minority in Britain has become under spot light of popular media because 
of this issue raising questions as to how Muslims can give their allegiance to 
another country and how Muslim minority in Britain can then be loyal to Britain. 
Indeed, this is an important issue, which will be dealt with in the fourth chapter of 
this study, and it will be discussed under the section of problem of being loyal to 
non-Muslim polity within and Muslim ummah without.   
Thirdly, of the total Muslim population in the world, one-third lives as 
minorities in countries where Muslims exist in social contexts that are different 
from the norms and values of Islam, where the majority has administrative, 
political and legislative control over them. Countries like India and China are 
considered to have the largest Muslim minorities, with India having over one 
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hundred and twenty million Muslims. Indeed, Islam has had its historic, scientific 
and cultural impact on the Indian subcontinent and its culture in general. 
3.2 Muslim Minorities of the World Today at a Glance 
Muslim minorities are found in almost all parts of the world today. They 
spread over 150 countries with differences in terms of their number, culture, 
ethnicity and language. Although accurate and reliable statistics on the number of 
Muslim minorities in the world are lacking, there is a general consensus that they 
constitute the one-third of the total number of Muslims in the world. Thus, they 
are fluctuating in between 100 Muslims in Haiti and more than 120 million in 
India.
77
 About 90 per cent of all Muslim minorities live in Asia and Africa.
78
 
There are 6 million Muslims in United States.
79
 In Europe, the number of 
Muslims is around 6 million in France, perhaps three million Muslims in the 
United Kingdom and 2.5 million in Germany.
80
 Altogether, there may be 17- 20 
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million Muslims in Europe.
81
 In Africa, the number of Muslim minorities is 
around more than 24 million.
82
  
History proves that numerous Muslim communities existed in various 
parts of the world through commerce and trade. Muslim merchants who settled 
down in foreign ports established their little communities through marriage to 
local women. Examples of such communities were those on the coasts of India, 
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), China, East Africa, the Indonesian and Philippines 
archipelago, and the Island of the Indian Ocean.
83
 In a few cases, majority Muslim 
communities have been reduced to minority Muslim community status through 
long scale expulsion and immigration of non-Muslims. Minorities of the former 
Soviet Union, Thailand and Ethiopia exemplify this type of Muslim minorities.
84
  
Some Muslim communities have been reduced, in some other cases, to 
minority status through losing their political power. This applies to India and 
Balkan.
85
 There is another type of Muslim minorities who came into being 
through immigration and conversion like the Muslims of Argentina, Australia, 
New Zealand, Western Europe and Northern America. “Some of the Muslim 
minorities counted as such by biased world statistics are quite the contrary, as true 
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figures state that Muslims are in majority in countries in question despite the fake 
statistics that internationally cite smaller numbers for Muslims, especially in 
certain regions, so as to serve the political purposes of certain groups. The most 
obvious example of that is the Muslims of Ethiopia: they are a majority, but an 
oppressed one, deprived of even the most basic human rights.”86 Another type of 
Muslim minority is Kashmir, which exemplifies a regionally concentrated type of 
minority. 
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Chapter 4: Muslims in Britain – Past and Present: Historical and 
Social background 
4.1 Introduction 
It is not possible to give an all-inclusive history of Muslims in Britain. The 
subject area is enormously vast and studies and research works on the subject 
keep coming and bring forth so far little known historical and social points of 
contact. This chapter, therefore, will focus on key historical stages of when 
Muslims arrived in Britain in different ages and historically important events that 
took place in relation to their interaction with the British society. It would, also, 
shed light mainly on historically important phases of their arrival in Britain in the 
recent past and their relationship with the society at large as a religious minority. 
In doing so, it strives to locate their demographical landscape at present and throw 
light on historically important events, and incidents, which shaped their presence 
in Britain at present as a sizable minority living in a non-Muslim society.  
The underlying objective is to help understand, firstly, the nature and the 
shape of the relationship Muslims had with the British society in the past, how it 
developed throughout the ages, and what direction it has been taking in the recent 
past. In particular, it will analyse how Muslims in Britain have been perceived by 
the society at large and vice-versa in the past and present and whether perceptions 
about each other might have been one of the causes of problems both parties are 
facing at present.  
Secondly, it aims to find out partly what sort of problems they have been 
facing in their interaction with the British society with reference to their overall 
religious needs as individuals, families, groups or communities since their 
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presence in Britain as settlers after the Second World War and partly, what sort of 
challenges they face in the contemporary British social context vis-à-vis their 
engagement with, and contribution to a non-Muslim society as a religious 
community.  
Lastly, it highlights what sort of measures Muslims have been taking to 
address issues and problems they have been facing as a religious minority in the 
British society in the post-Second World War Britain. This will help shed light if 
there is any Islamic legal (fiqh) precedence or source of reference in the past 
initiated by them with the help of Islamic jurists as a means to solve their religious 
issues so that contemporary Muslims may find similarities or guidance or even 
learn lessons when they come to deal with similar situations from the perspective 
of Islamic jurisprudence.      
From exploring the existing literature on Muslims in Britain, it can be 
noticed that the bibliography of research on the subject through various fields of 
studies is on the increase. The growing bibliography comprises a number of 
academic disciplines from sociology, economics, politics, geo-politics, culture, 
ethnicity, to religion. There is little doubt that these studies have contributed to 
enrich and enhance the ongoing research and chronology on the subject and are 
useful in documenting Muslims’ presence in Britain. Moreover, these 
contributions are important in providing valuable insights into under what 
circumstances they have arrived, what problems they faced, how they managed to 
survive when they arrived as individuals and how they formed themselves when 
they were joined by their families, how they established communities and 
institutions, and what challenges they are facing at present socially, politically, 
economically, culturally, and religiously.  
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Dispite the richness of these studies, they also have their limitations 
depending on the purpose of such studies undertaken. While some of them seek to 
provide detail information on Muslims in Britain, others attempt to offer brief and 
panoramic view of them in a given time. While an approximate approach for the 
former can be found in Humayn Ansari’s study on Muslims in Britain since 
1800,
87
 an example for the latter can be seen in Paul Weller’s religious 
directory.
88
 In some cases, the study is limited by the specificity of the subject 
area studied and the ethnicity of the people or groups observed.  
Ron Geaves’ monograph,89 for instance, constitutes an example for this 
type of study where the author mainly focuses on the national ‘sectarian’ 
influences present within Muslims in Britain, particularly within South Asian 
Muslims. Hence, the study is specific to Muslims from South Asian region and it 
does not include Muslims of Arab, African descent, Turkish or other ethnicities 
and their organisations and movements. Undoubtedly, the book is of enormous 
use with useful information. Moreover, it is an added contribution, which enriches 
the general understanding of Muslims in Britain. Nevertheless, the title of the 
book, Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain, is perhaps misleading as this 
research is more of a study of Muslims than Islam. Precisely, the author pays 
particular attention to a segment of British Muslims descending from a particular 
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region with special reference to their theological and ideological differences and 
their impact on the Muslim community within the society at large and out of 
society. The title appears to imply that Islam itself is a religion of sectarianism, a 
notion that has hardly any evidence when looking at the inherent nature of the 
fundamental teachings of Islam. It is true that Muslims who align with a certain 
sect or a group draw on the fundamental teachings of Islam, precisely the Qur’ān 
and the Prophetic traditions for their claims and argue that they are closer to Islam 
than others. Moreover, they present the same evidence which their counterpart 
presents for their side of argument in order to prove they are right. Yet what is 
evident in looking at both side of the arguments is mostly the manipulation of the 
text and implementing it inappropriately either through deliberately ignoring the 
other part of the text or taking it out of context or misunderstanding it unwittingly 
altogether.  
What is required, as a matter of fact, is a holistic approach not only to the 
text but also to the context in which teachings of Islam, although they are now 
documented as a set of guidelines and rules, were originally introduced by the 
Prophet through revelation from God over a period of 23 years, according to 
needs, requirements, and contexts in 8
th
 C Arabia. When a certain part of text is 
drawn, after the end of its revelation by God and its application by the Prophet, 
for the purpose of implementation in a certain context, it is always advisable in 
order to do justice to the text not only to look at the text but also to the context. It 
seems that Geaves did pay little attention to throw light on both the said inherent 
nature of Islamic teachings as well as the contributing factors which caused 
British Muslims from the South Asian origin to split themselves into different 
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sects and groupings. This missing point is what this study aspires to address in the 
following chapter.     
There are some other studies which treat Muslims in Britain in detail. The 
infidel within: Muslims in Britain since 1800
90
 by Humayun Ansari is a case in 
point. The author deals with Muslims’ arrival in Britain before and after the 
Second World War and their settlement in different parts of Britain from a 
historical and social point of view. As one of the main sources which deal with 
Muslims in Britain, it largely focuses on the experience of Muslims in Britain 
coming from diverse cultural, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds and their 
contribution to shaping modern British society over the past two centuries.  
According to the author, up to the end of the 19
th
 C it was the class factor 
that had been more at play in the British society than race in shaping the 
relationship between Muslims and the wider society. Yet, generally speaking, he 
makes no mistake in underlining the religious factor which runs through the fabric 
of Muslims’ interaction with the wider society, particularly with their arrival in 
Britain after the Second World War, but he is quick to spotlight the element of 
cultural formation which is often intrinsically interwoven with the attachment to 
Islam. In this respects he rightly points out some contentious issues which is 
relevant to the current study such as the generation gap, arranged marriage, 
patriarchal culture, art and music, and issues related to education. But, the book 
does not point out how these problems and issues can be addressed through 
religious guidance and what sort of jurisprudential mechanism British Muslims 
can undertake in dealing with these problems. Overall, the book is largely helpful 
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to identify most of the problems contemporary Muslim communities facing in 
Britain and the text, therefore, has been quite extensively used in this study.  
The other type of study which deals with Muslims in Britain is based on 
race and colour. In this respect Coloured Minorities in Britain: Studies in British 
Race Relations based on African, West Indian, and Asiatic Immigrants
91
 authored 
by Sydney Collins is worth mentioning. The author mainly focuses on different 
national, tribal, and linguistic minorities and groups who migrated to and settled 
in Britain in the years between the two world wars and immediately after the last 
from a racial point of view. The interwar period has seen an increasing racial 
tension between ‘coloured people’ and the white majority. These tensions and 
other socio-economic problems have grabbed the scholarly attention and been a 
source for the emergence of scholarly work like the one under scrutiny. As a 
comparative study, the author largely concentrates on how the race relationship 
has taken shape between these communities, particularly between Muslims 
(Indians, Pakistanis, and Somalis) and Negro communities in Tyneside and Welsh 
town on the one hand and Muslims and the wider society on the other.  
The author provides in the third chapter of the book an insight into how 
race relationship evolved and developed between Muslims and the wider society 
in Tyneside and Welsh town highlighting their internal structure and their 
relationship to the host society and the forces at play which reinforce or weaken 
these relationships during the time in question. The book contains undoubtedly 
useful information that adds to the general understanding of race relationship 
between emigrant communities, particularly Muslims and the indigenous white 
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society during the time in question. Moreover, it deals with socio-economic 
problems Muslims were facing during the time in question in terms of housing, 
family relationship, education, and religion.  
The author has also thrown light on crucial issues Muslim youth were 
undergoing when interacting with the wider society and the consequences 
resulted, by this interaction, in their personal life. This change in their life has 
made parents, author points out, extremely concerned about them being 
influenced by the British social life and its negative impact on their social habits 
and personal behaviour such as alcohol consumption and attending dance clubs
92
. 
Although, children are ‘trained to become Moslem in religion and culture’ at 
home as well as ‘Zoaia,’93 through parents’ influence at home and ritual practices 
in the Zoaia, so that they may withstand the influence of out side home, the 
effectiveness of this training has been more or less diminishing when they become 
teens and lasting as a result, according to the author, only to their adolescence.  
Exploring the contributing factors to the emergence of this social dilemma, 
the author maintains that “the Moslem child…is confronted with two types of 
social life and trained to adjust himself to both. What seems to happen is this: 
Until adolescence, the child’s life is strongly influenced by Moslem customs and 
values. Later he tends gradually to free himself from these controls and to 
orientate his life increasingly towards the ways and values of British society.”94  
Indicating this drift, the author observes that children above the age of fifteen 
show little interest in the religious rituals held in Zoaia. They are generally less 
enthusiastic than aged about eleven or twelve. “Of an average of about eighteen 
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worshippers at the daily salahs held in one of the Zoaias, there has seldom been 
more than one of the Anglo-Asiatics present at any time.”95  
Although remedies were taken by the community through various such 
measures as training children ‘to observe Moslem customs’ at home and evening 
Qur’ān teaching at Zoaia so that they may become strong in their religion and its 
practice, as observed by the author, the results were less effective, time bound, 
and short-lived in comparing the age limit of the younger generation as noted 
above. In other words, the macro environment outside home: school, society, and 
friends both at school and wider society seem to be stronger in influencing the 
teens than the micro environment which is their home. The impact outside world 
makes on their life style is far greater than the household environment and has, 
thus, caused them to endanger their religiosity as Muslims. Overall, what the 
author identifies as an impediment with the Muslim community in Tyneside and 
Welsh town is a tendency “for some Anglo-Asiatics after adolescence to weaken 
their social ties with the Moslem community in response to the strong pull of 
British social life.”96 It is this social setback that has been a constant fear and 
concern expressed by not only classical Muslim jurists but also contemporary 
Muslim scholars when reasoning their reluctance to permit Muslims to reside in 
non-Muslim societies. This has also increasingly become a pressing issue 
confronted by Muslims in the contemporary British society which is still at large 
and this study aspires to address in the following chapters. 
Collins, while repeatedly emphasising the same observation again and 
again throughout this study as a rational for the decline of religious interest among 
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some section of the community, also highlights another reason for this social 
failure; the absence of social institutions for Muslim communities in Britain. 
Quoting a Yemeni Arab who mentioned how legal action in his country would 
serve as a deterrent to those who lax in their religious duties, Collins observes that 
“the absence of legal sanctions and positive measures against recalcitrants is 
considered as encouraging laxity”. What this statement implicitly means is that 
Muslims, either as individuals or a community, may not be able to become 
committed to their religion unless they are provided with not just religious 
teachings per se at home at a micro level but also facilitated with a proper social, 
educational, and religious environment in the form of institutions at macro level 
including ‘legal sanctions and positive measures against recalcitrants’, as 
observed by Collins.  
The quotation and the observation made by Collins may sound accurate 
compared to the true nature of Islam, its social order, and the function of Muslim 
communities confining itself only to the boundaries and parameters laid down by 
Islam. Therefore, to fully appreciate Islam and its teachings in real life as 
prescribed by the fundamental sources of Islam: Qur’ān and Sunnah of the 
Prophet and as understood by Muslims for the last fourteen hundred years, it may 
sound appropriate to have Islam implemented in its total form, governing not only 
individuals or personal lives of Muslims as minimum as expected by secularism 
but also society and its institutions including its legal system as laid bare by 
Islamic fundamental sources. Yet, the crucial issue is how far this totality as a 
complete social system or a way of life can be actualised within another social 
system which is far greatly different not only at an individual level but also 
societal as well as institutional level? In other words how far Islam as a complete 
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way of life can be accommodated let alone implemented in a secular liberal social 
system like Britain? Is there any room within Britain for Islam to be practiced in 
its totality as explained above? Or can Muslims simply choose to put Islam in 
practice as much as they can at an individual level that is to implement it at a 
personal level, while accepting to subscribe to social, political, economic, 
educational, and legal institutions of British social system at a social level? If it is 
so, what system or mechanism can possibly fill the gap which would supposedly 
be left by ‘the absence of legal sanctions and positive measures against 
recalcitrants’ as found out by Collins as reasons for crisis in Muslim life in 
Britain? Does British legal system allow and permit for such ‘legal sanctions and 
positive measures’ to be implemented against such ‘recalcitrants’? If not, are there 
any alternative measures Muslims in Britain can possibly bring forth to tackle 
with the issue in question? These and similar questions are considered to be 
serious issues faced by Muslims in Britain not only in the past but also at present 
in the contemporary social context in which they have seen their third generation 
teens undergoing similar crisis when they are confronted with the real life 
experience out side their home. The need to look at this issue from Islamic 
juridical point of view is what misses in Collins’ work and this lacking is what 
can be noticed in most studies on Muslims in Britain including the following one. 
This missing point is what this study attempts to deal with in the following 
chapters.  
Negroes in Britain: A Study of Racial Relations in English Society 
authored by Kenneth Little
97
 is another source used in this chapter and this work 
                                                 
97
 Little, Kenneth, Negroes in Britain: A Study of Racial Relations in English Society, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 2
nd
 ed., London, 1972 
 81 
examines issues emanated from social interactions and reactions resulted in the 
presence of coloured people in Britain with special reference to coloured 
community in the dockland of Cardiff in 1940s. As a case study Little analyses 
‘social and psychological consequences of socio-geographical urban isolation’ of 
minority communities including Muslims in Cardiff. Significantly, the relevance 
of both works by Collins and Little to the current study can be measured by their 
treatment of some issues related to relationship between Muslims and the 
indigenous society in terms of integration and assimilation: an issue which is still 
being debated in the circles of contemporary British academia in relation to 
Muslim and non-Muslim relationship within the scope of pluralism and 
multiculturalism. The contemporary debate among scholars which revolves 
around this issue is one of the focal points that will be addressed in the following 
chapters.    
The Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British 
Muslims: Bradford in the 1990s
98
 is another material used in the current study. 
Authored by Philip Lewis the text deals with Muslim communities in Bradford 
from a religious studies perspective. As a case study, it largely focuses on the 
element of relationship of religion and ethnicity which largely tends to underlie 
the engagement of these communities with the British society. It serves as a 
microcosm of Muslim minority communities in Britain who settled in Britain after 
the Second World War and found no option but to abandon ‘the myth of return’ 
and eventually had to struggle through to develop a British Muslim identity. As an 
empirical study, it seeks to highlight the dynamics of Muslim community 
                                                 
98
 Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims: Bradford 
in the 1990s, London, 1994. 
 82 
formation in Britain, particularly in Bradford as a sample where, according to the 
author, a microcosm of Muslim community’s engagement with the wider society 
in its various levels may largely be spotlighted. More importantly, the author’s 
treatment of the subject of the ‘nature of the intellectual and cultural formation of 
the religious leadership which took place largely in South Asia and their (religious 
leadership) ability to connect with the different linguistic, cultural, educational 
experience of British born and educated in Britain’99 is largely a relevant issue to 
the current study.  The issue becomes significant as the study attempts to identify 
the causes of problems faced by contemporary Muslim minorities in Britain vis-à-
vis Muslim religious leadership and their capacity to guide Muslims to become 
true representative of their religion while serving the society they live in as 
exemplary citizens. Moreover, it also seeks relevance to the study under scrutiny 
as the author spares no attempts to highlight the tension which exists between 
younger and older generation of Muslim minorities in terms of adherence to 
religion and respecting their inherited culture.  
The other book used in this study is Nielson’s Muslims in Western 
Europe.
100
 The author provides an overall introduction to Muslim communities 
living in contemporary Europe. In dealing with Muslims in Britain, Nielsen sheds 
light briefly on their early history in Britain while giving a fare account of their 
social, political, cultural, and religious position. He makes an attempt to explain 
how Muslim communities in Britain emerged as settlers, what caused them to 
migrate, what makes their present-day ethnic composition, where their 
demographic distribution concentrates, and what shape their organisational 
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patterns takes place. Importantly, the book deals with political, legal, and cultural 
contexts in which they live in and also issues related to role of the family, 
worship, education, and religious thought. The author’s insight into legal issues 
pertaining to Muslim minorities living in a non-Muslim society is what makes this 
work particularly relevant to issues discussed in the study under scrutiny.  
Islam in Britain authored by Nabil Matar
101
 is another text used in this 
chapter that deals with Muslim and non-Muslim interaction during 16 and 17 
centuries. The significance of this text lies in its treatment of Muslim-non-Muslim 
relationship, their perceptions of each other, particularly in terms of religion, 
culture, and civilization which are still forcefully at play in perceiving each other 
in the contemporary Western world. In that sense, the text distinguishes from the 
works of Ansari, Little, and Collins who are more concerned about race and class 
factors than religion, although it is unfair to say that the religious factor has been 
totally ignored by them in their works mentioned above.  
The other distinctive feature of Matar’s book can be gauged by its effort to 
throw light, from a religious, cultural, political, and social perspective, on root 
causes of image construction actively engaged by each other both negatively as 
well as positively. Yet, the book is quite distinctive in its attempt to highlight 
Muslim-non-Muslim interaction in a positive way.  
Matar believes that the relationship between Muslims and Christians 
during the time in question was not always, as assumed quite often, problematic 
and oppositional, rather there were, as portrayed by Matar, positive, cultural, 
intellectual, and religious interactions between each other. Yet, scrutinising the 
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text one can easily identify the root causes of modern-day problems encountered 
by both Muslim minorities and Western Europeans in general and the Muslim 
minority and the British society in particular in their interaction with each other. 
This is an aspect which makes this work more relevant to the current study as it 
attempts to address the problems contemporary Muslim minorities facing in 
Britain. Particularly, at the roots of such crisis as racism, Islamophobia, caricature 
of the Prophet, and Pope Benedict’s the XIV remarks on Islam and the Prophet, 
for instance, lie the problems of image construction of the ‘other’, prejudices, and 
stereotypes projected polemically during the time in question examined by Matar.  
More importantly, a close scrutiny of this book, particularly chapter 5,
102
 
will provide a reader with the root causes, which are mostly overlooked by many 
writers, of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. Scrutinising British 
eschatological writings
103
 during the time in question, as articulated by Matar in 
detail in this chapter,
104
 one can simply discern a craving wish English and 
Scottish eschatologists had polemically presented envisaging conversion of Jews 
into Christianity. In doing so, they hoped, the divine promise, which is the 
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creation of Protestant English kingdom of Christ, can be fulfilled by Jews by 
restoring Christianity in Palestine by expelling Muslims. Consequently, the 
coming of Jesus to the Promised Land: Palestine would be expedited as they 
wished.    
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the crisis in Palestine started 
with the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine in 1948 might have its roots in 
anti-Islamic polemics articulated by both English and Scottish theologians and 
preachers during the Reformation. There have been numerous such eschatologists 
in C 20
th
 Britain giving an ideological explanation why they should support to 
“take possession”105 of Holy Land by the Jews, as contended by Matar.  
Moreover, gauged by the intense debate around the biblical eschatology 
which has been on its peak during early   20
th
 C Britain, as extensively referred by 
Matar in this book, it can be assumed that the impact of such theological polemics 
on the British society cannot be underestimated. The socio-political implications 
of such a religious phenomenon, as a result, might have influenced on the then 
British government, which had its involvement in the creation of Israel in 
Palestine. Britain, therefore, being a part of the conflict since its beginning, has 
been pushed, willingly or unwillingly, to take it on board when forming its foreign 
policy towards Palestine issue. Whether Britain has worked to resolve it or not, 
every time there is a problem between Israelies and Palestinians, it has resonated 
in Britain and tended to cause tension between Muslims and the society at large. 
Evidently, the tense situation prevailing between Muslims and the wider society in 
Britain since recent past as a result of Israel’s military action in Lebanon in 2006 
and in Palestine in 2008 and 2009 has been an example of this social reality. This 
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social condition would also explain why the notion of British foreign policy has 
attracted a wide debate since the recent past in the national and international 
political and intellectual discourse as being one of the causes of Muslim 
extremism and radicalisation of Muslim youth in Britain.   
Therefore, it can be assumed that some of the root causes for the 
emergence of the conflict between Israel and Palestine since its beginning has 
been deeply rooted in the psyche of the British society. Hence, the origin of the 
conflict, it appears, has been largely religious than political although it is not 
adequately acknowledged enough by analysts of the conflict and thus the religious 
dimension has been almost overtaken by the political one. The political side of the 
problem is, therefore, only a tip of the iceberg. Secondly, there seems to be no 
proper solution for this ongoing conflict in Palestine without addressing its 
historical root causes highlighted above, thereby easing the tense situation which 
tends to shape the Muslim, non-Muslim relationships in the cotemporary British 
society.   
Hence, against this background the book becomes relevant to the current 
study as it helps identifying the root causes of ongoing political conflicts, which 
tend to shape the contemporary Muslim and non-Muslim relationship in Britain. It 
is needles to say that such problems as highlighted above cannot be thoroughly 
dealt with without accurately addressing the deep-seated root causes of the current 
situation. 
In addition to the sources mentioned above, this chapter will also use some 
other books, articles, and websites that are relevant to the titles and subject 
matters under scrutiny.         
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4.1.1 Muslims in Britain since 8
th
 to 17
th 
C as Visitors and 
Sojourns        
For well over a century, a substantial number of Muslims have been living 
in Britain. Their presence in Britain as groups and communities is traced back to 
the 19th
 
C. There seems to be no dispute between scholars who deal with the 
presence of Muslims in Britain from the historical perspective that their existence 
as settler communities dates back to mid 19
th
 C. Ansari maintains that it was the 
time “when the first relatively permanent Muslim populations were established in 
Manchester, Cardiff, Liverpool, South Shields and East End of London.”106 This 
opinion has almost been shared by Lewis
107
 and Collins.
108
 Although this was the 
first phase of settlers in Britain, which would be discussed in the following 
section, Muslims’ interaction with Britain and British isles goes as far back as to 
early centuries of Islam’s emergence in the Arabian Peninsula in the 8th C.  
Ansari contends that their presence was to be seen in France in 732 
followed by establishing “their hegemony over Spain and Sicily.”109 Bernard 
Lewis is of the opinion that “Muslim armies occupied Sicily, parts of southern 
Italy, and seemed to menace even Rome itself.”110 Philip Lewis also maintains 
that the early contact of Muslims with Britain goes back to 8
th 
C. He notes that the 
eighth-century Anglo-Saxon monk, Bede, in Jarrow in North of England had 
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mentioned about Muslims in his book Ecclesiastical History of the English with 
following remarks: “swarm of Saracens ravaged Gaul with horrible slaughter.”111 
There has been mutual relationship between rulers of the Muslim world and kings 
of Europe during medieval time. It has been recorded that Charlemagne (d. 
814)
112
 and King Offa (d.796)
113
 were in close connection with Muslim rulers of 
their time, particularly Abbasids, which culminated in having mutual relationship 
with each other.
114
 The relationship King Offa had with Abbasids had been as 
close as Charlemagne’s connection with them. It can be pointed out that, as a 
proof of this mutual connection between the two sides, the ever first gold coin 
minted in Britain by King Offa has the inscription of the declaration of Islamic 
faith in Arabic.
115
 According to Al- Hassani, the coin is now in the collection at 
the British Museum.
116
 A coin of this nature, it can be argued, cannot come to 
existence unless there had been a considerable degree of interaction between Offa 
and the Muslim rulers of the time in terms of trade and diplomacy.  
            Having scrutinised the nature and the feature of the coin, some scholars 
even argue that it is not only an indication of trade and diplomacy, but also an 
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acceptance of Islam by the King.
117
 Al-Hassani, although does not rule out the 
possibility of the King’s conversion to Islam, is of the opinion that “the more 
likely story is that it was produced for trade or for pilgrims to use as they travelled 
through Arab lands.”118  
               It is an irony though that historians dealing with the history of Muslims’ 
interaction with Europe and vice versa are astonishingly silent about the presence 
of King Offa in the history of Muslim-British interaction. There is no mentioning 
whatsoever about his relationship with Muslims in general and his peaceful 
encounter with Muslim rulers. Montgomery Watt and Bernard Lewis, for 
instance, unfailingly present a historical account of Charlemagne’s historical 
connection with Harun al-Rashid
119
 have little mentioning of King Offa who had 
also had relationship with Abbasid rulers almost in the same period as 
Charlemagne did with them as highlighted before. Whether this lack of 
information form the part of both historians is due to lack of enough evidence or 
for any other reason is not quite clear. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
there might have been some sort of peaceful interactions between the Kings of 
Europe and Abbasid rulers of the time as indicated by evidence shown above.     
The Ballycottin cross-found on the southern cost of Ireland dating back to 
the 9
th
 c is another evidence to indicate Islam’s early interaction with Britain. The 
significance of this indication largely lies on the Arabic inscription the cross has 
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on its centre which set in a glass bead in kufic Arabic script, which reads the 
Arabic phrase ‘Bismillah’ (In the name of Allah).120 
The field of scholarship had been another mode of interaction between 
Muslims and Britain as early as 8
th
 and 9
th
 C. As a geographer, Muhammad Ibn 
Musa al-Khwarizmi (780-850), for example, who was also an astronomer and a 
mathematician has founded algebra
121
 and algorism,
122
 as contended by al-Hassani 
and B. Lewis respectively. Al-Hassani maintained that he has depicted a detailed 
description of the British Isles in his book: Kitābu Sūrat al-Ard (Book of the 
depiction of Earth)
123
 and thus it can be believed, he suggests, that it has been the 
first of its kind, which includes a map of the world.
124
 Although al-Hassani’s 
opinion of authorship of the book by al-Khwarizmi has been shared by Watt and 
B. Lewis, the originality of the book, nevertheless, has been disputed by both of 
them and both of them are of the opinion that the book was “based on the 
Geography of Ptolemy,”125 Yet, B. Lewis did not fail to credit both the book and 
the author. He maintains thus that Al-khwarizmi not being content with mere 
translation of Ptolemy’s work had “incorporated number of corrections and 
additions deriving from the geographical information available to the Persian and 
Arabs.”126 He further maintains that Al-khwarizmi has given a “brief account of 
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western Europe,”127 an opinion shared by Al-Hassani acknowledging al-
Khwarizmi’s knowledge about British Isles as mentioned above.        
The other notable pattern of interaction, which took place between the two 
sides, was travels undertaken by knowledge seekers from one country to another 
and learning from one another. Particularly, British men were travelling to 
Muslim countries, learning Arabic, and translating what they learnt into Latin. 
Among the prominent persons, as contended by Watt, who travelled extensively 
to and stayed long in the Muslim lands, particularly in Spain with the purpose of 
learning was Adelard of Bath (1080 -1160).
128
 Staying well over seven years with 
Arabs, he has been able to author a book Quaestiones Naturales that consists of 
seventy-six chapters. The book is in the format of dialogue in which he discusses 
quite extensively different scientific questions.
129
 Watt although uncertain about 
Adelard’s scholarship in Islamic Spain, has acknowledged the fact that he was 
well aware of “Arab Scientific scholarship”130 and also authored the book 
mentioned above
131
 by which he was able to help spreading “knowledge of Arab 
science.”132 It is surprising that B. Lewis does not mention Adelard in his 
masterpiece of The Muslim discovery of Europe which is referred in this study.   
Popularly known as the First English Scientist, Adelard also translated Al-
Khwarizmi’s work on mathematics and astronomical tables, as contended by 
Watt.
133
 As a matter of fact, it was through these translation works that the 
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numerical value of ‘zero’ and the Hindi-Arabic numerals were introduced into 
Britain.
134
 It has been largely acknowledged by historians in the West that “if not 
for the work of Al-Khawarizmi and its translation made by Adelard, it is likely 
that Britain would have been using Latin numerals for much longer period.”135   
The other important personality, like Adelard, who travelled through 
Muslim lands: South of Spain, Cordoba, Toledo, and Seville in seeking 
knowledge was Daniel of Morley.
136
 Having equipped with number of sciences in 
many a fields of knowledge, Al-Hassani contends, Daniel was masterly able to 
lecture in Mathematics and Astronomy at Oxford by 1180.
137
 Similarly, Norman 
Daniel is of the opinion that Michael Scot’s translation of Ibn Rushd’s (Averroes) 
work on Aristotle is largely considered to be one of the remarkable contributions 
that paved the way for the 'Renaissance' in the West.
138
 Watt contends that “it was 
through the earlier translations that Arab science and philosophy made its great 
impact on the intellectual life of Western Europe.”139 Jack Goody sharing Watt’s 
opinion contends that “rebirth of learning in Western Europe began long before 
the Renaissance and that owed a great deal to Islam and its translations.”140 He 
further notes that “there was an influx of Aristotle’s writings in natural philosophy 
and science from about 1200, the principle part of which came from Arabic 
versions and from the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroȅs.”141  It is not 
unreasonable to argue that if not for such translations as of Daniel of Morley, it is 
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more likely that the modern world would have been deprived of seeing the fruits 
of knowledge about Aristotle whose thought was not only transmitted to 
Europeans by Arabs, as contended by Watt, but also kept alive and extended its 
range.
142
 Watt maintains that “when about 1100 Europeans became seriously 
interested in the science and philosophy of their Saracen enemies, these 
disciplines were at their zeniths; and the Europeans had to learn all they could 
from the Arabs before they themselves could make further advances.”143  
It becomes clear from the section discussed above that a great deal of 
Muslim scholarship in various fields had played a significant role in building 
bridges between Muslim world and the West, especially in the fields of science 
and philosophy. According to Salim al-Hassani,
144
 the West, especially Europe 
had benefited form the Muslim civilization quite enormously and indebted to it a 
great deal for being a vehicle by which the fountains of knowledge on science and 
technology were passed on to the West during medieval time. As contended by 
many historians, he further observes, it is a well-known fact that there was a 
dynamic intellectual give and take process, which helped illuminating the Muslim 
world as well as the West in all fields of knowledge from agriculture, to 
geography, music, science, mathematics, astronomy and social science.
145
  
Against this historical backdrop, a question arises as to why the two 
worlds, after having benefitted from each other through mutual knowledge 
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seeking as well as sharing experience could hardly move on building better 
relationship between each other. Consequently, both sides were entangled in bitter 
enmities and hatred towards each other as reflected in battles, wars, and polemical 
writings directed against each other? What did in fact prevent them from 
benefitting each other socio-politically, as they did in the fields of science and 
philosophy? Why have both sides become antithetical to each other perceiving 
one as enemy of the other while there have been a number of commonalities 
between each other which can bring them together? 
  First and foremost, the influence of Muslim Spain, for instance, on 
medieval Europe as noted above may be considered as a consolidating meeting 
point for the two worlds to appreciate each other’s common endeavour and 
contribution towards building bridges between each other.  
Secondly, the Islam that the Prophet Muhammad introduced in Makkah 
and what Muslims are following all over the world is a religion emanating from 
Abraham
146
 as Judaism and Christianity. Hence, Islam is not less a Western 
religion than the latter two if both were to be considered as Western.   
Lastly, the common rich legacy shared by each other in terms of science 
and philosophy as seen before has been more than just a knowledge sharing 
experience which bonds both together socially and politically while being 
inherited a common legacy religiously.  
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Then, did the failure to move on building better relationship socially and 
politically happen because of the confrontational meeting points that occurred 
between Muslims and Medieval Europe? Was it happened when the former 
emerged as a political power and echoed in various such forms as battles and wars 
known as Crusades and counter campaigns, as contended by Watt
147
 and Ansari
148
 
who argue that Islam was seen as a threat by the Christian world during medieval 
time? Instead, did it come about because of exclusivist worldviews and 
approaches taken on board by both parties when perceiving one another as viewed 
by Jacques Waardenburg, Goody, and Matar? Alternatively, did it occur because 
of barriers put in place by negative socio-political consequences which resulted in 
the Colonial domination of Western powers over the Muslim world in the recent 
past which made the two worlds look at each other with enmity and suspicion as 
suggested by Watt and Waardenburg?       
In fact, it is not one factor or the other that may have brought about this 
disruption in their relationship. Rather it appears, from going through the works 
done by authors mentioned above which will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs and with some detail in the following chapter, that a combination of all 
factors with varying degrees has contributed one way or another to the emergence 
of this setback. It is not unfair to suggest, therefore, that the rift that came about in 
the relationship of both sides, which is widening since recent past, causing socio-
political problems threatening the co-existence of Muslims and the wider society 
in Britain could be traced back to bias and prejudices perpetuated by, and towards 
each other resulted in centuries long negative images and stereotypes deep-seated 
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in the psyche of large number of people of both sides. Therefore, the unhealthy 
relationship which is perpetually lasting among Muslims and the wider society 
which reflects in the form of social unrest, riots, and attacks has thus become one 
of the main problems Muslims and non-Muslims facing today in the British 
society which this study endeavours to address in the following chapters.  
Hence, it can be suggested that the confrontational meeting points that 
occurred in the history of Muslim-European relationships including Britain 
triggered by exclusivist worldviews may have contributed to the emergence of 
such an unhealthy socio-political trend. Therefore, had it not been for the 
polemics and misperceptions entertained by both parties against each other, the 
healthy interactions manifested between each other as highlighted above could 
have been extended to other such areas as social and political. This might have 
been instrumental to keep the mutual relationship between the two worlds: 
Muslim and the Western uninterrupted till today. The Crusades have thus been 
identified by some scholars as one of the historical outcomes for the perpetual 
misperception of Christendom about Islam and Muslims.      
Watt contends that Muslims presence in Spain and Sicily in the early 8
th 
C 
was conceived by Europeans as a threat to Latin Christendom. “The crusading 
movement of the later eleventh century may be regarded as a vigorous response to 
Islam” as “Rome itself was threatened” and the picture of Islam was depicted as a 
result in the minds of people in Europe “as the great enemy.”149 Sharing Watt’s 
opinion on the notion of perceiving Muslims as the enemy by European in the 
medieval period, Ansari notes that, by establishing their supremacy over Spain, 
Sicily, and southern Italy, Muslims were able to make their presence in Europe 
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reckonable in terms of military power and perceived “as a major threat to 
Christendom”. Considering the imminent threat from Muslims, the Christian 
Europe launched a counter military campaign known as Crusades to stop Muslims 
from expanding their hegemony all over Europe. It was against this background 
that the Crusades of the early middle Ages were launched in order to respond to 
“a military and ideological enemy, with the military contingent led by Richard I of 
England (the Lionheart) representing his country’s robust contribution to the 
campaign.”150     
What it appears form the historical accounts mentioned above is that, 
firstly, Muslims were present in some parts of Europe as it is today, yet their 
presence was not either as migrants or settlers, but rather they were as occupiers 
and conquerors, particularly with having ruled Spain for nearly eight centuries 
since 8
th
 C to the end of 15
th
 .
151
  
Secondly, these historical accounts also would prove that the Muslims’ 
presence in Europe, particularly in Britain has begun not just after the Britain’s 
colonial history, but it goes as far back as 8
th
 C as noted above. It is undeniable 
that the largest presence of Muslims in Britain as in other parts of Europe was 
highly visible in the aftermath of the break-up of most colonial powers. From then 
on, Muslims from across the British Empire and later the British Commonwealth 
started arriving in Britain and this has thus given rise to the emergence of modern 
landscape of British Muslim history.  
Lastly, it seems that the misperception people in Europe had of Muslims 
and vice versa as the ‘other’ - besides all achievements and advantages benefitted 
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by each other through interactions in terms of knowledge, discoveries, and 
findings - which is still at play in the form racism, Islamophobia, stereotypes, and 
prejudices as noted before might have been caused to exist because of early 
confrontational meeting points that have taken place in the form of wars against 
each other.                
The other important meeting point Europe and the Muslim world had 
encountered with each other was the emergence of “Turks” as a rival power in 
Europe. The defeat of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 as well as besiege of Vienna 
in 1529 by Ottomans had made Europe, particularly Britain reckon the Muslim 
power in the region to the extent that Elizabeth I offered, acknowledging 
Muslim’s dominance and strength, to enter into an alliance with Murad III (1546-
95) to overthrow the then King of Spain as she viewed Muslims as 'fellow 
monotheists' and the Spanish King as 'idolatrous'.
152
 It was through this mutual 
political alliance that both the British and the Ottomans co-operated with each 
other “as trading partners and…military allies.”153   
As partners in trade and military, the travel and commercial activities 
between each other were on the increase than ever before. The venues of 
partnership had developed and transformed, as a result, into a new phase of 
mutual relationship. As such, Ottoman Muslims found their way into Britain as 
merchants. Ahmet Efendi, for instance, was believed to be the first Turk to arrive 
in England as a merchant.
154
  Subsequently, “in 1627 nearly forty ‘Turks’ were 
said to be living in England as tailors, shoemakers and menders and button 
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makers, and one even as a notary.”155 Moreover, the high profile diplomatic ties 
between the two were enhanced. Thus, “Ottomans ambassadors were appointed in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the diplomatic exchange between the 
court of James I and the Sublime Porte came to be conducted by a ‘Ledger 
Ambassador.”156  
Looking at the interaction pattern Muslims had with Britain for nearly a 
millennium since 8
th
 C to 17
th
 C as discussed above, it can be noticed that the 
interaction between Muslims and Britain had evolved through two different types 
of relationship. Broadly speaking one is external and the other one is internal, 
particularly since 15
th
 C with the dominance of Ottomans in the region. Hence, 
from 8
th
 C to 17
th 
C the relationship between Muslims and Briton had evolved 
more or less through individual as well as collective interactions. It had been 
largely sporadic and was based on to a large extent pull and push factors triggered 
by social, economic, and political considerations weighed strategically by both 
sides as seen before. The lack of uniformity in the pattern of Muslims’ interaction 
with the British society has been, therefore, one of the characteristics which single 
out this long period from the succeeding centuries:   18
th
 C and beyond. Thus, the 
18
th
 C
 
Britain and the period leading up to Second World War, which will be 
discussed in the following section, had witnessed a systematic migration pattern 
of Muslims into Briton as groups and settlers with specific motives.  
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4.1.2 Muslims in Britain since 18
th
 C to Second World War as 
Migrants and Settlers       
This section of the chapter seeks to explore in brief what sort of interaction 
Muslims had with the indigenous British population as well as the socio-political 
institutions of Britain since 18
th
 C to Second World War during which Muslims 
arrived in the British Isles as lascars, traders, and settlers in particular after they 
had arrived as visitors and sojourners. The significance of this phase as they 
arrived in Britain is largely reflected in how both Muslims and the British society 
had interacted with each other, particularly how Muslims were viewed and treated 
by the wider society as a minority in general and a religious community in 
particular although Ansari, Little, and Collins are appeared to be more 
comfortable to see the relationship between the two sides from class and racial 
perspective rather than a religious perspective. Yet, by looking at the anecdotal 
evidences presented by the same authors mentioned above and examining the way 
Muslim migrants and settlers were treated by the society at large during the time 
in question one cannot simply ignore the possibility of them being viewed and 
treated as a religious ‘other,’ too and the relationship between the two thus was to 
a large extent shaped by this tense social reality as well.  
The notion of religious factor which presumably interplayed between 
Muslims and the British society when they interacted with each other during this 
time can not be downplayed. There exists enough evidence to suggest, as 
contended by Ansari, Goody, Matar, and Waardenburg, that the British society 
had already perceived Muslims as religious ‘other’ even before they arrived in 
Britain as settlers because of prejudices and negative images British people 
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seemed to have had about Muslims as a result of long fought religious battles 
during medieval time known as Crusades. Similarly, it cannot be denied that 
Muslims, although their motives of migration to Britain was largely economic as 
maintained by Ansari, Lewis, and Nielson, were also appeared to be largely 
religious and their relationship with the British society was to a great scale  
shaped by this outlook. The anecdotal evidence shows how resolute they were in 
the face of hostilities they faced in the host society and what efforts they have 
taken to remain so continuously throughout their presence in Britain since 18
th
 C 
to Second World War and how they still continue to do so to date. On the other 
hand, it is equally evident that Muslims also have their fare share of pessimistic 
thinking towards non-Muslims as ‘other’ as Jacques Waardenburg,157 Habit 
Abdullah,
158
 and E.M. Sartain
159
 explore in their works extensively. Yet, the 
question arises, within the scope of this study, as to how far Muslims have 
succeeded as a religious minority in their efforts to withstand the challenges posed 
towards their religiosity by the host society and to what extent they have managed 
to become part and parcel of the wider society through contributing to it while 
safeguarding their identity; this is an issue which will be discussed in the course 
of this chapter.  
Hence, it examines how Muslims had reacted and responded to the socio-
economic and religio-cultural realities of their new environment and what sort of 
mechanisms and strategies they initiated in an attempt to withstand challenges 
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they faced in a little known social context alien to their social and cultural ethos 
and norms. It further attempts to highlight if there were any initiatives taken up by 
Muslims, given their varied expressions of diverse schools of thoughts in matters 
of religion, culture, and customs, to negotiate survival in the face of challenges. In 
doing so, the third and fourth chapters of Ansari’s book: The infidel within: 
Muslims in Britain since 1800 have been used quite substantially in this section.  
Ansari mainly focuses on what sort of social relationship eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Muslims had with people of Britain and more often how they 
were perceived by the indigenous population in terms of colour, class, and race. 
He maintains that, up to the end of 19
th 
C the class factor was more crucial in 
defining relationship between Muslims and the indigenous population than race or 
any other popular social yardsticks. He further argues that Muslims who came to 
Britain during this time, particularly in 18
th
 C, no matter what social backgrounds 
they came from and social strata they ranked within,  they were not without 
restrains in their dealings with the host society and had to function within the 
parameters of the social and political realities of that time, more precisely their 
engagements with the society had to be within the framework of British Empire 
and its supremacy over the Muslim world and its subordination to British 
interests. This has been resulted in producing unequal relationship between 
colonial masters and subject people
160
 and thus developing a social gap in the 
wider society at large. It was against this backdrop that “Muslims from different 
social backgrounds, with varying levels of skills and knowledge of British society, 
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strove to achieve different kinds of engagement with the society in order to retain 
some measure of control over their lives.”161   
Against this social background, how successful they were in handling key 
spheres of their lives in terms of norms, culture, customs, and attitude, largely 
depended on how they planned their stay in that social milieu. For most of them it 
was not their intention to settle in Britain permanently for two main reasons. 
Primarily, they were not sure what the future holds in store for them in an 
unfamiliar country, particularly in terms of culture and religion. Secondly, they 
were not free to make their own choice in terms of their stay and settlement as 
they left their kith and kin back home and the options were, therefore, limited for 
them to settle permanently. 
Hence, given the background mentioned above, the duration of their stay 
in Britain had its lasting effect on shaping the nature of their relations with the 
wider society. As contended by Ansari, there is little wonder, therefore, that “the 
more transient their situation, the less committed and participatory they seemed to 
be.”162  
Hence, it was this stage – 18th C to Second World War – for the first time in the 
British history that Muslim settler communities either as transient or permanent 
“from a range of social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds made an impact on 
British society and the ways in which they did so were influenced to varying 
degrees by their religious identity.”163  
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These Muslim settlers had primarily started to emerge in Britain’s port 
cities as sailors, and then were “joined by merchants, itinerant entertainers, 
servants, princes, students and a sprinkling of people from the professional 
classes.”164 Mostly, they arrived from “different parts of the British Empire with 
predominantly Muslim populations – Yemen, Somaliland, Malaya and India”165 
with distinct cultures, languages, and political traditions. 
Among countries which came into contact with Britain during eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the Indian subcontinent was the foremost whose 
relationship and interaction with Britain was multifaceted and whose considerable 
number of population tends to shape the majority proportion of the modern-day 
British Muslim minority landscape. But it is not to say, nevertheless, that the 
modern-day Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi Muslim communities are the 
direct extension of their ancestral settlers in 18
th
 and 19
th
 C, a notion which has 
hardly any evidence to suggest to that effect, rather they are to a large extent the 
third generation of the subcontinent Muslim migrant communities to Britain after 
the Second World War, a subject which will be dealt with in the later part of this 
chapter.  
However, by the end of eighteenth century, the travellers and visitors from 
the subcontinent started to arrive in British Isles seeking employment as well as 
experiencing a new culture. Encouraged by the East India Company and attracted 
by future opportunities in the new land, a number of Indians who arrived in 
Britain at this time had decided to settle in it. Among the prominent ones who 
embarked upon such an adventure was ‘Sake Dean Mohomed who came with 
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Captain Baker of the East India Regiment in 1784 and was among the first to 
settle’.166 This phase of the arrival into Britain though remained limited and 
confined to a number of persons, nevertheless, was noteworthy as it brought in 
sort of people who were ‘members of India’s professionals and wealthy elites’ 
such as Mirza Abu Talib, Lutfullah, Mirza Ihtisamuddeen, and Sayyid Ahmed 
Khan.
167
   
Apart from these elites, Britain saw an influx of Indian students who 
embarked upon to study law at reputable English and Scottish universities so that 
they can retain, on returning home, the social status they used to enjoy before 
being subjects of British Empire.
168
 Among the prominent ones who ventured into 
seeking western education, according to Ansari, were Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
who became the leader of the Muslim League and founding father of Pakistan and 
Muhammad Iqbal who was revered as the interpreter of Muslim nationhood in 
India. While the latter arrived in England in 1905 for his studies at Cambridge and 
returned home in 1908 after being qualified as a barrister, the former came as a 
student in 1892 and in 1930 he did come again and practiced law in England until 
1934.
169
 Apart from the sort of people mentioned above, there were “several 
wealthy merchants, learned Moulvies, the expositors of Mohammedan law and 
faith…”170  Moreover, “there were also scholars of languages, such as Professor 
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Syed Abdoolah, who taught Hindustani at University College, London in the late 
1860s.”171  
The other notable arrivals in Britain since the end of the eighteenth century 
were the servants of the employees of the East India Company. They were 
brought over in great numbers to work for their masters who had made enough 
money in India and wanted to live the life style they had become accustomed to 
there.
172
 “The most famous example was Munshi Abdul Karim, who arrived soon 
after Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee in 1887, and as a favourite of the Queen 
taught her Hindustani and rose to become her Indian Secretary.”173  
England was attracted by other nationals as well from around the globe, 
notably Moroccans and other Arab nationalities who were mostly merchants. One 
of the few attracting cities of England at the time was Manchester whose 
popularity was well echoed through out the Muslim world ‘as the textile-
manufacturing capital of the world’. This was mainly possible because Ottomans 
as a dominant power in the region had played a significant role in introducing the 
Manchester centred textile industry to Muslim territories through which it was a 
transit to India, China, and beyond. With the opening of Suez Canal at the end of 
the 1860s, the industry further boomed and it continued through out the century 
gravitating outsiders, particularly Arabs into the industrial city. Hence, ‘the 
traders from various parts of the Middle East and North Africa settled in the 
city.’174  
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The section discussed above shows how Muslims from various regions 
and continents had made their presence in Britain as individuals and groups and a 
sizable amount of them, it seems, had been living just as transients in different 
time span till the first half of the 20
th
 century. Drawing on the above discussion, it 
can be suggested, therefore, that most probably the earliest Muslim settlement in 
Britain though it was transient, it appears, dates back to the middle of the 19
th
 C 
“when the first relatively permanent Muslim populations were established in 
Manchester, Cardiff, Liverpool, South Shields, and the East End of London.”175 
According to Collins, the settlers were seamen and initially “settled in a number 
of British ports and vary in the size of their population from a few thousand, as in 
Cardiff and Liverpool, to less than two hundred, as in Hull and North Shields.”176 
As far as the origins of these early settlers are concerned, Ansari maintains that 
they were, apart from Indian seafaring communities, mostly Yemenis and Somalis 
together with Ottoman Turks.
177
 They started arriving in Britain after the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869.
178
 Of those seafarers, Yemenis in particular had 
“worked on ships arriving at British ports…and did not always return to Aden, 
and so pioneered the Muslim settlements of the late nineteenth century, mainly in 
Cardiff and South Shields, but also in Liverpool and London.”179 According to a 
recent study, as observed by Lewis, there is evidence that the Yemeni settlers 
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have established their communities even in Hull and Sheffield in the 20
th
 C in 
addition to the cities mentioned above.
180
  
Although there appears to be a slight discrepancy in the exact timing of the 
establishment of these settlements, the opinions largely confirm and complement 
each other as far as their locations are concerned. The existence of early Muslim 
settlement in Britain can be traced back to the third quarter of the 19
th
 C and were 
located in the main ports of 19
th
 C Britain, and the settlers represented a bulk of 
ethnicities.  
There is also some evidence to suggest that there were other seamen too 
who were popularly known as lascars: the sailors. Mostly Indians, the lascars had 
settled in some other port cities, apart from London,
181
 such as Ben Lomond, 
Aberdeen, Dumbarton, and Clydemank in Scotland.
182
 Although they “were 
present in Britain’s ports in sizable numbers”183 yet, unlike other settler 
communities mentioned above, their settlements were not intended to be 
permanent and were largely, as maintained by Lewis, “shifting and 
impermanent…in London and various ports…”184                     
With the emergence of these Muslims settlements in Britain, Muslims’ 
interaction with the British society had marked a significant turning point in 
Muslims’ relationship with the British society and vice versa. Most importantly, 
the treatment Muslims received by the wider society on their arrival in Briton 
during this time was to a large extent unwelcoming. Unsurprisingly, Britain’s 
political power in the world during this time in general and its hegemony over 
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Muslim lands ruled by Ottomans in particular had led Muslims to be viewed less 
equals after being equals and rulers, and treated more or less as subjects as a 
result.
185
 Muslims were now seen as subordinated people within the framework of 
British Empire.
186
   
It was against this background that Muslims, who arrived in Britain in 18
th
 
and 19
th
 C, as individuals and groups, had to face problems and hardships in their 
race to acquire the material, moral and cultural space that comprised British 
society at that time.
187
 Moreover, their quest to survive as a religious group with 
distinct needs and requirements was an uphill task for them let alone fulfilling 
rituals and daily practices of their religion as a community or groups. Therefore, it 
was not easy being Muslims at that time as a separate community amidst a non-
Muslim society which was distinct in almost all spheres of life, especially in 
social, religious, and cultural aspects. It is true, as contended by Ansari, that 
colour, race, and ethnicity of Muslims might have served to a certain degree as 
contributing factors for being treated as such by the society and had to face, as a 
result, untold sufferings during the period under scrutiny. Yet, it is undeniable that 
their being ‘Muslims’ with a distinct religious identity had also equally subjected 
to undergo immense hardships, particularly in practicing their religion including 
maintaining themselves as a separate community or group.  
The evidence shows, as contended by Ansari, that many of the Indian 
Muslim sailors were brutally treated on ships, particularly in terms of their 
customary life pattern which Muslims unfailingly uphold in all most all 
circumstances. On one occasion, for instance, they were forced to eat pork. “The 
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insult carried further by violently ramming the tail of a pig into their mouths and 
twisting the entrails of a pig round their necks.”188 Consequently, of the many of 
whom this was their awaiting fate some even jumped ships hoping to escape such 
harrowing ordeals and “took their chances in London’s East End”189 where the 
seamen’s boarding houses were located.  
Such cruel conditions might have been prevalent largely because of the 
way they had been viewed, undoubtedly, as ‘coloured’ or as ‘subjects’ of the 
Empire as noted before and cited by Ansari and therefore, the “interactions 
between Muslims and British society were largely shaped by contemporary 
popular views regarding their position in the human hierarchy relative to degree of 
civilization. These views were complicated by the juxtaposition of race with 
religion. As non-European ‘races’ subordinated to the British, those from Muslim 
lands were evaluated disparagingly. Negative images were reinforced by the 
collective memory acquired over the centuries since the Crusades.”190  
What this account by Ansari brings into sharp relief is, perhaps, Muslims 
were not only viewed as ‘coloured’ and ‘subjects’ but also treated as the ‘other’ 
projected by negative images, as contended by Ansari himself, gained ground in 
European soil including Britain through centuries old religious rivalries took place 
between Muslims and Christian during medieval time popularly known as 
Crusades as noted before. This arguably shows that Muslims were discriminated 
not only on the basis of colour and race but also on religious ground as well. 
Hence there seems to be a valid case in presenting the religious factor in this 
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argument and it makes sense if someone suggests that the raison d'être as to why 
they were subjected to these appalling social conditions could have been because 
they were viewed, to a large extent, as equally ‘Muslims’ as ‘coloured’ or 
‘subjects’ and they had been identified more with their religion, culture, and 
customs than their outward appearances reflected in their colour. The way they 
were treated on ships, particularly them being forced to eat pork, as seen before, 
shows the rationalisation of this suggestion and the attitude shown towards them 
by the 19
th
 C British public and the Christian missionaries, which will be 
discussed in the latter part of this chapter, evidently prove the veracity of these 
comments. 
Although Ansari’s assessment of their existence in Britain has been one of 
a social and historical one and his reasoning for their fateful destruction is largely 
based on socio-economic factors within the realms of colour and class, it is not 
unreasonable to argue that there was also a religious factor that had largely 
contributed to their unfortunate predicament. Otherwise, it is pointless to suggest 
that they had disappeared from the landscape of the British society by being 
diluted culturally with no trace of identity as a religious minority. Ideally, as the 
main sources of Islam conform, for Muslims it is their religion and religiosity that 
provide them a sense of identity than any other ethnic, regional and geographical 
considerations. Their cultural expression is mostly shaped by their religion and its 
teachings more than any other local or regional affiliations in terms of language, 
ethnicity, and geographical location, although it is undeniable that each one of 
these affiliations or more have their fair share and imprint in flavouring each and 
every one’s culture. Generally speaking, for a Muslim it is Islam that gives him or 
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her sense of belonging and identity irrespective of his or her ethnicity, region, 
colour, and language.                                  
While this had largely been the general attitude of the British society 
towards these seamen on one hand, their conduct and behaviour in their day-to-
day life too were mostly deplorable on the other. While they were supposed to be 
Muslims who practice the religion, their daily life style was little of an average 
Muslim who adheres at least to the basic tenets and daily practices of Islam. In 
more than one occasion, as Salter
191
 describes, they had ended up in prisons for 
being found gambling, ‘smoking the insidious opium’, street fights, and petty 
thieving.
192
 According to Salter, “The records of Horse-monger Lane Jail and the 
city prison, Holloway give evidence of repeated visits from the worshippers of 
Mohammed…”193 Their appalling living condition in poorly accommodated 
boarding houses might have led them to live such an unsatisfactory life or perhaps 
the landlords and boarding house-keepers who were accused of indulging in 
unfair and corrupt practices, as noted by Salter,
194
 might have led them to end up 
in such a misery or even poor understanding of their religion and less commitment 
in it might have led them to act as such. Yet, it would not be untenable to 
speculate that the lack of religious guidance either through a religious guide or an 
institution also might have contributed to a large extent to their vulnerability to 
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the uneven social condition which led them ultimately to their moral decadence. 
Whatever the reason might be, it is unfair to point the finger solely at the social 
setting they chose to live in while ignoring their fair share of the contribution to 
the problem, as noted before, either by being complacent about the situation or by 
being overpowered by the situation.      
Although this has been the overwhelming social condition during this 
period, it is undeniable that there were some seamen who had managed to cling to 
their daily rituals and religious practices. Yet, it is questionable whether their 
daily religious practices had made any impact on their mundane affairs as far as 
the effectiveness of the spirituality is concerned. Salter remarks that, on one 
occasion, he questioned, for example, a performer of the night prayer which is 
‘ishā195 who had concluded it in no time in order to prepare himself for the Drury 
Lane Theatre and he asked him: “You repeat your prayers five times a day and 
then go to the theatre and dance; what honour do such prayers bring to God?”. 
The Muslim’s reply was: “The first was a duty, the second was a pleasure” on 
which Salter remarks: “A tacit acknowledgment that prayer was no pleasure, and 
that the heart was in Drury Lane while he performed the onerous duty of 
prayer.”196  
This incident may be manifested as a striking example of the cross section 
of such Muslims as those who had little understanding and knowledge of their 
religion, thereby having only a shallow attachment to their religion and religious 
practices and had no impact, as a result, on the behavioural pattern of their daily 
personal life. There is little wonder that 18
th
 C Britain, being a prosperous 
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wonderland with all sorts of pleasure in abundance, was an eye-catching place for 
such Muslims with that poor level of understanding of their religion and was the 
right place to enjoy life in whatever manner they wished to experience it.  
It does not mean, however, that Islam forbids its adherents from seeking 
material enjoyment and worldly pleasure. The seclusion from the worldly things 
and its affairs has never been celebrated in Islam. Yet, the enjoyment of worldly 
pleasure should not overtake the main purpose of this life which is attaining the 
eternal bliss in the Hereafter as commanded by God in the Qur’ān and practiced 
by the Prophet during his life time rather it should be the means to achieve the 
said purpose of life.   
Striking balance between these two aspirations of life: seeking worldly 
pleasure while aspiring to attain eternal bliss in the Hereafter entails Muslims, 
firstly, the dire need to endeavour to ensure maintaining the sheer balance 
between religious as well as secular needs. One sphere should not be neglected at 
the expense of the other. Both spheres should be given their equal share of the 
right consideration and fair treatment, which is one of the unique characteristics of 
Islam that runs through the fabric of its teachings as a norm as well as an 
established principle.  
Secondly, the boundaries and the limits stipulated by God need to be 
maintained and should not be crossed. In other words, there are set of principles 
and values which Muslims are required to follow in order for them to acquire the 
true meaning of being Muslims. As Islam is not only a faith but also a code of 
conduct and a way of life, a Muslim is always reminded to make sure that this 
fundamental link between the faith and the practice is thoroughly interconnected.  
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Lastly, in order for Islam to be followed in daily life it requires, according to main 
sources of Islam, a proper social environment under a competent leadership who 
is capable enough to lead Muslims towards a model Islamic life not only as a 
belief system but also as a practice and a code of conduct for Islam comprises all 
spheres of life as elaborated in detail in the Qurān and the Sunnah of the Prophet: 
the Prophet’s way of life.  
When looking at the life style and the living condition some of the early 
Muslim settlers had chosen to live in Britain, as seen before, one can extract 
certain important points in the light of the explanation discussed above, which are 
relevant to the main theme of the current study: what should be the mechanism a 
Muslim should seek to live an Islamic life in a non-Muslim society. Also, the 
lessons which can be learnt from the experience of 18
th
 C Muslims are equally 
helpful to understand the scholarly discourse of classical as well as modern 
scholars of Islamic law on plethora of issues and concerns related to a Muslim’s 
life in a non-Muslim society, which will be dealt in detail in the sixth chapter. 
Primarily, it seems that early Muslim settlers had been under immense 
pressure in safeguarding their identity as Muslims with many of them had been 
diluted in the wider society with no trace of them as separate community. As 
contended by Ansari, “the sheer imbalance of the numbers and power relationship 
involved meant that their struggles to sustain distinct identities proved largely 
unsuccessful.”197 This implies, therefore, that if Muslims are weak either because 
they are few in number or they are fragile economically, socially, and politically 
and they end up, as a result, in such a condemning situation as 18
th
 C Muslims had 
ill-fated as described by Ansari, the consequences are serious and dreadful for 
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they are strongly condemned as sinful by God in the Qurān and by the Prophet in 
hadīth, a detail of which will be discussed in the following chapter.  
For those of whom this is their social condition, the alternative 
recommended by Islamic jurisprudence is perhaps not something other than 
migration to a place where they feel secure to follow their religion with the sense 
of security and freedom for their religion and to live a peaceful life maintaining 
their identity as a separate community. Mostly, this was the case vis-à-vis the 
early migration undertaken by the Prophet and his companions from Makkah to 
Medina in 620 CE, whereby the Prophet and his companions were able to live an 
Islamic life and created a society which was a model to be emulated by 
generations to come. It is worth noting that this migration was preceded by the fist 
and foremost migration undertaken by some of the Prophet’s companions to 
Abyssinia in 616 CE,
198
 which is another striking precedence for Muslims who 
live as minorities.  
A small group of Muslims who were persecuted by Makkan Arabs who 
also happened to be their fellow tribesmen had to flee Arabia to escape the 
torturous social environment hoping they may practice their newly adopted 
religion: Islam in an un-hostile social environment. Although one may argue that 
the comparison between the two situations is disproportionate which is partly true 
as far as the form as well as material structure and formation of the two social 
settings are concerned as the social, political, and economic condition of 7
th
 C 
Abyssinia was in no way similar to the18
th
 C Britain, yet in essence the disparity 
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between the two scenarios is arguably slim in terms of challenges and problems 
they faced; In both situations Muslims faced more or less similar problems and 
challenges in a non-Muslim social environment in terms of religion, culture, 
norms, and ethos; they were few in number and they had very little power as far 
as their social status is concerned. Yet, strikingly, unlike the Muslims of 18
th
 C 
Britain, these migrated Muslims to the Abyssinian land were largely able to 
withstand the challenges of the new environment without loosing their identity. 
Particularly, they were able to hold fast to their religion despite all sorts of 
propaganda campaign unleashed by Makkan rivals in the court of the Ethiopian 
king Negus. Despite their imbalance of power in contesting the social spheres of 
the wider society, they as a community, never thought of giving up Islam in the 
face of socio-economic pressures which came in their way except for one 
individual incident of conversions to Christianity. 
Similarly, it might be appropriate to note, for instance, that the spread of 
Islam outside the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in East Africa, South Indian 
costal areas, Sri Lanka, and South East Asia was largely due to the fact that early 
Muslims who sojourned to these lands as traders and merchants were largely 
successful in establishing embryonic communities in an effort to safeguard their 
religious identity, as contended by Arnold. The matter was, therefore, nothing to 
do with either their number or economic or political power, rather it was their firm 
conviction as well as steadfastness in the path of their religion coupled with strong 
commitment towards safeguarding their identity as a religious community.   
Hence, firstly, migration for the sake of security either for his religion or 
his life has been actively at play throughout the Muslim history and it is still 
actively in practice driven by modern day’s unwholesome social and political 
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climate prevailing in some parts of the Muslim world which is an evidence 
manifested by the modern day political migration made by a sizeable number of 
Muslims from the traditional Muslim lands to Europe including Britain. Those 
who lost their identity in the 18
th
 C Britain were thus resorted to migration as an 
alternative measure in the face of cultural dilution, as noted by Ansari, without 
forsaking their religion. Their fate would have been different and their 
commitment and sacrifice in safeguarding their identity would have been 
remembered even today as a model to be followed by many generations to come.         
Secondly, the destiny these Muslims had faced, has again reinforced the 
validity of the sheer warning given by the Qurān and Sunnah and proclaimed by 
Muslim jurists (fuqahā) of both classical as well as modern time regarding 
supposedly outcome of such condemning situation, which will be dealt with in 
detail in the sixth chapter. In brief, their opinion on the issue in question has been 
that whosoever finds himself or herself in a similar situation described above has 
the duty of migration to a place where it is secure for him or her to practice the 
religion. Failing to do so, he or she will have to risk the loss of his or her religious 
identity resulting in abandoning the religion itself, a situation the Qurān and the 
hadīth have categorically warned Muslims of its fatal result, an issue which will 
be thrown light in the following chapter. 
Although their scholarly opinion on migration was largely based on 
classification of the world into two as dār al-Islam and dār al-ḥarb,199 the option 
of migration, according to some arguments which will be discussed in the 
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following chapter, is thought to be still valid and not outdated according to main 
sources of Islamic law: Qurān and hadīth and legal opinions of Muslim jurists 
throughout the Islamic history. Irrespective of long debates and arguments 
Muslim jurists have engaged in defining what is dār al-harb and dār al-Islam and 
how does migration operate, the common thread which runs through the fabric of 
their scholarly discourse on the issue in question is their concern about the fate a 
Muslim could end up in a non-Muslim society in the event of his or her inability 
to withstand challenges posed to his or her religious identity by a particular non-
Muslim society, which is what had taken place in the case of ill-fated 18
th
 C 
Muslims in Britain as seen before. 
Lastly, Islam, as stipulated by the Qurān and Sunnah as a way of life, is 
more of a religion of society than of individuals. It is better placed and 
implemented in a society than in one’s individual life for most of its teachings and 
obligations are to a large extent social oriented than individual based. Even for the 
proper fulfilment of the five pillars of Islam
200
 including haj, which is the annual 
pilgrimage to Makkah, which are expected to benefit individuals as well society 
with good conduct and morality in this world and rewards in the Hereafter, there 
needs an appropriate Islamic social setting. There is little to be expected, 
therefore, if Islam cannot be accommodated in an apt social setting as a way of 
life with its full strength and dynamism without which it will be more nominal 
than real. It appears that the pathetic failure from the part of 18
th
 C Muslim 
seamen in bringing about this salient feature of Islam, which is to create a 
dynamic society vibrant with Islamic teachings, in their ports settlements was 
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what made them facing the reprehensible outcome: disappearance from the social 
landscape as separate communities with distinct identity.  
As this was the situation at work in the social setting in general, to what 
extent Muslims managed to uphold their religion and its teachings as the first and 
foremost component of their identity as Muslims is questionable. Although Ansari 
speaks about issues and challenges Muslims faced in consolidating their social, 
political, and economical position as individuals and groups in the British society 
during the period in question, there is hardly any mentioning of evidence which 
can prove any sort of measures taken by them in an effort to preserve their 
religious and cultural identity through teachings of Islam, particularly through 
guidance from Islamic jurisprudence. 
Apparently, the reason behind the decline of those 18
th
 C Muslims as a 
separate community might be, it seems, because Muslims were lacking a much 
needed source of guidance in the face of challenges threatening their religious 
identity. Either they were not concerned enough to reflect upon such an important 
need because they were preoccupied with their struggle to raise their socio-
economic condition or they were not bothering at all about the fate which was due 
to befall on them as Muslims because they were weak in their adherence to their 
religion or there was no such a reference body to which they could approach to 
seek guidance to resolve the problems posing a threat to their religious identity. 
This should inform the necessity to make such guidance available for Muslims 
who live in the contemporary British society. There is enough evidence to show 
that the lack of this guidance is what it forms the background for problems faced 
by the contemporary British Muslims in terms of social, economic, educational, 
and political crisis.  
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The case of Salman Rushdi, for example, and its aftermath echoed through 
riots and communal disharmony in Bradford; the 1
st
 Gulf War and its implications 
on the British society contributed enormously to widen the social gap between 
Muslims and the wider society; the 9/11 tragedy and its implications and adverse 
effects on Muslims in Britain, the war in Iraq and its socio-political consequences, 
and the 7/7 bomb attack in London and its colossal impact on the British society 
with far reaching affects in social relationships between Muslims and the wider 
society, stress the vital need for such guidance. However, it is not an exaggeration 
to say that it is the lacking of this direction that tends to widen the social gap 
between Muslims and non-Muslims of the contemporary British society.  
Generally speaking, at the root of all these crisis, lies the lack of awareness 
and understanding from the part of Muslims as to how they should resolve these 
crisis and conflicts in a situation like this as a religious minority in a non-Muslim 
society and what should be the behaviour and approach they should apply in 
tackling similar circumstances in the future. Their far-reaching repercussions on 
the British society, particularly on Muslim-non-Muslim relationship is still to be 
felt and there is also a legitimate fear that it can widen the gap between both 
parties if the situation is left un-attended without taking appropriate measures, 
particularly, among other viable means, through guiding Muslim communities by 
teaching Islam. Failure to do so with little delay is what one may predict as a 
disaster waiting to befall not only on their social, economical, political, and 
religious life of Muslims but also on their very existence in the British society as 
it happened to the  18
th
 C Muslims of Britain.                                    
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Despite this horrendous experience some Muslims had to go through with 
the “widespread hostility to Islam in Britain in the eighteenth century,”201 as 
contended by Ansari, not all of them did surrender to the challenges prevailing 
during this time. Indeed, some of them were brave enough to face the situation 
and remained steadfast in the face of these hostilities. Although they were such 
handful of people as Muslim slaves enslaved from Africa, their exemplary 
endeavour in overcoming difficulties of being Muslim in a non-Muslim social 
setting has been somewhat worth noting. Captured in Gambia as a slave, for 
instance, in 1731 and arrived in England in 1733, Ayuba Suleiman Diallo (b. 
1701) had impressed his benefactor by displaying a great deal of devotion to his 
religion resulted subsequently in his freedom. This was same with another Muslim 
slave called Mohammad who was enslaved in Africa and brought to England 
towards the end of the 18
th
 C. Having impressed his owner by displaying a great 
deal of knowledge of the Qurān, like Diallo, and mastery in Arabic literature, he 
managed to earn his freedom and returned to Africa after a short stay in Liverpool 
in 1811.
202
    
The stance taken up by both Diallo and Mohammed while they were 
staying in Britain has been an extraordinary example which amply demonstrates 
the ability a Muslim can display in the face of challenges he or she faces in a non-
Muslim society. Given the hard-hitting socio-political environment prevailed 
during the time in question and the attitude shown by the British public, as a 
result, towards non-Europeans, particularly Muslims, the standpoint both of them 
had persistently upheld was not something to be overlooked. It makes them 
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exceptional as their effort was extremely ambitious and hard-earned as it was not 
easy being Muslim practising Islam at that time. This instance shows, as a matter 
of fact, that if Muslims either as individuals or groups are better equipped with 
strong belief in and unwavering commitment to their religion, it appears that they 
are largely capable of withstanding the challenges coming in their way. The more 
they are aware of their religion the more they are protected from going astray. 
Hence, living in a non-Muslim society has neither been condemnable nor 
unconditional as long as Muslims are capable enough either as a community or 
individuals to retain a measure of control over their lives, particularly their 
identity as Muslims.  
It can be said, therefore, that taking residence in a non-Muslim social 
milieu by Muslims has never been undesirable merely because they choose to 
reside in such a social setting though it is always advisable for Muslims to give 
preference to take residence in a Muslim society as encouraged by the Qurān and 
the Sunnah. It is also not unconditional for them, at the same time, to take 
residence in a non-Muslim social setting regardless of the way they choose to lead 
their life in it whether it affects their identity as Muslims or not. Hence, it is 
neither the case. It all depends, therefore, how far a chosen social setting is 
accommodative enough for a Muslim to live an Islamic life, at least by observing 
the basic tenets and rituals of the religion and, at best, by practicing it as much as 
possible in all spheres of his or her life. It can be said, therefore, that the migration 
might have been the right option Muslim settlers of the early 18
th
 C Britain could 
have opted for. The issue of migration in such circumstances highlighted above, 
thus, opens up another window of interesting discourse among Muslim jurists of 
both classical and modern time, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Drawing on the above discussion, we may conclude that the socio-
economic and religio-political circumstances of the 18
th
 C Britain together with 
negative images reinforced by collective memory gained ground in the British 
society through the Crusades over the centuries, might have played a major role 
undoubtedly in influencing British public’s perception of Muslims as ‘subject 
people’203 and it might have led them to evaluate Muslims negatively “with 
discriminatory effects for individual Muslims in their key spheres of their 
lives.”204 This is not to deny, however, that Muslims were not responsible for 
forming the part of the problem they had to encounter in the 18
th
 c British society. 
With the poor knowledge and understanding of the British society and culture, the 
language barrier, and, above all, the inadequate level of religious knowledge have 
led them to the situation where they had to end up. It is not far from truth if it is 
said that the fair share of the responsibility, apart from hostile attitude shown 
towards them by the British society, should be borne by those vulnerable Muslims 
too who had to undergo those bitter experiences and turbulences in their religion 
as explained by Salter and Ansari in the examples highlighted above.  
It appears, therefore, that the vulnerability of these Muslims had been 
largely caused, in the first place - on top of economic and social crisis they had to 
go through as individuals and groups because of their colour, class, and race - by 
lack of proper leadership equipped with religious guidance capable enough to lead 
them in the right direction, which is one of the core issues this study will handle in 
the following chapters.  
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Secondly, it seems that them being unorganised either as one single 
community or a group under an able leadership could be another reason why they 
had to undergo such trials and turbulences in the 18
th
 C British society. It may be 
their preoccupation with socio-economic problems and challenges which might 
have led them to be more scattered and disorganised to the point that they even 
could not win their basic rights as human beings in terms of their livelihood, food, 
and lodging as described by Ansari in detail. Yet, it is inexcusable that, as 
Muslims who were supposed to be retaining a measure of control over their 
religious needs as individuals and a society, they had forsaken their religious 
identity for gaining material bounty. In similar situations the priority entails 
Muslims making an effort to seek migration as recommended by the majority of 
scholars of Islamic law, an issue, which will be, have some light thrown on  in the 
following chapter.  
4.1.3 Muslims in Britain – From Being Settlers to Institutions 
What follows is somewhat viewed as the main efforts of organised Islam 
in Britain in the 19
th
 C comparing this to the social situation Muslims went 
through in 18
th
 C Britain as seen before. Muslims in the 19
th
 C were relatively 
organised and structured in terms of their social and religious experience, 
particularly towards the end of it, where they managed to initiate institutionalised 
activities centred on Islam and its teachings. From being mere individuals and 
groups with no such rallying point as centres or organisations, Muslims were able, 
to a large extent to form a sort of social base for them so that they could act as a 
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community wherever they happened to be, in such places as Manchester, 
Liverpool, London, and Working.
205
 
Did they manage to see a difference in their life style in 19
th
 C Britain as a 
religious minority compared to what they faced in the previous century? What 
was their experience in leading an Islamic life during that period? Were they 
successful in forming a community with an able leadership? What sort of 
problems and challenges they faced in navigating their life as a religious 
community or group in the trouble waters of 19
th
 C Britain? The following section 
will deal with some of the main events of 19
th
 C Britain in order to find answers to 
these and similar questions.  
Before delving into the strenuous efforts taken up by 19
th
 C Muslims for 
consolidating their presence as communities mainly centered on institutions, the 
mentioning of the socio-religious condition prevailed during 19
th
 C British society 
seeks relevance.   
For Muslims, 19
th
 C Britain was more or less not dissimilar to the 18
th
 C as 
far as the challenges and problems are concerned. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that Muslims had to encounter more problems during this period than faced in the 
18
th
 C. More precisely, at the turn of the century with the expansion and 
consolidation of British influence over Muslims lands and territories “popular 
prejudice against non-Europeans and Christian hostility towards ‘heathens’ in 
Britain had gained currency…”206 In addition to this intolerant attitude and 
aggressive approach shown by the wider society towards Muslims, the 
evangelising mission was on the rise targeting conversion of non-Christians 
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including Muslims into Christianity. “By the mid-nineteenth century many 
Christian evangelists were convinced that their religion was the only path to 
salvation and that the followers of other faiths were doomed to eternal 
damnation.”207 Backed by high-ranking evangelical Christian officials like 
William Muir who authored Life of Mahomet and concluded that ‘the sword of 
Mahomet and the Coran are the most fatal enemies of civilization, Liberty and the 
Truth which the world has yet known’,208 missionaries actively embarked upon 
‘civilizing Muslims’ through conversion. The Indian mutiny209 which took place 
in 1857 had been a case in point which availed themselves of an opportunity to 
form a negative image of Muslims as uncivilized and it gave them a good 
justification to see Muslims as incapable of grasping “moral and intellectual 
uplift, a more progressive system of administration, and modernisation.”210  
Hence, “by 1860s negative images of Islam and Muslims were embraced 
in the hardening religious and racial prejudices that were beginning to be 
articulated in the form of pseudo-scientific theories of race in Britain.”211 It will 
not be difficult to imagine, in line with this unhealthy socio-political context, what 
sort of hardships and turbulences Muslims could have gone through in the British 
society at this point in history. The vulnerable section of the Muslim population at 
the time had to face, among other issues and problems, the challenge of 
conversion. Particularly, a large number of lascars were the prime target of this 
trial who were not only poor in their understanding of the British society but also 
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too naïve to realize motives and intentions behind services and help they received 
from missionaries. These services took various forms such as English lessons “for 
these ‘depraved’ mendicants to be helped to adapt to their new 
environment…standing surety for those convicted of petty crime, exercising 
influence with magistrates on behalf of those needing good character references, 
or meeting their ‘temporal’ needs in hospitals and prisons.”212 Through extending 
their generous helping hand, as such, by pouring all the resources they had in their 
possession, what they ambitiously wanted to see from the beneficiaries was the 
realisation of “civilising and Christianising the lascars, especially 
‘Mohammedans’ among them.”213 More importantly, the missionaries were 
ambitious enough, in the process, to make sure that “the beneficiaries were always 
reminded that their rescue from distress was the work of Jesus, to whom they 
ought to submit.”214  
But, for many a Muslims the situation was mostly not irresistible although 
it had been extremely tough for them to tackle. Not drifting away with the tide, 
many of them were extremely dead set against to the missionary message. 
Consequently, “all were denounced as infidels and spiritually ignorant.”215 Quite a 
number of Arabs were also denounced as ‘deluded’ for not only being defiant in 
the face of the missionary but also maintaining persistently that salvation could be 
achieved through Islam.
216
 For some of them it was not easy at all to be on their 
guard against proselytising endeavour of the missionary. Some of them even had 
to pretend to be converted to Christianity. Ansari points out that “some of these 
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Muslims, unable to meet Islamic obligations and reliant on charity, converted to 
Christianity out of what may well have been sheer necessity.”217 After presenting 
a lengthy example, Ansari maintains that “not all those who claimed to be 
Christians had really converted. Some gave the impression of having converted to 
Christianity without actually doing so in order to earn a living.”218  
Looking at the issue of fake conversion taken up by some of these 
Muslims under the circumstances mentioned above, it seems that they might have 
resorted to this tactic with fare knowledge of their religion and its teachings. The 
possibility of this speculation for acting in such a manner cannot be 
underestimated because it might have been clear for them that resorting to such an 
approach under duress does not harm one’s belief in Islam according to Islamic 
legal rulings. Despite this it is not clear whether they knew of this religious 
rulings or not and consulted an Islamic scholar or not with regard to this matter 
for there is little evidence to prove it. These Muslims it appears must have been 
well aware of the seriousness of turning away from the religion. Otherwise, there 
seems to be little justification as to why they turned back to Islam denouncing 
Christianity either when they felt that they can stand on their own feet without 
depending any more on charities offered by missionaries or when their Christian 
wives died and no longer dependant on their help and support under whose 
compulsion they became Christians.
219
 
It is worth noting that it was against this hostile socio-religious 
background that 19
th
 C Muslims in Britain had become more conscious about 
their religion and their religious identity. The more they were aware of the 
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impending danger to their religion, the stronger they became committed to its 
teachings in their life. This has been the case with what to be noticed in the 
contemporary British Muslim experience as confirmed by recent empirical 
studies, a subject which will be discussed in the following chapters. Because of 
this religious consciousness coupled with the realisation of imminent danger 
posed towards their sheer existence as a religious group or a community, Muslims 
must have started, it seams, mapping strategies and plans hoping to find out how 
they can respond to this precarious situation. It is not unreasonable to see, 
therefore, that Muslims in the last quarter of the 19
th
 C started forming embryonic 
communities, institutions, and centres consolidating communal as well as 
religious solidarity so that they could face any onslaught of oncoming challenges 
not just as individuals but as a collective body. If Muslims continued to live in 
East London localities such as Shadwell and Wapping in their own groups and 
enclaves representing the ‘Oriental quarter,’220 it may be because they wanted to 
maintain some sort of control over their social as well as religious wellbeing and 
also “because of religious prohibitions and out of a sense of communal 
solidarity”221 as contended by Ansari.  
It will not be wrong to assume, therefore, that what went wrong with the 
18
th
 C Muslims who lost their religious identity as a separate community as seen 
before might have served as a reminder for 19
th
 C Muslims in Britain. The fate 
their predecessors had been destined to might have been still fresh in their mind. 
Therefore, there is little wonder that the latter must have thought that they should 
organise themselves in such a fashion that they do not repeat the same mistake 
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and end up losing their identity. In order to safeguard themselves from the hostile 
environment, it must have appeared to them that the appropriate way to do this is 
to live as a group holding fast to their religious values and customs with a sense of 
communal cohesion. Although there is a sizable number of Muslims living at 
present in Wapping and Shadwell, it is unclear whether they are the offspring of 
those who lived in 19
th
 C Britain, another area of study worth researching. Parallel 
to the existence of these 19th C Muslims, another group of Muslims settled away 
from London. They settled in Manchester, and did well to a large degree as a 
religious community.  
Arab merchants, who had made a permanent presence in Manchester life 
in the second half of 19
th 
C, had “created a separate enclave in which they 
successfully retained some of the key features of their culture, language, customs, 
dress, diet and religion.”222 Moreover, in their daily rituals and religious 
observances they had always ensured that they did the right things as far as their 
religious life was concerned and for that matter, they did not even bother going 
out of their way to seek religious guidance from a right person even if that 
religious scholar was to be found living abroad. Illustrating an incident, Ansari 
mentions that “these Moroccans seemed to adhere strictly to their Muslim 
religious practices: for example, before arrangements could be made for halāl 
meat, a ruling was requested regarding eating of meat slaughtered by non-
Muslims from the Islamic reformer Muhammad Abduh, and this allowed for 
kosher
223
 meat to be purchased from a Jewish butcher.”224  
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What it appears from the behaviour these Muslim displayed in conducting 
their day to day life in conformity to religious guidance is that, firstly they were 
careful to ensure that their daily rituals and religious observances were rightly 
guided by Islam and its teachings so that they may be prosperous in this world and 
in the Hereafter according to what they might have understood from Islamic 
teachings as elaborated in the Qurān and the Sunnah. Secondly, it shows the 
central role they had given to religion in their life style and the sense of priority 
and preference they had offered to religious guidance over any other 
considerations in their life. Lastly, it appears that, due to their affluent position as 
merchants, they were able to safeguard themselves and had managed to be on 
their guard against any impending dangers threatened their religiosity. Gleaning 
through the available writings with regard to their social life reported by Ansari 
and Little, one cannot easily notice whether there was any sort of challenges they 
had to encounter as faced by the lascars such as poor economic condition resulted 
in their being dependent on charities offered by missionaries and consequently, 
the repercussion of proselytising manoeuvre as cited before.  
Yet, the non-Muslim social surrounding they encountered in Manchester and 
challenges it posed were little less strong to keep them out of danger although 
they  managed to retain some sort of distinctions in their religious personality as 
noted before. Particularly, with the coming of their second generation who 
adapted English as their first language, their control over their younger generation 
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began to lose and had no option but to allow them, as a result, to have “some 
outward adjustments to mainstream English life.”225 Their appearance in terms of 
dress and hair had thus changed to the point that they were viewed back in 
Morocco as Christians and some of them who settled permanently even anglicised 
their names.
226
 However, their adaptation to the new social environment was kept 
to the minimum as their engagement with the British society was selective “with 
little social mixing involved.”227  
The life pattern of 19
th
 C Muslims in Manchester as seen before contains 
an important lesson to be learned by any future Muslim minorities to come in the 
British history. That is to say, by opting for a non-participatory approach when 
living in Manchester they might have thought, it appears that they would be able 
to retain a certain degree of security for their religious identity and exercise a 
measure of control over their spiritual wellbeing. But, it is not unreasonable to 
argue that, by displaying this non-engaging attitude thereby contributing less to 
the wider society, they had more or less contributed indirectly to give Islam a 
negative image as an inactive, unproductive, and reactionary system which has 
nothing to offer to the society at large on one hand and had given the wider 
society, on the other, an ample opportunity to view Islam as another religion 
which falls under the category of faiths typically defined by secularism as systems 
that have no say in the affairs of practical life.  
It is undeniable, of course, that they were caught up in the middle of a 
stormy social setting as noted before. Indeed, they were on the horns of a dilemma 
which left them with no option but either to surrender to the prevailing social 
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setting by fully submitting to the social, economic, and political forces through 
assimilating into the wider society disregarding religion, culture, and identity or to 
stay behind without integrating into the society opting for a defensive strategy so 
that they can be on their guard against everything which was considered by them 
un-Islamic which is what they had really done in the process of their settlement in 
19
th
 C Britain. By going for the second option, it might have appeared for them 
that it was the lesser of the two evils with regard to their spiritual betterment.  
Moreover, it might have also appeared for them that the best possible 
safest way to attain salvation in the Hereafter was to isolate themselves from the 
non-Muslim society as far as possible: an approach still at play in most of the 
contemporary Muslim minority communities throughout the Western world 
including Britain, which would be discussed in detail in the following chapters 
with reference to issues and challenges involved in their contemporary 
experience.  
However, the question arises as to what extent their approach was 
compatible with Islamic teachings as a whole which, particularly, revolve around 
the responsibility of Muslims as individuals and communities towards humanity 
as bearers of final divine guidance which emphasises the importance of their 
being a role model towards and witness to humankind. But, it is unclear, due to 
lack of evidence, as to how far they were aware of this responsibility and to what 
extent they had made effort to play their expected role even if they were aware of 
it. Yes, one should not forget, of course, that their minority situation with all its 
negative impacts and far-reaching implications on their living condition as a 
community might have put them off their duty. It is not unreasonable to imagine, 
one can argue, that the sheer impracticability of realising Islam as a way of life in 
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a non-Muslim social setting had been beyond their capacity and was not 
something under their control even if they were fully aware of their expected 
responsibility.  
Hence, it is unacceptable to blame them for what they were not 
responsible for. Although this argument has its own validity and sounds 
reasonable given the exact social, political, and economic situation of the 19
th
 C 
Muslim community of Manchester, the image created in the hearts and minds of 
the British public about Islam and its teachings by remaining aloof from the wider 
society must have been exceptionally distorted in addition to what British public 
had already perceived about Islam and Muslims through prejudices and negative 
images as contended by Ansari. Had they approached the situation more 
positively with a farsighted future vision – safeguarding the religious identity 
without cocooning from the real world and interacting positively with the wider 
society without assimilating in it – they could have set a pioneering example to be 
emulated by future Muslim generations to come in a secular non-Muslim social 
setting.  
Therefore, it appears, had they been rightly guided through a clear vision, 
as noted above, with a long term strategy without confining themselves only to 
seek temporary Islamic legal solutions as they really did with the Egyptian 
reformer Muhammad Abduhu regarding their dietary issues as mentioned above, 
they would have rightly accomplished their expected role as required by their 
religion. In order to realise this vision, it seems, it requires a sound sophisticated 
Islamic approach based on a meticulously studied method which was what they 
had been devoid of and is what this study seeks to suggest for the betterment of 
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contemporary as well as future Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim societies, 
particularly in Britain.            
The way forward for Muslim minorities for realising this mission in their 
real life is to represent Islam with an appropriate approach and a presentable 
method relevant to the context they live in, as explained before, through engaging 
positively with the wider society while safeguarding their religious identity which 
is undoubtedly not without issues and challenges, a subject which will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.                                        
4.1.3.1 Abdullah Quilliam (1856-1932) – as Sheikh Al- Islam and 
the Founder of Liverpool Mosque and Institute         
Apart from embryonic communities which sprang up in 19
th
 C Britain like 
the ones mentioned above, community centres, institutes, and mosques also put 
down roots in some of the major cities like London, Liverpool, and Woking. In 
this sense, 19
th
 C Britain has seen another landmark turning point in its interaction 
with Islam and Muslims with the conversion of William Henry Quilliam to Islam 
in 1887 CE.
228
 His coming into Islam has resulted in what is called 
institutionalization of Islam in Britain. From mere visitors and sojourns to the 
British Isles and transient settlers at some point as noted before, Muslims under 
the leadership of Quilliam were able to establish themselves as a community and 
Islam had thus become institutionalized in Britain for the first time. The striking 
feature of Quilliam’s Muslim community is the indigenousness of its nature 
unlike the settlers who were migrants. In this sense, Quilliam’s conversion had 
been a remarkable initiative in introducing Islam as an institution.  
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Sojourning to Southern France as a holiday maker and crossing over to 
Morocco and Algeria as a visitor, Quilliam became a Muslim through learning 
Islam and interacting with Muslims.
229
 Having become Abdullah Quilliam and 
returned to his hometown: Liverpool in 1889 CE, he championed the cause of 
Islam by converting hundreds into his religion.
230
 He was honoured by the Sultan 
of Turkey: Sultan Abdul Hamid II as ‘Shaykh-ul-Islam’231 (Grand Scholar of 
Islam) of the United Kingdom in 1894. Moreover, the Sultan of Afghanistan sent 
him a gift of £2,500, honouring him for his services to Islam.
232
  
Pioneering the institutionalisation of Islam in Britain, he had succeeded in 
establishing a mosque and an institute. Fighting a long battle for nearly two 
decades to establish Islam and a community which holds fast to it in Liverpool, 
his mission came to an end with his departure from Britain in 1908.
233
 After going 
into self-exile in a country outside Britain for some time in order to keep himself 
away from bitter politics and hostilities of the early 20
th
 C British society, he 
retuned to Britain and died in London in 1932.       
4.1.3.2 Abdullah Quilliam as “Sheikh al-Islam” 
Quilliam’s multifaceted struggle which longed for more than two decades 
since 1887 to 1908 as described before has been unique in its kind and 
unprecedented ever since the presence of Islam in Britain since the 8
th
 century. He 
might be the only personality who has been exceptionally strong in his faith and 
practiced as a Muslim since Islam’s introduction in Britain for nearly a 
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millennium comparing to early Muslim settlers of 18
th
 C Britain, who lost their 
identity and disappeared from the landscape of the British society. As a revert to 
Islam he was not only endeavouring to be a role model for Islam in his individual 
level but also making effort to guide his fellow Muslims towards Islam and its 
teachings. What attracts us, in this respect, to study his contribution to Islam and 
Muslims in Britain during his life time is his title as ‘Sheikh ul-Islam of the 
British Isles’, a subject matter deserves to be studied and scrutinised within the 
scope of the current study.  
Does this title inform us that Quilliam was appointed by the Ottoman 
Sultan as a religious scholar or a ‘mufti’ who is capable enough to guide Muslims 
in their religious matters? Did he see himself as a competent authority in issuing 
religious verdict (fatwa) on issues that matter Muslims in their day today life? 
More precisely, did he consider himself as a ālim (religious scholar of Islam) 
whose scholarly guidance was sought after quite often by Muslim masses at times 
of their need for such assistance so that they can be guided through Islamic 
teachings?  
What is apparent from Quilliam’s role as a champion of Islam in 19th C 
Britain is, as contended by Birt,
234
 that he had considered himself as a Mufti who 
is capable enough to issue religious verdicts on issues concerned Islam and 
Muslims. He had presented himself as a competent authority in Islam and 
manifested him as someone who can give fatwas.
235
 In one of his rulings (fatwa), 
precisely on the issue of British invasion of Sudan in 1896,
236
 the terms like 
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‘fetva’, ‘proclamation’, and ‘declaration’ were used by him. Undoubtedly, it was 
his capacity as a ālim237 that might have convinced him to be capable enough to 
give religious verdict on such issues. Moreover, it can be said that it was his sense 
of religious conviction, rather than any thing else, that could have prompted him 
to act as an alim who is responsible for dealing with such issues so that people 
who seek his guidance can be educated according to their religion.  
It seems that the role he had played as a Mufti was not conditional on 
receiving such title as Sheikh-ul-Islam from the Ottoman Sultan or a designation 
which brings material gaining, rather it was his own initiative and commitment to 
his religion. His own description of the mission he had undertaken under this title 
underlies what was his real motivation to embark upon such a task. When he 
wrote to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool in 1903 he emphasised that: “I do not 
officially represent Turkey in Liverpool, but I do represent the Muslim faith, and 
am the Sheikh of the Mussulmans in the British Isles. I do not receive one penny 
from the Turkish government.”238  
It is true, of course, that in Friday sermons he never failed to mention 
Sultan Abdul Hamid’s name and his institute held services according to the 
Hanafi school which is an indication that he was following the Ottoman method 
of running the affairs of other Muslim communities elsewhere in the Empire, 
including religious functions. Yet, it does not indicate anything other than what it 
appears to be his own approach and initiative in conducting his own affairs by 
following a certain system in leading his community in Liverpool. Although this 
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would show his support and allegiance to Ottoman caliph as he had shown his 
loyalty to him by being in his side in time of political crisis as mentioned before, 
particularly being critical of the British position in political matters concerned 
with Muslims under the caliphate, which will be highlighted under the following 
title, yet it can not be interpreted as a politically motivated strategy used by both 
in order to achieve certain political gains, rather it was a matter of principle for 
him, which he exercised unashamedly out of conviction and loyalty to his religion 
as well as to his fellow Muslims, which can be described as his worldview: pan 
Islamism. This attitude of him is quite phenomenal in his way of seeing matters 
related to Islam and Muslims across the world during his time.  
What is obvious from the above discussion is “that Quilliam”, as 
contended by Birt, “did see the honorary title of Sheikh-ul-Islam as a serious 
means by which to found Islam in Britain and to create a permanent office. This 
non-stipendiary office, as Quilliam saw it, included the duties of legal guidance, 
preaching and the mobilisation of the Muslim Diasporas in support of the 
Ottoman caliph. In that sense the Ottomans not only bestowed Quilliam with 
symbolic legitimacy but with a model of religious institutionalisation in Britain 
and a pan-Islamism…”239 What is quite unclear in this connection, though, is the 
decline and the discontinuation of Quilliam’s effort. As noted by Birt, although 
Quilliam ‘groomed’ one of his sons, Ahmad, as his successor,240 the time proved 
the opposite bringing all his efforts to an end. With Quilliam’s departure overseas 
in 1908, as mentioned before, “the thriving Muslim community of Liverpool, 
lacking the direction and determination of its founder, declined sharply. 
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that a community of about 200 survived for some 
years and continued to conduct its business quietly and unostentatiously with the 
Liverpool Mosque and Institute (LMI) as its institutional focus.”241  
4.1.3.3 Abdullah Quilliam as the Founder of Liverpool Mosque 
and Institute  
Being a solicitor by profession and using the inborn talents he was 
bestowed with, he began holding lectures on Islam and its teachings and soon 
found himself in a position of setting up the Liverpool Mosque and Institute 
(LMI) in Brougham Terrace in West Derby Road in 1889.
242
 “Within a few years 
these…premises were enlarged, and by the mid-1890s the LMI consisted of a 
mosque, a madrassa, a library and reading room, a printing press, a museum, a 
boys’ boarding- and day-school, a girls’ day-school, a hostel for Muslims and an 
office for a literary society.”243  Widening the circle of interaction with his locality 
and taking the message of Islam further to the wider society, he set up a weekly 
Debating and Literary Society which attracted many non-Muslims and brought, as 
a result, a hundred and fifty non-Muslims into Islam by 1896.
244
  
He also published two journals: The Crescent
245
 and The Islamic World,
246
 
which covered unfailingly wide range of political and social issues concerning 
Islam and Muslims, and were circulated locally, nationally, and even 
internationally, and attracted, as a result, a wide range of readership through 
                                                 
241
 Ansari, H., Op. Cit., p. 126 
242
 Ibid. p. 122; Accessed at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/forgotten-
champion-of-islam-one-man-and-his-mosque-459936.html on 26th February 2008 
243
 Ansari, Humayun, Op. Cit. p. 122. 
244
 Accessed at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/forgotten-champion-of-islam-
one-man-and-his-mosque-459936.html on 26th February 2008 
245
 A journal of eight pages was first published in 1893 and continued to appear weekly till 1908: 
Ansari, Humayun, Op. Cit. p. 122  
246
 A thirty two page monthly journal: Ibid.  
 142 
subscriptions from all over the world “including India, Turkey, China, the United 
States, Egypt, Morocco, Switzerland, West Africa, New Zealand, Germany, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Australia and Canada.”247 Furthermore, he wrote two 
books: a book of Muslim hymns in English and ‘the faith of Islam’. The latter was 
published in 1899 and was translated into 13 languages.
248
  
Having pioneered the example of institutionalising Islam in Britain as 
noted above, Quilliam’s timing of this endeavour was largely untimely, as 
contended by Ansari, as the political mood in Britain at the time was extremely 
tense because of the ongoing political crisis with Sudan.
249
 He had to face, 
therefore, severe opposition throughout his mission and was subjected to harsh 
criticism from both public as well as press because of his stance on the British 
invasion of Sudan as mentioned above. Generally speaking, the overall socio-
political situation during this time was very much inappropriate for an initiative 
like the one Quilliam wanted to take for the wellbeing of his community. Even 
“the very mention of Islam in Britain was like a red rag to a bull”250 Exacerbating 
the already fractured relationship between him and the public, his landlord of the 
property which he was using as a mosque forced him to vacate the premises and 
made it clear that he “would not have any person occupying his premises who did 
not believe and preach the saving efficacy of Christ Jesus’ blood”251 This is 
another example of re-emergence of religious factor in the socio-political 
spectrum of 19
th
 C Britain. This makes clear that not only the class and colour that 
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were more strongly at play in perceiving Muslims by the 19
th
 C British public, but 
also the religious factor too was as strong as the other ones.           
4.1.4 Dr. G.W. Leitner – Woking Mosque 
With the fall of Quilliam’s Muslim Institute in Liverpool, another mission 
came into being under the patronage of Dr. G.W. Leitner: Hungarian orientalist 
and the ex-registrar of the University of Punjab 
252
 “who had already established 
in 1889 the first purpose built-mosque”253 in Woking254. The purpose of the 
mosque was very much personal and limited as it was not equally accessible by all 
Muslims.
255
 Only those who had accepted the restrictions stipulated by him were 
allowed to enter his mosque. Whom these conditions were targeted at is not clear. 
Nevertheless, his attitude, according to Ansari, towards South Asian Muslims, for 
instance, “was patronising.”256 Although no reason has been given by Ansari as to 
why Leitner had seen those Muslims as such, Leitners’s purpose, as contended by 
Ansari, for building the mosque was somewhat discriminative and it was, 
therefore,  intended “to provide a place where Muslims of ‘good family’ could 
practice their faith.”257  
While it is again not clear as to why someone should be a member of a 
‘good family’ in order for him or her to be permitted to enter this mosque since 
there is no such categorisation has been celebrated in Islam neither in the society 
nor in the mosque, it is also equally unclear whether any particular group of 
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Muslims, precisely South Asian Muslims towards whom his attitude ‘was 
patronising’, were targeted by this self-classified grouping as ‘good family’.  
Was that perceived qualification coined by Leitner with regard to ‘good 
family’, based on class factor or social status or wealth and fame or political 
influence and power is not known, an aspect beyond the scope of the current 
study. Nevertheless, what becomes clear though in this regard, as contended by 
Ansari, is a number of limitations put in place by him when he established this 
mosque as to how the worshipping premise should be utilised.  Hence, the 
worshipping place, while should be a space where Muslims of ‘good family’ 
could practice their faith, should not be used at the same time, according to 
Leitner, “for the purposes of converting Englishmen to Islam, or to introduce new 
doctrines into that faith, or to promote religious and political propaganda, or to 
celebrate the generally unhappy marriages between Mohommedans and English 
women.”258 Whether there can be any link between his classification of Muslims 
as ‘good family’ including the conditions stipulated by him and his reservation 
about South Asian Muslims is yet to be uncovered. Moreover, it is equally unclear 
whether these functional conditions of the mosque had been just a pretence 
hatched by him for the exclusion of the South Asian Muslims from the mosque 
under the category of ‘good family’. It is because, there is little evidence to prove, 
in the event of their access to the mosque, that they would exploit it for the 
‘allegedly purposes’ which were deemed by Leitner as inappropriate.  The matter 
is still thickly clouded and the missing link looms largely unidentified as there is 
hardly any evidence to prove to this effect.   
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It appears that Leitner might have thought that he should be more selective 
in his approach towards the usage of the mosque: whom he should allow to use it 
and how it should be used. It seems perhaps he might have been more cautious 
about not to face what Quilliam had encountered in Liverpool and not to endanger 
his mission while witnessing all the negative consequences resulted in Quilliam’s 
approach as mentioned before or may be he was rather pre-cautious about the way 
the mosque should be utilised by the users if it was to function according to his 
wishes and plans. He did not want to leave the options open as far as the function 
of the mosque is concerned, particularly with the arrival of Muslim immigrants in 
London, especially from South Asia who had just become the subjects of the 
British Empire after the 1857 mutiny, whom he might have considered to be 
rather politicised in their movements and activities. It might be the reason why he 
had laid down that the place should not be used ‘to promote religious and political 
propaganda’. If it is the case, one should not be surprised why, as contended by 
Ansari, “his conditions for the use of the Mosque did not go unchallenged by 
London-based Muslim societies, mainly of students from Indian subcontinent.”259 
In fact, a group of South Asian Muslims took to the fore challenging the status 
quo - with regard to the purpose as well as the function of the mosque - under the 
leadership of Khwaja Kamaluddin, a barrister from Lahore, who established the 
Woking Muslim Mission on the same site in 1912 after it remained deserted for 
many years after the death of Leitner
260
 in 1899. From then on, the place had 
become the “active centre”261 for many South Asian Muslims who arrived in 
Britain at the turn of the 20
th
 century.  
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Among the leading lights of the Mission, besides Khwaja Kamaluddin, were 
Abdullah Yūsuf Ali and Syed Ameer Ali. As the founder of the Mission, Khwaja 
Kamaluddin, unlike Leitner, had opened the doors of his centre for all Muslims 
from all backgrounds and affiliations although he was affiliated to the Ahmadiyah 
movement.
262
 One of the main objectives they intended to initiate through the 
Mission, according to Ansari, “was to build a viable Muslim community in 
Britain, partly at least through conversion…”263 In order to achieve this aim, they 
worked out a number of plans and strategies, and to disseminate their ideas and 
vision, they started a monthly journal called Muslim India and Islamic Review in 
1913.
264
 One of the plans they persistently believed to carry out was to convert 
non-Muslims to Islam, an idea calculatingly put aside by Leitner when he founded 
the Woking Mosque and thus, one of his conditions for the function of the 
Mosque was thrown out of the window by his successors. This initiation by the 
new custodians of the centre unfailingly reinforces the speculations made earlier 
on the supposed reason why Leitner was so cautious about whom he should allow 
to access his Mosque or whom he saw as fit to enter the premises of his Mosque 
or more precisely, whom he considered to be members of ‘good family’. It will 
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not be incorrect to speculate that Leitner, when he laid down the rules and 
conditions for the function of his mosque, might have had South Asian Muslims 
in his mind and was quite right to a large extent in his selective approach towards 
his worshipping place in terms of whom he should let in and what it should be 
used for.      
Being the hub of Muslim activities in London during and after the First 
World War, Woking Mosque attracted more and more Muslims who arrived in the 
capital from all parts of the Muslim world. With the increase in the number of 
London’s Muslim population, the need for an Islamic centre was strongly felt by 
the leading members of the Mosque: Lord Headley, Kamaluddin, and syed Ameer 
Ali who in turn set up a trust fund to finance construction of the proposed centre. 
In 1926, as a first step, “three houses in Stepney were converted into a mosque, 
then in 1928 the Nizamiah Mosque Trust was set up and a site in Kensington was 
bought with the help of a large donation-some £60.000-from the Nizam of 
Hyderabad. In 1930 plans for a complex were announced, and the foundation-
stone was laid in 1937.”265 But the implementation of the proposed plans had 
suffered a setback and did not go according to the expectations of the trustees as 
the leading lights: “Headley and Kamaluddin had died in the early 1930s.”266 The 
project, therefore, had to be shouldered by a new committee who “severed its ties 
with the Ahmadiyyas”267 as its “status as an Islamic movement was increasingly 
contested.”268 From then on, the Mosque with a new face had managed to remain 
as a centre for Muslims from diverse background as ever before until well after 
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the Second World War. Its influence and significance, however, dropped 
considerably after the war despite its organ The Islamic Review had been on the 
run fulfilling its job: disseminating information about Islam.
269
  
The question arises as to what extent that Leitner’s perceived restrictions 
on the way his Mosque should be run including his idea of ‘good family’ can be 
accommodated within the precepts of Islam? How did his successors manage to 
put forward their plans and strategies to the British society? What kind of 
activities and approaches did they put into practice in order to implement their 
plans? These and similar questions would be addressed in the following section to 
see how far they are relevant in today’s British socio-political context and whether 
there are lessons to be learned in the making of the Muslim community in the 
contemporary British context. 
4.1.5 Central London Mosque   
While the Woking Mission and its activities were declining and its 
influence was fading away, “The East London Mosque was inaugurated in August 
1941.”270 Paralleled to this project, an idea for an Islamic Cultural Centre in the 
capital, which later became known as the Central London Mosque in Regent’s 
Park took shape and established in 1944
271
 with the help and “support from 
several Muslim countries.”272 Ever since its establishment, which over a half a 
century now, it has largely succeeded in gaining reputation and recognition as the 
“central religious institution of the diverse Muslim communities in Britain.”273  
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Between the interwar periods a number of delegations came to visit Britain and a 
few such as the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian formed the diplomatic corps of the 
Muslim states to the courts of St. James. There were also an increased number of 
Muslim students, businessmen, and workers travelled to London during this 
period.
274
 As many of these Muslims found it was inconvenient to travel to 
Woking mosque for their congregational prayers and, therefore, in want of a place 
of their own for the congregation, the need for a Central Mosque in London thus 
became inevitable and thus Central London Mosque in Regent’s Park found its 
way to the existence in 1944.  
Being named as London Islamic Cultural Centre in 1944, the mosque took 
its fullest shape only in 1977 at a cost of £6.5 million and it was privileged by 
having an administrative wing in 1994 in its 50
th
 anniversary since its inception.
275
  
The main purposes of the Mosque and the Cultural Centre were to organise 
Islamic cultural activities in the United Kingdom, to establish an institution which 
would guide the Muslim community in its religious and cultural requirement, to 
provide information to non-Muslims on Islamic history, culture, and literature. 
According to its website, The Islamic Cultural Centre’s central role is to provide 
facilities for daily prayers, to provide education to children in Central London and 
surrounding areas, and to extend helping hand to other mosques and Islamic 
organisations to establish themselves in order to serve their respective 
communities.
276
 Its overall activities are, as the website states, providing library 
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facilities to its users, facilitating religious services, educational, social, and health 
services for the Muslim community.  
As for its religious services, it mainly provides guidance through a 
committee of religious scholars whose primary responsibility is to resolve 
religious issues put forward to them by issuing fatwas.
277
 There is little 
information about what kind of issues presented to the fatwa committee and how 
they have been resolved. Yet, from its media section which contains some 
information regarding its press release one can gauge its standpoint on issues 
related to day-to-day issues of the wider society as well as the Muslim 
community. Particularly, its press release condemning 7 July 2005 bomb attack in 
London, for instance, can be seen as its official position regarding the tragic 
incident and as a positive step forward in rejecting terrorism in its all forms.   
The Centre also runs a supplementary weekend school called al-Qalam 
which teaches Arabic and Islamic courses to children as well as adults. Its social 
services section provides matrimonial services through facilitating and conducting 
Islamic marriage ceremonies by its appointed imams. Its academic contribution to 
Islamic studies can be gauged by its quarterly journal: Islamic Quarterly which 
has been publishing since 1954 to date.   
It appears that the Centre has been largely successful in its neutrality as 
“the representative of the entire British Muslim community in all its 
diversity…”278 In so doing, as contended by Ansari, the Centre has been 
maintaining a non-partisan low-key approach to Muslim issues. “It has been able 
do this by offering its resources and its facilities to all Muslim groups as well as 
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giving space to people engaged in dynamic debates right across the theological 
spectrum.”279 While the Centre and the Central Mosque have both together been 
serving many expatriate Muslim communities living in the capital, the local Arab 
communities concentrated around Edgware Road have been the direct 
beneficiaries of the services and facilities provided by the Centre and the Mosque. 
According to the Centre’s website the weekly attendees of the Mosque and the 
centre fluctuate between 8,000 and 10,000 and they number 20,000 for two Eid
280
 
festivals prayers.
281
     
It appears that the overall picture of the London Central Mosque and the 
Islamic Cultural Centre as seen above largely demonstrates its suitability to be 
emulated by other mosques and centres in Britain at a time when sectarianism and 
sectarian influences tend to tear the British Muslim community apart. Comparing 
to mosques and centres discussed in this chapter, although they are few, and their 
continuity in servicing Muslim communities in Britain, the London Central 
Mosque together with its sister wing has managed to survive the challenges which 
came in its way and to stand continuously with strength and vigour as it is today. 
The underlining reason behind this apparent success may be it appears because of 
the persistent adherence to the principle of ‘unity in diversity’ held by the Mosque 
administration, which lacks in many of the mosques, institutions, and centres 
around the country.                         
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4.1.6 Sheikh Abdullah Ali al-Hakimi and the Alawi Tarīqā 
With the arrival of Sheikh Abdullah al–Hakimi in Britain in 1936,282 Islam 
has seen another development in the form of Muslim organisation in England and 
Wales. Representing Alawi Tarīqā283  al-Hakimi endeavoured to organise the 
Muslim community in South Shields and Cardiff on the basis of spiritual order 
with an orientation to Alawi Tarīqā. The timing of his arrival in Britain has 
coincided with a rising tendency towards formation of embryonic Muslim 
communities in both of these port cities. Having married to local English 
women,
284
 Yemeni Muslim sailors have begun to consolidate their social status 
with a better position of economic stability after the First World War.
285
 Yet, it 
was not without colour, racial, and employment issues as usually found during 
interwar period as contended by Little and Ansari.
286
 The need for a formation of 
a community was immensely felt by the community. Fulfilling this timely need al-
Hakimi was appointed by Sheikh al-Alawi: the founder of the order “founded the 
Alawi order in that year (1936) and called it the Zaouia Islamia Allawouia 
Religious Society of the United Kingdom.”287 
The organisation’s main concern was how to put a stop to the ongoing 
problem of moving away of many Muslim communities of Britain’s sea ports 
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from their religious and cultural roots. Due to mixed marriages which were not 
conducted according to Muslim law
288
 as they mostly married British women
289
 
and the concerns related to the education of young children in a non-Muslim 
environment while most of the seamen’s wives remained in their own religion,290 
a proper religious guidance to safeguard the Muslim personality of the community 
was inevitably a timely need. It is not to deny, however, that some of these British 
women did in due course become Muslims. Nielsen maintains that they “had 
usually become Muslims.”291 This emerging social situation gave al-Hakimi the 
impetus to organise the religious life of the Muslim communities of the sea ports 
of Cardiff and South Shields where Yemeni and Somali communities lived with 
their English wives and children.
292
  
As a result of al-Hakimi’s strenuous effort, his Zaouia, as noted by Ansari, 
“was notably successful in institutionalising the religious activities of the Yemeni 
and Somali Muslim communities in England and Wales.”293 The Zaouia mainly 
focused on community building activities such as educating young Muslims; 
publishing Islamic literature; “initiating social reform among the Muslims in 
Britain, strengthening cultural and social bonds between Muslims and non-
Muslims; strengthening communications between Muslims in Britain outside; 
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exchanging Islamic knowledge and sending groups of students abroad to study in 
Islamic universities…”294 Little has observed that behind all its activities, the 
Zaouia’s stimulus was  “essentially religious and social rather than political in its 
interest.”295 According to Collins, some Muslims in Tyneside dissociated 
themselves from the Sufi order criticising the “Alawaians as being more a 
political than a religious group”. Although Collins did little note why the group 
was criticised as such and who were behind this criticism, it appears, nevertheless, 
that the sectarian influences might have been the source of such disparagement. 
Apparently, there was some sectarianism in the community as contended by Little 
who has given a vivid account of this damaging social phenomenon: “There is a 
an Arab club, and a Somali club. When a general meeting of the community as a 
whole is called, each club sends its own representatives. The Somalis are said to 
be particularly “independent”, and do not seem to have affiliated completely with 
any other section.”296  
However, it is difficult to ascertain, despite this report with regard to social 
gap between Arabs who were predominantly Yemenis: Alawaians and Somalis 
who were said to be “independent”, that Somalis were behind this dissatisfaction 
towards the order as there is hardly any evidence to suggest to this effect. 
However, the chances for the emergence of such accusations in similar social 
circumstances where sectarianism is the predominant feature is not something 
unpredictable and therefore, can not be completely ruled out from its occurrence. 
But, whether the criticism came from Somalis is still to be proved. Despite this 
ambiguity as regards to the exact source of such dissatisfaction, it seems that the 
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socio-political situation that arose in the community in 1930s with the arrival of 
Sheikh al-Hakimi in Cardiff, had given some space for such divisions to put down 
roots in the community.  
Having successfully represented the Muslim community in Tyneside in the 
local authorities winning a number of social benefits for the community in early 
thirties,
297
 al-Hakimi, while representing it in the local government in Cardiff as 
its religious leader via mediating in matters of social and economic concerns, also 
became involved in political issues after he moved to Cardiff. More precisely, he 
was actively involved in political discussions by organising conferences on 
“happenings in Muslim countries, some of them colonial territories.”298 His 
involvement in politics, although it was initially seen by the community as serving 
their interests, gradually became disenchanted by an increasing number of 
community members, not necessarily Somalis, thereby creating conflicts among 
rival groups. Especially his “active anti-Yemenite attitude”299 had been considered 
by some community members as “detrimental to the well-being of the Muslim 
community in Britain.”300 It is not difficult, therefore, to assume that this 
unhealthy situation might have given rise to the emergence of such divisions in 
the community. The underlying cause behind this dissatisfaction expressed by 
some part of the community, it seems, was their disagreement in finding an 
                                                 
297
 Through negotiations with the Municipal Council he managed to acquire a section of the 
cemetery for Muslims in Tyneside: Collins, S.F., Coloured Minorities in Britain: Studies in 
Britain Race Relations Based on African, West Indian and Asiatic Immigrants, Op. Cit. p. 178 
298
 Ibid. pp. 222- 23 
299
 Ibid. p. 223 
300
 According to Collins, “the British government and Yemenite government happened to be on 
friendly terms at the time”: Ibid.   
 156 
appropriate way to reconcile between religious and political interests of the 
community.
301
  
Given this socio-political phenomenon, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the discontent within the community might have arisen from within the 
Yemeni community itself for disputes over political issues rather than sectarian 
divisions gained ground in the community between Somalis and Yemenis as 
mentioned before. Hence, it is not inappropriate to suggest that the chances for the 
materialization of such dissatisfaction within some section of the community 
including Somalis is due to the community’s failure in finding a balance approach 
between religious and political interests were far greater than the sectarianism 
itself although the role which can be played by sectarianism in creating such 
divisions in the community can not be underestimated. As contended by Collins, 
this division in the community had far reaching consequences and had eventually 
led it to its fateful split. Consequently, “the sheikh was forced to give up his 
position and he left the country”302 as a result of the failed attempt by some 
members of the Cardiff Muslim community in persuading him to confine himself 
only to religious leadership in exclusion of political activities, but he “was too 
deeply involved in his political commitments to relinquish his political 
activities.”303   
Drawing on the above discussion, one may extract some lessons in 
relevance to the scope of the current study which can throw some light on how the 
contemporary British Muslim minority can benefit from the experience lived by 
their ancestors as minorities in a non-Muslim social setting.  
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Firstly, there seems to be certain similarities between the experience of 
Quilliam and al-Hakimi; both were largely successful in institutionalising Islam in 
Britain; aims and objectives of both and the means to achieve them were more or 
less matching although it is not clear whether Quilliam’s revert to Islam was 
caused by al-Alawi sufi order when he was travelling in Algeria as al-Hakimi 
himself was attracted towards Alawiyya tarīqā. Like Quilliam’s LMI and Islamic 
Review, al-Hakimi also established Nur al-Islam mosque in 1947 including 
zāwiyās304 and a printing press which published an Arabic fortnightly paper called 
al-Salām;305 the range of activities in reaching out to people were to a large extent 
similar although in the case of al-Hakimi the scope of initiatives were broader 
than Quilliam, particularly with his efforts to achieve a solid base for Muslim 
community in the wider society via cultivating connections with “local officials 
such as the mayor, town councillors and the Chief Constable”;306 although both 
were engaged in politics and met with lot of opposition, the causes for opposition 
were drastically different: While Quilliam faced opposition from the wider British 
society including press, whereas al-Hakimi had to face resistance from within the 
Muslim community itself which led eventually to the division of the community. 
In a similar fashion, both had been forced to leave their respective communities 
because of the pressure both had to encounter thereby paving the way to the 
decline of the very communities they had constructed painstakingly; yet in the 
case of Quilliam it was the external pressure that forced him to live in exile which 
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led to the fading away of his efforts, whereas al-Hakimi had been forced to leave 
his people for good in 1952
307
 because of the internal pressure he had to encounter 
from within his own community. 
However, what the short-lived contribution of both personalities to their 
respective communities indicates, despite its sound origin and growth in both 
locations, is that some of the approaches devised by both as means to achieve 
their goals were largely questionable and even in some cases appear to be 
inappropriate as they both seemed to fail to figure out their respective contexts 
through lenses of two types of fiqh: fiqh al-awlawiyyāt308 and fiqh al-tawāzun,309 
particularly in dealing with political issues. Although Quillam’s da‘wah310 method 
based on one-to-one approach as well as personal acquaintances was largely a 
success story as contended by Ansari,
311
 the tone he used to address the political 
issues of his time, as seen before, was a nuisance to the ears of his audience which 
resulted in a damaging effect on his mission, an indication of failure in 
approaching the situation through both fiqh al-awlawiyyāt in terms of priorities as 
well as fiqh al-tawāzun in terms of balanced approach which can help evaluate the 
whole situation on the basis of Islamic legal maxims.
312
 In the case of al-Hakimi, 
on the other hand, the underlying cause for the immature outcome of his efforts 
was again paying little attention, as identified with Quilliam, to guiding methods 
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of Islamic jurisprudence namely fiqh al-awlawiyyāt and fiqh al-tawāzun, a subject 
which will be treated in detail in the sixth chapter.  
Understanding the whole experience of both Quilliam and al-Hakimi in the 
manner discussed above can largely help guide the contemporary Muslim 
minority in Britain in handling their affairs which determine not only their well-
being but also their very existence in Britain in the long run. It is worth noting that 
there arose already similar socio-political situations in Britain: the Salman Rushdi 
affair, Gulf War, 9/11 tragedy, war in Iraq, and 7/7 bomb attack in London. 
Muslims disappointingly failed to act along the lines of the guiding methods 
mentioned above, a detail account of which will be discussed in the fifth chapter.                     
Unlike the Moroccans in Manchester who had to rely on Muhammad 
Abduhu for religious guidance on issues of their day today life as mentioned 
before, Muslims in South Shields and Cardiff, on the contrary, had their own 
imam and the religious scholar who was responsible not only for their guidance in 
matters of their religion but also for giving them a proper leadership in their 
social, political, and economical affairs. As contended by Little, the community 
was more or less “Islamised”313 under the leadership of al-Hakimi. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that if al-Hakimi were a little more patient and 
perseverant throughout his career, the outcome of his multifaceted contribution to 
improve the life of Muslims in South Shields and Cardiff would have been 
entirely different and it would have yielded some benefits in the form of good 
examples and models not only to contemporary Muslims of the area where he 
represented but also to Muslims of other parts of Britain. So much so, even the 
contemporary Muslims in Britain could have reaped the fruits of his endeavour by 
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emulating him as a role model. This should serve as a reminder for the 
contemporary Muslims of Britain that they may not repeat the same mistake when 
handling the affairs of their day-to-day life, particularly when they face such 
problems as the ones mentioned above where they missed to act with wisdom and 
far-sightedness.  
4.2 Muslims in Britain – Since the Second World War to Present 
Time 
This section of the chapter seeks to focus on Muslims’ arrival in Britain 
after the Second World War, their demographical locations with particular 
reference to main areas where they were concentrated in large numbers, their 
main efforts to establish themselves as religious communities, and historically 
important issues and challenges they faced as Muslim minorities in a non-Muslim 
social setting. It also attempts to concentrate mainly on particular events and 
incidents which have taken place in the recent past which tend to shape Muslim, 
non-Muslim relationships in Britain.  
In doing so, it also aims to highlight the migration pattern they made to 
Britain in different time spans and how it affected the sustainability of their 
presence in Britain as a community and their contribution to the wider society 
depending on their wish to stay or not to stay permanently. It also aims to 
appreciate their community building efforts and how far they have been 
successful in that endeavour. If they were not succesful it aims to analyse how and 
where it went wrong. It also intends to identify currents which run beneath the 
social, political, and religious problems Muslims are facing in modern-day Britain 
which tends to affect the community relationship between Muslims and the wider 
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society. The overall aim of this section of the chapter is to shed light on how 
contemporary Muslim minorities in Britain are apparently vulnerable to loose 
their religious identity if their current situation which is full of crises and 
problems goes unchallenged without being guided through their religion, which 
this study aims to illustrate.           
Muslims’ arrival in Britain after the Second World War can be considered 
as a watershed in the history of British Muslims. It has drawn a clear line between 
the pre and post war period in terms of Muslims’ migration and their settlement in 
Britain, and also their relationship and interaction with the British society. There 
are certain important characteristics which distinguish between the two periods: 
pre and post war. The striking feature of this distinction is conspicuous not only in 
terms of contributing factors which led to the migration into Britain but also in 
terms of the nature and size of the migration. Moreover, the noticeable 
characteristic of this migratory pattern can be gauged from the locations these 
Muslims have come from and the religious backgrounds they have represented. 
Unlike early Muslim settlements which put down roots in Britain since 
18
th
 to early 20
th
 C as seen above, the settlement pattern Muslims initiated after 
the Second World War has taken a different shape in size, nature, and location. 
Especially, when Muslims arrived in Britain after 1950s, their arrival was in large 
numbers at a time. Their coming as migrants has been another striking feature 
which was little to be found in the previous settlement pattern. Their settlement in 
inner cities, particularly in industrial areas, rather than in dockland areas of British 
seaports as sought by previous settlers, has been the distinctive feature of post 
Second World War Muslim settlements in Britain which has laid the foundation 
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for the formation of the modern-day British Muslim communities in major cities 
of Britain.  
Moreover, contrasting the pre-war settlements which were mostly 
moulded by sufi-oriented religious initiatives, the post-war Muslim settlers who 
have been mostly from New Commonwealth countries and Indo-Pakistan 
subcontinent are much influenced by the 20
th
 C Islamic movements of Arab-
Islamic countries and Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The sheer reflection of this 
influence is amply manifest in the religio-cultural initiatives contemporary 
Muslim communities have taken in consolidating their religiosity in the modern-
day Britain in the form of mosques, organisations, institutions…etc. This has 
partly caused to emerge an array of religious and cultural manifestations displayed 
by bulk of these migrants in the contemporary British society while holding to 
fundamental teachings and practices of Islam with varying degree of attachment 
to Islamic teachings in their day-to-day life.  
According to 2001 census, Muslims accounted for 3.1 per cent or 1.5 
million of the UK population and are measured to be “the second largest group 
considered in terms of religion…compared with 35 million or 72 per cent of the 
population for Christians.”314 Since 1851, as contended by Peach, the 2001 UK 
census was the first to pose a question on religious identity. According to him, 
Muslims’ population in Britain has risen from 21,000 in 1951 to 1.6 million in 
2001.
315
 The number has ascended due to Muslims’ migration in large numbers 
since the Second World War. As contended by Ansari, Muslims have migrated “in 
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much large numbers than before 1945, with the majority still coming from South 
Asia, parts of the Middle East, Africa and Cyprus.”316 Muslims’ migration to 
Britain remained thus low in 1950s and then it was rapidly on the increase in the 
consecutive decades because of the migratory flow triggered by the demand for 
migrant labour in the post Second World War Britain. This was further increased 
by the population growth of Muslim communities in Britain with having their 
younger generations born in the host country to reach the current figure thus 
estimated by 2001 census which is an indicative of the way the demographic 
landscape of contemporary Muslim minorities have been taking shape in the 
modern-day Britain. 
  Vertorec observes that, “in the early 1950s, when labour migration from 
the South Asian subcontinent was in its early phases, the Muslim population of 
Britain was around 23,000."
317
 Peach observes, “by 1961, there were about 82,000 
Muslims in the country, rising to about 369,000 by 1971, some 553,000 by 1981, 
and about one million by 1991.”318 By extrapolating the trend of the population 
growth of Muslims in Britain for the last 50 years, as seen above, it may not be 
unreasonable to predict that the current figure for Muslim minorities in Britain 
might have approximately risen to not less than 2 million.  
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This flow of migrants was largely originated from South Asia, particularly from 
Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. According to the consecutive census from 1951 to 
1991, as contended by Lewis, the combined number for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi Muslims who have formed the biggest source of migration to Britain 
since 1950s to late 20
th
 C, rose from 5,000 in 1951 to 24,900 in 1961 with 1.2 per 
cent of British born; between 1961 and 1971 the number increased by seven fold 
to over 170,000 with 23.5 per cent of British born; then it ascended to make it 
more than doubled in the next ten years to 360,000 with 37.5 per cent of British 
born and then to 640,000 with 47 per cent of British born by 1991.
319
  
Gleaning from the 40 years of data from 1951 to 1991, as seen before, one 
can notice an unprecedented and steady population growth of migrants within a 
short period of time from 1961 to 1971. This was caused precisely by the rapid 
rise of migration from Indo-Pakistan subcontinent aftermath of the British 
government’s decision to bring the migratory flow under control for the 
“migration from the former colonies was already causing anxiety to the British 
government as relations between sections of the indigenous population and 
migrant groups showed signs of strain.”320 By the 1960s, the British government, 
hence, brought in various acts to stem the flow of migrants from abroad despite 
“women and dependant children were generally allowed to join the men,”321 as 
contended by Veterec. Ansari observes that as a result of these immigration 
legislations and the voluntary controls introduced by India and Pakistan up to 
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1959 the migration, instead of being contained, has increased dramatically in 
1961, “and stayed relatively high in 1960s and early 1970s.”322  
Nielson contends that “almost half of the more than 130, 000 Pakistanis 
who had arrived in Britain by the end of 1967 had arrived after the introduction of 
controls on 1 July 1962…”323 Having come in large numbers from West as well as 
East Pakistan which later became Bangladesh since 1971, the subcontinent 
Muslims had their own reasons to migrate to Britain from particular areas of their 
homeland. As noted by Ansari, the migrants mainly came from poorer areas of 
Pakistan, particularly from Mirpur district in Southern Kashmir and the 
Cambellpur district of the north-eastern Punjab. Some smaller groups also came 
from the areas of the North West Frontier Province next to the Afghani border. He 
further maintains that in the case of Mirpur the particular factor was the 
displacement caused by the Mangala Dam Project which started in 1960 and had 
drastically affected 100,000 Mirpuris by submerging 250 of their villages.
324
 The 
other two key areas were, as contended by Nielson, the Sylhet district and the port 
town of Chittagong which later became two main regions of Bangladesh since 
1971.
325
  
The other notable group of people who had played their part in the 
migration process during 60s and early 70s were Indians. In contrast to the factors 
contributed to the migration from Pakistan, as seen above, the underlying reasons 
for people of Indian origin to undertake migration to Britain were varied 
compared to migratory pattern from Pakistan in terms of number and location. 
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Nielson contends that the number of Indian Migrants was small and they were 
largely “Gujaratis who have come from the well-educated trading and 
professional families of the adjoining districts of Baroda, Surat and Broach…”326 
In a similar fashion, a sizable number of Indian Muslims had to find their way to 
Britain from certain East African countries: Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and Malawi as migrants in the 1970s. This was largely due to the fact that they 
“were experiencing pressure from Africanisation policies of especially Kenya and 
Uganda.”327 Having alarmed by impending danger and insecurity under the 
nationalistic policies of these African governments, Muslims along with other 
Asian communities who had British passports decided to migrate to Britain 
adding the number of Muslim population in Britain by another few thousands. 
Lewis maintains that “in 1981, 155,000 South Asians of East African origin were 
living in Britain, of which possibly 15 per cent were Muslims.”328 
The circle of Muslim migration into Britain was further expanded by 
coming of Turkish Cypriots as migrants. Their arrival mostly coincided with the 
timing of the migration of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis into Britain and was 
largely triggered by the civil strife in Cyprus in the mid-1950s. Then it “speeded 
up in the aftermath of the 1957 troubles”329 occurred between two main ethnic 
groups: the Greeks and Turks. Hence by 1958, it was estimated that there were 
8,500 Turkish Cypriots in Britain, as contended by Ansari.
330
 Nielson maintains 
that their number peaked just in two years before the implementation of 1962 
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immigration act.
331
 Hence, “an immediate influx of 25,000 Cypriots took place in 
1960-1.”332 The partition of Cyprus in 1974 triggered another wave of Turkish 
Cypriots migration into Britain and this time it was estimated as about 3,000.
333
 
As for Arabs, the largest community in Britain, according to Ansari, by the 1970s 
consisted of Egyptians. “They had arrived in significant numbers since 1950s, and 
by 1991 were estimated to number between 23,000 and 90,000.”334 Other Arabs 
who came to Britain in 1970s were Iraqis, Algerians, Libyans, and Palestinians. 
While Palestinians started to arrive in Britain after the creation of Israel as the life 
under the Israeli occupation was intolerable the rest moved away from their 
homes in order to escape persecutions perpetrated by their respective regimes 
because of political differences.  
Similarly, it was the feeling of insecurity and loss of life for religious or 
political persecutions committed by their opponents whether they were 
individuals or ruling elites that had driven off Turkish kurds and Iranians from 
their homeland to Britain.
335
 As refugees some 20,000 Iranians were estimated to 
seek sanctuary in Britain from the late 1970s. This amount includes the bulk of 
people representing different ideas and opinions but taking the same action to live 
in exile; while supporters of Shah wanted to escape the social isolation and the 
political marginalisation under the new revolutionary regime, the “moderate as 
well as revolutionary Muslims opposed to the clerical political system brought 
into existence by 1979 Iranian revolution.”336 As a nation without a country, 
Kurds also entered Britain during 1980s and 1990s seeking refuge for being 
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subjected to human right abuses in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In a similar fashion, the 
Somalis arrived in Britain in large numbers from mid-1980s as refugees 
numbering over 15,000.      
Apart from Muslims who had migrated to Britain in relatively large 
numbers after the Second World War as seen above, there were other such groups 
who had moved to Britain in smaller numbers as Malaysians, West Africans, 
Moroccans, and Yemenis
337
. As for Moroccans the size of their community in 
London had grown to between 5,000 and 10,000 by the early 1990s. As a distinct 
community, Yemenis emerged in Liverpool as a small community with no more 
than about 100 by the mid-1970s and then flourished into a community of 3,500 
by 1992.
338
 Ansari contends that in the early 1960s there were estimated to be 
12,000 Yemenis in Britain and by the mid-1970s there were around 2,000 of the 
first generation in Birmingham alone.
339
                 
It is worth noting that this migration trend was further enhanced, as 
contended by Ansari, by “the reuniting of the families and movement of refugees 
and asylum-seekers” causing further increase in the population growth of the 
Britain’s Muslim migrants in the 1980s and 1990s.340 The ‘reuniting of families’ 
can be considered as a general social phenomenon shared by almost all migrant 
communities entered Britain in groups in post Second World War. Yet, for the 
majority of Muslims of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent it was a slow process phased 
over several years depicted by Lewis as ‘four phase pattern of migration’ which is 
                                                 
337
 Nielsen, Jorgen, Op Cit., p. 40 
338
 Ansari, Humayun, Op. Cit. p. 156 
339
 Ibid. pp. 156-57 
340
 Ibid. p. 148 
 169 
known to be as ‘chain migration’341 as phrased by Ansari. In the case of majority 
Turkish Cypriots as well as East African Asians on the other hand the process 
took only a few months as the socio-political circumstances forced them to 
migrate were different to the once experienced by South Asian Muslims as seen 
above.  
However, the distinct feature in the case of most of the Turkish Cypriots 
migrants as opposed to the majority of South Asian Muslims is, Ansari maintains, 
that the migration for many of them was more of a personal choice rather than a 
collective decision as they did not have to support their relatives or families back 
home as the majority of South Asian Muslims
 
did
342
. Secondly, the personal and 
family calculations had also come to play in the case of South Asian Muslims 
whose migration, as contended by Ansari, was counted to be “an indicator of 
affluence and status, so that individuals and families competed to outdo each other 
in their capacity to emigrate”343. What this background for migration apparently 
reveals, it seems, that it became, “a system, a style, an established pattern, an 
example of collective behaviour” as contended by Anwar .344 
In this respect, none of these migrant communities had intended to stay 
permanently in Britain. For many of both communities the prime aim was to 
accumulate enough savings and then “to return home with enhanced status, to 
retire in dignity and in comfort. For a significant number this ‘home orientation’ 
or ‘myth of return’ was an enduring aspiration, but for others it was neither the 
sole nor the most important objective. Some wanted to access better education for 
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their children, and a few had political and personal motives to live in a more 
stimulating ‘modern’ environment, to strive for self-improvement, and to break 
away from communal and family obligations.”345 This stimulus for the migration, 
however, was largely not to be found in the case of Turkish Cypriots although the 
similarities of both communities’ migration was “the aim of profiting from 
opportunities in Britain” and returning home with having their objectives fulfilled 
as contended by Ansari.
346
  
Different approaches in deciding matters such as this had the tendency of 
having long term “implications for the way South Asian and Cypriot Muslims 
were to engage with British society.”347 This is to say that each of these Muslim 
communities had to face the difficult challenge of deciding their future direction 
in Britain; how they were going to engage with the British society and what sort 
of a mechanism was to be applied in interacting with an extremely alien social 
environment that was entirely unfamiliar to them. It appears that this dilemma was 
what largely to be reflected in the way both communities, on moving to Britain, 
had endeavoured to interact with the British society, while still having in the back 
of their mind the idea of returning home. In fact, forming of a clear future action 
plan with this uncertain mindset as to what their future holds in the host country 
was a daunting task for both South Asian and Cypriot Muslim communities when 
they migrated to Britain. Generally speaking, they were at a crossroads as to 
which way to take and to make their presence meaningful in the British society at 
this crucial time of their presence in Britain.  
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In reality, evidence shows that directions taken by them at this critical 
moment of their presence in Britain had been remarkably central to what their 
future had turned to be in 1990s and onwards. The empirical studies and surveys 
conducted by social scientists on evolution and development of these communities 
in later part of the 20
th
 C Britain amply reveal, as contended by Ansari,
348
 the 
impact of approaches taken by these communities at the initial stage of their 
presence in 1940s and 1950s. Not surprisingly, the implications of initiatives 
undertaken by them at this early stage is still to be felt by the contemporary 
Muslim communities in Britain in general and their own communities in 
particular in terms of their interaction with the British society, maintaining as well 
as preserving their religious identity, forming themselves into communities as 
well as initiation of their own institutions. 
  In this sense, for most of these Muslim migrants, their interaction with the 
British society was only to a minimum level. Barton observes that there were little 
more contacts with the general public in the social sphere than what their work 
necessitated.
349
 Ansari maintains that “their social life revolved around a few local 
cafés, with traditional food, music and other pastimes.”350  
Hence, the social mingling with the society at large became minimal and 
limited; in other words, they preferred, it seems, not to engage with the wider 
society, particularly in its social realm; it may be because they were cautious 
enough not to endanger their own culture and identity; or they might have wanted 
to maintain their own life style which they used to enjoy in their own country of 
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origin; or perhaps they might have sought to avoid any unnecessary social 
problems which could be generated by interacting with the indigenous society 
because of colour, race, and religion
351
 as experienced by 18
th 
C and 19
th
 C 
Muslim settlers of Britain as mentioned in the previous section.  
Whatever reason it may be, as there is some evidence presented by case 
studies, as contended by Ansari,
352
 to suggest the plausibility of these 
assumptions, the consequences of this negativity reflected in the non-participatory 
approach adopted by them in their relationship with the wider society had had a 
lasting effect not only on the image of these communities but also on the image of 
the religion which they were representing as it happened in the case of Moroccans 
in Manchester in 19
th
 C Britain as seen above.
353
 Moreover, their ghetto-like life 
style had tended to undermine their ability to compete with the wider society in 
social, economic, educational, and political spheres.  
Therefore, the selective approach upheld by them in interacting with the 
society at large, as contended by Halliday,
354
 though for obvious reasons as 
highlighted above, had largely tended to relegate them into a seemingly social 
exclusion, thereby depriving them much of social, political, and economical 
benefits and advancements enjoyed by the wider society. This apparent failure 
from the part of the post Second World War Muslim communities which was 
never to be felt so seriously until after some serious social problems tended to 
emerge in these communities as a result of their children’s active engagement 
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with the wider society can be described as a sheer consequence of persistent 
desire of parent generation “to remain detached from the wider British society.”355  
It is to suggest that challenges they had to face as communities in 1990s 
have been an indication of this unsuccessful method of passive engagement with 
the British society which can be described as non-engaging approach adopted by 
them in 1940s hoping to be on their guard from the dangers of contacts with 
Western culture and to maintain enough security for their religious identity in the 
initial stage of their migration to Britain. Before highlighting what sort of 
challenges they had indeed faced under the circumstances described above, it is 
appropriate to raise certain questions which are relevant to the scope of this study. 
Do Islam and its teachings call Muslims to adopt this non-participatory and 
isolationist approach if they really feel their religious identity is in stark danger 
whence they interact with a non-Muslim society? How far this non-participatory 
approach is effectively compatible with basic teachings of Islam? Does Islamic 
jurisprudence have provision or precedence to directly or indirectly indicate to 
this effect? If there is any, does it simply make binding on contemporary Muslim 
minorities in Britain even if it is more to do with a particular culture or a context 
than religion, its values, its principles, and its teachings? These and similar 
questions which lie at the roots of this study will be dealt with in detail in the 
following chapter.         
One of the pressing challenges, as such, they had to encounter, with the 
reuniting of their families in 1960s, was how to effectively pass on their Islamic 
traditions and cultural ethos to their children and younger generation. It is 
undeniable of course that they had managed to found religious and cultural 
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institutions in no time in order to cater for this immediate and timely need. Yet, 
whether they have been able to achieve their aspirations by making such space in 
an effort to raise their children along the same line which they themselves had 
been raised in their homeland is largely questionable because, Ansari maintains, 
many of the second generation of these migrant communities assimilated more in 
the British society than their parents. This assimilation although it was informal, 
as contended by Ansari, the impact it made upon the younger generation of these 
communities were deplorable.
356
 Statistical as well as anecdotal evidence show, as 
contended by Ansari, Lewis, and Nielson, that a considerable proportion of 
second and third generations of Muslim migrants have largely been challenging, if 
not rebellious, towards not only the culturally nurtured life style of their parents 
but also their way of thinking on matters largely pertaining to the life pattern these 
younger generations aspiried to live in Britain.  
This social situation was born out of a situation where for many of the 
South Asian Muslims their purpose of migration was largely economic and 
therefore, they did not bother about how far they were religious.  Both Ansari and 
Lewis maintain that in the beginning of their arrival in Britain in 1940s many of 
the South Asian Muslims, particularly Bangladeshis in Bradford, were generally 
satisfied with their daily life routine preoccupied with the idea of ‘survival’, in 
which they were more concerned about their livelihood than any thing else even 
their commitment to religion which they saw as marginal to their daily lives. It 
was not their priority at this time of their presence, they argue, to concentrate 
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more about their religiosity than their economic wellbeing for which they had 
migrated for in the first place.
357
  
They believed it appears, that it was enough for them to be deputed on 
their behalf by their kith and kin back home in following religion. Barton observes 
that most Bengalis, on arriving in Britain, ‘suffered an almost total lapse of 
religious observance’. Their primary concern was to live and work in Britain on 
behalf of their families who, in turn, prayed on their behalf.
358
 Praying on 
someone behalf is only acceptable by God if it means supplication: du`ā which is 
generally a known practice among Muslims who perform it quite often. But, if the 
praying in this example means five times daily prayer which is strictly an 
individual obligation, then it is undoubtedly an innovation which is not 
permissible in Islam and has no value in the site of God.  
However, it is not clear which type of these prayers mentioned above was 
meant in this example. Despite this ambiguity, what this amply explains is many 
of the first Muslim Bengali generations, it appears, were overwhelmingly 
preoccupied with their primary goal of sojourning to Britain which was to become 
affluent and return home as quick as possible to join their families and relatives. 
Although the idea of ‘returning home’ has been their lasting ambition since the 
beginning of their arrival, it has turned out, at the end, to be a mere wish as most 
of them preferred Britain to their countries of origin and formed themselves into 
communities established around their religion, places of origins, and kin 
networks.  
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Concluding this chapter, it can be said that Muslims’ presence in Britain 
goes as back as to the early centuries of Islam. Since then Muslims have arrived 
sporadically as visitors, adventurers, and sojourners until relatively the 18
th 
C. 
Onwards from the 18
th
 C, Muslims arrived in Britain as a result of interaction 
which occurred between Britain as a colonial power and Muslim countries. 
Between the 18
th
 C to the Second World War Muslims came as lascars and 
seafarers and established dockyard settlements and Islam started to institutionalise 
itself on British soil in the forms of institutions and worshiping places. With the 
labour requirement of the post Second World War era many Muslims were 
attracted to Britain in search of economic fortunes. The first generations who were 
mainly economic migrants had no intention of staying back in Britain. Their sole 
intention was to acumilate some money and return home but as Muhammad 
Anwer noted, it was only a myth. As a result they were joined by their families 
and they had to stay back and establish themselves as permanent settlers. Having 
their first generation born in Britain, they faced various problems in their social 
life as highlighted in our discussion. The main issue Muslims encountered in their 
presence in Britain was how to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim society. The serious 
question is how the Muslim minority in Britain, particularly the youth are going to 
keep their Muslim identity intact and at the same time to integrate in the wider 
society? Moreover, what kind of a mechanism are they going to adopt in 
responding this crucial question? The following chapters will critically analyse 
this issue in the light of problems and issues Muslims in Britain are facing in the 
contemporary social context.    
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Chapter 5:  The Problems of contemporary Muslims in Britain 
Contemporary Muslims living in Britain face number of issues and 
problems in their day-to-day life. As any other minority community living in the 
contemporary Britain, Muslims with their minority status as explained in the third 
chapter of this study encounter many challenges. The problematic situation they 
face in Britain is not only because of their vulnerability as a minority but also of 
their presence as a ‘religious minority’. Despite sharing many of the social, 
cultural, religious, and political problems with other groups and communities in 
Britain, the way Muslims seem to look at these issues is quite distinct. It may be 
because they tend to address them from a religious perspective. It may be also due 
to the fact that they tend to see all aspects of life within the purview of Islamic 
teachings as a way of life. It may be said, generally speaking, that a Muslim as 
defined in the third chapter does not seem to look at life compartmentalised; 
mostly he does not adhere to religion in his private life while following another 
lifestyle in his public life; he or she may tend to practice religion as perceived by 
him or her in this way wherever he or she lives either in a Muslim society or in a 
non-Muslim society. Consequently, he or she may be seen as someone resisting to 
be assimilated in the society and someone who does not stubbornly want to 
integrate in it, a fundamental problem the contemporary nation states face today, 
particularly the western nations. It can be said that this underlying cause of the 
dilemma: Muslims are not ready to integrated into the society, which is widely 
debated in the West, particularly in Europe including Britain may be considered 
vital if issues and problems related to Muslims’ presence in the West needs to be 
understood in its proper perspective.  
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One may ask are there real or perceived problems for a Muslim living in 
Britain in relation to his or her religion? If so, who does consider them as 
‘problems’? Who does want to see them as ‘problems’? Are they community 
leaders or religious leaders or parents or people themselves? Do Muslims in 
Britain really care that they have ‘religious problems’ or ‘problems related to 
religion’? It is important to find answer to these questions before discussing so 
called ‘problems’ if any. Upon finding an answer to these questions, the study will 
seek to discuss the core issues and problems that confront contemporary Muslims 
in Britain. Apparently, the whole discussion will revolve around more or less the 
following dilemma: can ‘a British Muslim who is a citizen of a secular liberal 
society’ still relate to what is popularly perceived in the West to be ‘a pre-modern 
religion which is Islam’ as a way of life while enjoying all sorts of freedom and 
human rights in a modern day nation state?   
This chapter, therefore, seeks to deal with these and similar issues 
confronting contemporary Muslims in Britain. In doing so, it mainly focuses on 
major issues and problems faced by them in contemporary Britain. As a literature 
based research, the current study seeks to employ surveys, statistics, reports, and 
literature based studies as well as empirical studies in order to find out what are 
the problems and challenges faced by contemporary Muslims in Britain. Having 
established that there exist reasonable grounds to justify that contemporary 
Muslims in Britain face real challenges, this chapter primarily intends to set a 
plausible and solid premise within which the problems and issues confronting 
them can be analysed in a systematic way. It concludes that contemporary 
Muslims in Britain face many a pressing problems in their day-to-day life and 
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they need concrete remedies. Hoping to find solutions to these problems, 
legislative measures and various other attempts may have been taken by 
consecutive governments, institutions, and Muslim community itself at local and 
national levels. Yet problems persistently exist and the impact they have on the 
society at large and Muslims in particular is enormous. The survey shows that the 
reasons for this unhealthy situation are two folds.  
It seems on the one hand that the wider society, particularly consecutive 
governments and institutions have been very slow in addressing concerns and 
grievances of Muslims as a ‘religious minority’. On the other, Muslims are also 
far behind in doing their homework or putting their house in order. It seems that it 
mainly owes to inadequate or lack of legal protection and legislative recognition 
that should be provided to Muslims by governments as it has been the case with 
some of the minorities, namely Jews and Sikhs.
359
 Yet there seems to be another 
reason, which many of the literature surveyed does not seem to suggest and this 
study would seek to propose, that the contemporary Muslims in Britain not only 
need material facilities as an underachieved community as many studies tend to 
suggest and legal provisions to protect them from various forms of 
discriminations done to them only because they are a ‘religious minority’, but also 
they need religious guidance to enable them to do their homework: to understand 
who they are in terms of their religious identity and how they interpret what their 
identity is, where they are in terms of space they live in, which is the 
contemporary British context, and what is expected from Muslims as a 
community towards the wider society in terms of contribution to uplift the society 
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as a whole. Therefore, the proposed religious guidance: jurisprudence for Muslim 
minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt), which will be discussed in the following chapter, 
may serve two purposes: On the one hand it may serve as a comprehensive 
pedagogy for Muslims to do their homework and on the other it may be used by 
governments and institutions as a reference point to look for how they can deal 
with concerns of contemporary Muslims in Britain.                  
5.1 Are There Problems for Contemporary Muslims in Britain? 
The proliferation of literature on Muslims in Britain since the second half 
of the last century, particularly on issues and challenges faced by them is ample 
evidence that they have been facing problems in their day-to-day life. Muslims, 
with the arrival of their families and children in Britain to join them in 1960s and 
1970s as noted in the previous chapter, had to face many problems. The explosion 
of literature on Muslims during this period covering many areas of their life 
experience in the new environment sheds light on the severity of the situation they 
have been going through. As contended by Steven Vertovec, who has compiled an 
‘annotated bibliography of academic publications regarding Islam and Muslims 
in the United Kingdom, 1985-1992,’360 the bibliographical survey undertaken by 
Daniele Joly and Jorgen Nielsen covering the period of 1960-1984 amply 
indicates that Muslims in Britain had faced issues and problems of their own. Yet 
by scrutinising these studies, however, one may come to understand that they 
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were more or less more concerned with their ethnicity and race rather than 
‘religious identity, institutionalization, or practice’.361   
As many a studies suggest that it may be due to the fact that Muslims were 
viewed by the wider society not as a religious minority, rather they were looked at 
as a race, colour, or ethnicity. Muslims were for example studied as ‘Indians’, 
‘Bangladeshis’, and ‘Pakistanis’ on the basis of race and ethnicity. Hence, the 
writings were mainly focused on issues revolved around ethnic and racial 
exclusion as contended by Kepel: “the notion of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’ has 
thus acquired importance, both in the research of British sociologists and in 
juridical practice. Michael Banton and John Rex, who both played a pioneering 
role in conceptualising the notion of race, have recognised race as a principal 
marker in terms of which individuals tend to be classified and suffer 
discrimination.”362   
These remarks by Kepel need to be understood in the context of Muslims 
arrival in Britain in 1960s and 1970s. The identity markers at the time were more 
to do with race and colour than religion. Hence, racism was one of the major 
problems that the British society was engulfed with at the time and Muslims, 
among other minorities, suffered the most as a result. It may not be wrong to 
assume that the speeches as well as election campaigns, for instance, made by 
certain politicians at the time has been a clear indication of this social problem. 
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Enoch Powell
363
 for example in his (in) famous speech of 1968 said: “We must be 
mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 
dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the 
immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in 
heaping its own funeral pyre.”364  Powell further said: ‘As I look ahead, I am 
filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming 
with much blood’.”365 Analysing Powell’s ‘river of blood speech’ Dilwar Hussain 
argues that it “may sound unacceptable to us now, but it seemed to have 
articulated the sentiments of the nation. Opinion polls showed that 75% of people 
supported Powell. Just prior to this, 1964, a Conservative local candidate in 
Smethwick won using the slogan ‘if you want a nigger for your neighbour, vote 
labour.’366   
This antipathy towards immigration had been mirrored in other parts of the 
country as well. Leicester, for instance, had been one of the places where racial 
tension was on the rise. In the wake of sudden influx of Asians into Britain from 
Uganda, particularly to Leicester, in 1972 as a result of Idi Amin’s forced 
evacuation, “the (British-supported) dictator” as described by Richard Bonney,367 
sentiments against migrants had rapidly increased in the city. Consequently, “at 
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the height of the forced Ugandan Asian exodus,”368 an advertisement was placed 
in the Ugandan Argus by the Resettlement Board discouraging migration to 
Leicester and the advertisement went on to say ‘Don’t go to Leicester.’369 
Moreover, Bonney maintains that “National Front370 agitation and demonstrations 
and counter-demonstrations had gathered pace and the City Corporation showed 
its nervousness on 15 September 1972.”371  The formation of National Front’s 
Leicester branch in 1969 had been coincided with the inauguration of the first 
Hindu temple in Leicester. One of the aims of the party, Bonney maintains, was 
‘the protection of British jobs from alien intrusion’. He further notes that “the NF 
gave active support to a strike by White workers (in retaliation to a dispute led by 
Asians protesting over the refusal of management and members of the Hosiery 
Workers Union to allow Asians promotion to skilled grades) at the Imperial 
Typewriters factory in Leicester in 1972.”372   
Roger Ballard, in his preface to the book Desh Pardesh,
373
 a collection of 
papers presented by a group of researchers most of whom were anthropologists as 
introduced by Ballard examining the presence of South Asian communities in 
Britain, notes that it is not far from truth that “racism is a deeply entrenched 
feature of the British social order…every single contributor to this volume makes 
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it clear that this indeed so.”374  It seems that this situation took hold in the British 
society not because they were viewed by majority society as people who were 
different in culture and religion rather they were looked at as a ‘coloured 
minority’. Kepel notes that “alongside the English or Welsh, then, there existed a 
dark-skinned population, a nation by default within the body of British citizens. In 
the public perception these undifferentiated people with dark skin including both 
people from Indian sub-continent and from the Caribbean were all referred to as 
Black.”375    
Although Muslims have become British citizens by virtue of 
Commonwealth citizens, that citizenship could not provide them with a right place 
in the society and place them on an equal footing provided to citizens of the 
majority community. It was not meant to be a full citizenship; rather it was a 
minimal one as noted by Gilles Kepel: “British citizenship has created for the 
immigrants of the Commonwealth resident on its soil a symbolic and political 
space, but only indirectly.”376  Consequently, the type of challenges Muslims had 
to face at the time, therefore, were of social nature ranging from housing 
shortages, inadequate social services, high level of unemployment, and poor 
educational facilities.
377
  
A question arises as to what Muslims did to overcome these problems and 
what government did to find solutions to them. As for Muslims they did not seem 
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to bother much about concerns and grievances confronted which them during this 
time, 1960s and 1970s, as they were preoccupied with the ‘myth of return’ as 
termed by Muhammad Anwar.
378
 It was not their intention to stay here 
permanently. Their sole purpose was to earn as much as possible and go back 
home: India, Pakistan…etc. Their only concern was, therefore, as noted by Sophie 
Gilliat-Ray, how to maintain their name and fame among their fellow migrants 
and their relatives back home. As a result, they were not concerned about their 
status or recognition in their host society. She further maintains that: 
“consequently, experiences of racial or religious discrimination in Britain were 
generally suffered rather than challenged, because there was perceived to be no 
long-term benefit to be derived from the distracting process of seeking redress.”379  
In other words, they paid little attention to seek solutions to their problems. There 
was little attempt taken by them to channel their grievances through government 
offices or public institutions. This may explain why there was minimal 
involvement from their part in trade union activities, as contended by Badr ud-Din 
Dahya. Their failure to act to find a way-out largely depended on their assumption 
that, as Dahya notes, “this is not our country, we are here to work and then return 
home and do not have time to get involved in such organisations.”380   
From the part of governments and official bodies, several legislative 
measures were taken to combat racism which took root in the British society in 
1960s and 1970s. To promote ‘racial equality’ between minority and majority 
communities as Kepel notes, political and juridical measures were taken at a local 
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as well as a national level. He maintains that, in the form of ‘positive action’ the 
local and national institutional actors had invested their energy to provide 
“corrective measures to racism in job opportunities, housing etc….This entails the 
attribution of quotas to ‘minorities’ defined as such by the colour of their skin”.381  
The Race Relations Act which was enacted in 1976 has been another step forward 
taken by the government to combat inequality and discrimination. As Nadeem 
Malik observes that this was the time when legislative measures were 
revolutionarily taking root in Britain. For instance, “the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, the Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into force in 1975) and the Race 
Relations Act 1976 transformed the way in which women and people from 
minority groups were perceived by the law.”382  As a matter of fact that 
discrimination on racial grounds, Malik notes, “was actually made unlawful by 
the Race Relations Act 1965.”383  Similarly, it should be noted that there were 
more recent legal initiatives in English law as well such as “the European 
Convention of Human Rights
384
 and its domestic application via the Human 
Rights act 1998
385
.” 386  
One may imagine that this amount of legislative measures would have 
been more than enough to fight against racism, discrimination, and unfair 
treatment, and minorities in general and Muslims in particular would have been 
safeguarded enough from all sorts of discriminations. The studies on the subject 
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reveal the opposite. Although some sort of redress has been found in cases related 
to other minority communities, particularly Jews and Sikhs,
387
 Muslims have 
continued to suffer. Discrimination and unfair treatment against them have taken 
different shape and form, namely in the form of Islamophobia.
388
 The shear 
manifestation of this pathetic situation have reflected in initiation of 
commissions
389
  and projects by government and private bodies probing into 
problems related to minority communities in general and Muslims in particular. 
Apparently, government reports and voluntary sector case studies
390
 are 
undeniably ample evidences to indicate the level of the problem as well as the 
failure of the legal system.  
Many of these studies and researches have come to conclude that minority 
communities in general and Muslims in particular continue to suffer 
discriminations despite legal mechanisms in place. Introducing their chapter
391
: 
Muslims and Religious Discrimination in England and Wales, Paul Weller, Alice 
Feldman, and Kingsley Purdam contend that in recent years in the United 
Kingdom there has been a genuine concern expressed by individuals and 
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organisations from a variety of religious traditions that “discrimination exists on 
grounds of religion and that such discrimination deserves to be taken as seriously 
as discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, gender, disability and sexual 
orientation. Muslims – who constitute the largest religious minority in the United 
Kingdom – have been at the forefront in arguing for such recognition. Many 
Muslims in the UK have also claimed a specificity of experience of unfair and 
discriminatory treatment that has been identified by the concept of 
“Islamophobia”. In addition, Muslims have been the main group arguing for the 
necessity of legislative measures to tackle religious discrimination.”392   
Weller and other authors further note that the report published by 
Runnymede Trust probing into Islamophobia “underlined both the particularity of 
the Muslim experience of discrimination, and the fact that at present in Britain 
there is no legislative means of protection or redress in respect of discrimination 
on the grounds of religion.”393  The significance of this observation by the authors 
lies in the fact that it has been based on a wide range of research tools as well as 
covering almost all religious groups in England and Wales.
394
 In their concluding 
remarks, the authors seem to be in an agreement in the findings of their research 
that “there was a considerable consensus among individuals, organisations and 
groups from within the religious traditions that a more inclusive policy approach 
is needed. This would be an approach that at all levels and sectors of society 
promotes a recognition of the distinctiveness of religious identity and in respect of 
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its relationship with other key dimensions of personal and social life. The findings 
of the research indicate that Muslims in England and Wales experience a 
significant and disproportionate degree of unfair treatment on the basis of religion. 
At the time of writing, the Government has not yet brought forward 
comprehensive or integrated policy initiatives to tackle religious 
discrimination.”395   
The core subject of this conclusion has been echoed in other studies as 
well. Nadeem Malik identifies one of the major obstacles for active Muslim 
participation in the British society has been due the deeply seated racism. As “vast 
majority of British Muslims belong to minority groups, they are potentially 
subject to racism.”396  According to Malik, Bikhu Parekh397, Herman Ouseley, 
David Ritchie, Ted Cantle, Ray Singh, and John Denham
398
, they have all arrived 
at a conclusion in their respective studies that “there is absolutely no doubt that 
racism is rife in British society and that it manifests itself at all levels. The studies 
also conform that Muslims, mainly Pakistani and Bengali males suffer the worst, 
especially in employment.”399 Malik further notes that it is not the inadequacy of 
legislation that is responsible for the status quo as legislative measures have been 
in place well over a quarter of a century, rather they are unsatisfactory and 
therefore, “the incredulous anomalies that exist with regard to religious 
discrimination and discrimination against Muslims in particular, are inexplicable 
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from a legal, moral or ethical perspective and can be the result of an 
unsympathetic political regime.”400   
Moreover, there are several other studies and reports that have come to 
similar conclusion. The Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia
401
, for example, 
which was published in 1997, looked at Muslim communities in British society 
from various angles: nature of anti-Muslim prejudice, media coverage of 
Muslims, employment, housing and public bodies, violence towards Muslims, 
inclusive education, inter-community projects and dialogue, and recourse to law. 
As an in-depth study into concerns of Muslim communities in various social 
spheres, the report found under each of these chapters that Muslims are subject to 
discrimination on the basis of their faith. In order to find remedies, it made sixty 
recommendations under three broad headings; central and national government, 
regional and local authorities and private and voluntary bodies.
402
 There is little 
doubt that “the shear depth and comprehensive nature of these recommendations 
highlights the fact that Islamophobia was found to exist across all spheres and 
spectrums of life in Britain.”403   
The Singh report
404
, which has studied racism in Birmingham City 
Council in year 2000 has found, as contended by Nadeem Malik, that the Council 
is “alarmingly guilty of institutional racism.”405 Therefore, it is not out of place to 
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argue that all the surveys, reports, researches, and projects that have examined 
Muslims’ presence in Britain since 1960s to date in terms of their arrival and 
experience, and how they have been looked at and treated by the wider society 
unfailingly indicates that Muslims in Britain have experienced not only ‘perceived 
problems’ but also ‘real issues’ for well over a half a century as found by Derby 
Report.
406
 This report concluded that there was discrimination and unfair 
treatment on religious grounds in a number of public spheres. Specially the report 
discussed extensively on issues in education
407
, employment
408
, criminal justice 
and immigration
409
, housing and planning
410
, health care and social services
411
, 
public transport
412
, shops and leisure
413
, obtaining funding and benefit
414
, the 
media
415
, other religious traditions and political and pressure groups
416
. 
Scrutinising these issues quite vigorously, the authors of this report
417
  seem to 
unanimously agree that “the findings of the research reported here show that, 
alongside their experience of more overt forms of hostility and violence, Muslims 
in England and Wales also have a less dramatic, but nevertheless wide-ranging 
and no less significant, experience of unfair treatment on the basis of religion...If 
not tackled  in a comprehensive, strategic, and vigorous way, there is evidence to 
suggest that such discrimination will continue to constrain the full participation of 
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Muslims and other religious minorities in the social, political, economic and 
cultural life of the country. It is at least arguable that there is evidence that the 
cumulative effects of unfair treatment are likely, if they are not vigorously 
addressed, to result in the storing up of resentments among those experiencing 
discrimination, and also to deprive the wider society of the full potential of the 
contribution that religious communities, organisations and individuals can make 
to its stability and well-being.”418   
The carefully crafted wordings of this quotation and the extent of its 
comprehensiveness amply imply that the issue of discrimination and unfair 
treatment is not just a minority-majority tug of war, but rather it is a give-and-take 
strategy: the minority should feel welcomed by the majority and then there is no 
reason why the minority should not integrate in and contribute to the wider 
society. Yet, when racism and Islamophobia are thriving in the society and 
communities are becoming polarised, community cohesion which is the 
foundational stone of a society to stand together is in grave danger. Consequently, 
the adverse effect can be felt in communities being disengaged and non-
participated as full citizens. In the context of Muslims being a part and parcel of 
the British society, they have a duty to share their thoughts, principles, and values 
with the wider society, especially in finding solutions to such problems as 
mentioned above so that a viable and just society can be established “where all 
people are respected, enabled and welcomed to become citizens in the true sense 
of the word. Not only must British Muslims be seen as ‘friends and countrymen’ 
but they too must see all others in society as their ‘friends and countrymen’ also. 
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The time to move the debate on is long overdue. The questions to be asked should 
no longer be: “Is Islam compatible with the West? Can Muslims be British 
citizens? Do Muslims want to engage with society? Rather, the questions that 
need to be asked are: “What are the challenges of multiculturalism? Is the playing 
field level? Does British society cater for the legal and political recognition of 
minority groups?”419  
The last question may sound, for religious minorities, particularly Muslims 
that there is no recourse against discrimination at all. It is not right to assume so if 
justice is to be done to the subject discussed here. Although Muslims in Britain 
have not been recognised yet as a religious minority and as a result they have been 
subject to miscarriage of justice as studies mentioned above evidently show, “the 
majority of the Judiciary have at least attempted to give a wide reading to 
legislation so as to be as inclusive of minority groups as possible. This 
interpretation has assisted Muslims on a number of occasions and that cannot be 
ignored. However, such reasoning is often relegated to the realms of ‘obiter 
dictum’ (non-binding principles) and fails to register in the essential ‘ratio 
decidendi’ (binding judgement).”420   
Perhaps, it was this type of anomalies and discrepancies in the legal 
System as far as Muslims are concerned that has made the Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia expresses its concern in its consultation paper: “It has 
been established through case law that members of two world faiths, Judaism and 
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Sikhism, are fully protected under the Race Relations Act 1976, sine they are 
considered to belong to distinct ethnic groups. It is a serious anomaly that no such 
protection exists for members other faiths, even though Muslims would 
emphatically not wish to be seen as all belonging to a single ethnic group. A 
further anomaly is that direct discrimination in employment on religious grounds 
in unlawful in one part of the UK, Northern Ireland, but not in Great Britain. 
Officialdom’s slowness to recognise these anomalies in anti-discrimination 
legislation may well be affected by Islamophobia, or by insensitivity to Muslim 
concerns. If new legislation were to be introduced specifically to outlaw religious 
discrimination, however, the clear public message would be that Islamophobia is 
unacceptable and that British Muslims have the same rights as all other 
citizens.”421   
Similar concern has been expressed by Lord Lester of Herne Hill
422
  who 
stated as quoted by Malik: “…surely has to be an effective legal remedy for the 
wrong of religious discrimination as well as the wrong of racial discrimination. I 
suggest that those who raise technical objections to the framing of legislation 
should concentrate on the need for a legal remedy for British Muslims that is as 
effective as that which exists for other minorities in this country. That is the 
pressing social need that must be addressed. When I hear technical objections 
being raised I wonder whether we ever look at the laws of other countries. Almost 
every other Commonwealth and continental European country, as well as Ireland, 
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have in their written constitutions guarantees of equal protection of the law 
without discrimination on any ground, including religion. It is only because we do 
not have such constitutional guarantees that we have the incoherent patchwork of 
laws that act in their place. Surely, it is absurd that my rights as a British citizen 
should depend on whether I happen to live in Great Britain or Northern Ireland. 
How can it make sense that religious discrimination is forbidden in Northern 
Ireland and not in Great Britain? I know of no other country like that.”423  
In view of the above, it would not be wrong to assume that the concerns 
expressed by such influential individuals in the British legal system as Lords and 
Judges might have influenced certain legislations to be brought in recent years. It 
seems there is some optimism and a ray of hope in certain legal mechanisms taken 
up by British Judiciary System aiming to address at least some of these concerns. 
Malik notes “although Muslims have, in the past, been largely unprotected from 
religious discrimination, some hope now exists in the form of Council Directive 
2000/ 78/EC of 27th November 2000 (on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment in employment and occupation – but not in any other spheres of 
life – without discrimination “on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation”). It has been adopted under Article 13 of the EC Treaty as 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. This Directive was implemented by the 
United Kingdom on 2nd December 2003 in respect of religion or belief, so as to 
be compatible with the rights set out in the ECHR. Despite its obvious limitations, 
it is a step in the right direction. Furthermore, in July 2004 the Home Secretary 
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again proposed a law against incitement to religious hatred. This was welcomed 
by the Muslim community as well as the Commission for Racial Equality which 
argued that any potential law should have wider application and also cover the 
delivery of goods and services. While these positive developments are 
acknowledged, British Muslims are concerned about the way in which they have 
generally been, and still are, treated under the English Legal System. Ranging 
from lack of legal recognition to specifically being targeted under the Terrorism 
Act and by being excluded even when the opportunities to offer them limited 
protection arise, such as under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 
British Muslims feel disadvantaged. This situation needs to be addressed urgently; 
if it is not, British Muslims will never feel that they are truly equal citizens.”424   
Drawing on the discussion so far made one may come to a conclusion that 
Muslims in Britain face perceived as well as actual problems as Derby Report 
suggested, that Muslims are subject to discrimination and unfair treatment not 
only on the grounds of race and ethnicity but also on the basis of religion as 
suggested by Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia as well as the Singh 
Report. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to argue that not only Muslim 
community assert that it genuinely faces problems that are very central to their 
religion in the contemporary British society as individuals and a community as 
acknowledged by Home Office Research Study 220 but also researchers, 
commissioners, and legislators agree and acknowledge that contemporary 
Muslims in Britain face problems and challenges related to not only their ethnicity 
but also their religiosity and religious identity. Therefore, what sort of problems 
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and issues Muslims encounter in the contemporary Britain with regards to their 
religion would be discussed in detail in the following pages.  
5.2 Problems of Contemporary Muslims in Britain 
This section of the chapter would mainly deal with major problems and 
challenges contemporary Muslims in Britain face in their day-to-day life which 
are religious in nature. It will also mainly cover the challenges they have been 
facing since their settlement in Britain after the Second World War, particularly 
when they were joined by their children, families, and kith and kin, precisely after 
1960s. As this chapter will endeavour to explore them in the following pages, 
there are major and minor problems. For the purpose of this study and to confine 
it within its limitation, it will restrict itself to deal with some of the burning issues 
contemporary Muslims face in Britain at four levels: Individual, Family, 
community, and the society at large.  
As individuals and families, whatever issues they encounter, that will 
mostly revolve around the notion of who they are in terms of their religious 
identity and how they interpret what their identity is. One of the popular issues 
here is that, for example, a young Muslim may prefer to identify him or her with 
religion and its teachings while parents would prefer for him or her a particular 
cultural tradition of the country of origin, or he or she may be expected by the 
wider society to strip off his or her cultural identity let alone religious one in order 
to align with itself in terms of norms, culture, and values, in other words to 
assimilate fully in the British society. As a community, the issues Muslims may 
encounter would be the notion of context, which is where they are in terms of the 
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space they live in, which is the contemporary British context. What is their 
relationship, for instance, vis-a-vis the wider society and how they perceive them? 
As far as the wider society is concerned, mostly the issues would revolve around 
how Muslims would be treated by them and how to handle them on the one hand 
and on the other what is expected from Muslims as a community towards the 
wider society in terms of contribution to uplift the society as a whole. 
Islamophobia, for example, could be cited as one of the major issues Muslims can 
encounter in this fourth level.  
It should be noted that such issues as racism, xenophobia, and 
Islamophobia which were brought into sharp relief in the previous section were 
highlighted to indicate that Muslims encounter perceived and real problems in the 
form of discrimination and unfair treatment because of racism and Islamophobia, 
how the issues were looked at from the legal point of view, and what was the 
outcome. In this section, on the contrary, some of these issues will be dealt with 
from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. However, in this fourth level, the 
dilemma that the wider society would encounter would be how can a Muslim who 
is a ‘citizen of a secular liberal society which is Britain’ still relate to what is 
popularly perceived in Western societies to be ‘a pre-modern religion which is 
Islam’ as a way of life while enjoying all sorts of freedom and human rights in a 
modern day nation state? The other side of this dilemma that Muslims may 
encounter would be why they are not being given due recognition and place in the 
society as a religious minority as other minorities are recognised and 
accommodated, and why the wider society cannot be more true to its hard-won 
secular values: rights and freedoms which should allow every community “to live 
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with mutual respect according to their beliefs and to contribute positively to the 
public sphere in an open and tolerant atmosphere.”425 
This section of the chapter, therefore, will use surveys, reports, and 
literature based studies to examine such questions, issues, and problems. Having 
scrutinised them in the light of studies and reports, this section would conclude 
that contemporary Muslims in Britain need both legal as well as religious solution 
to the problems they face in their day-to-day life and both should go together if 
they are expected to play a vital role in the contemporary British society as full 
citizens.  
5.3 Contemporary Muslims in Britain and Problems Related to 
Identity 
One of the main problems contemporary Muslims in Britain face seems to 
be related to ‘identity’. Most of the time, issues and problems he or she may 
encounter in the wider society are more or less related to sense of identity and 
belonging. The issues of hijāb426, jilbāb427, niqāb428, beard, faith school, halal 
meat…etc. for instance, are just few examples of this burning issue. Although 
Muslims have been living in Britain well over half a century as a permanently 
settled community establishing institutions and organisations, and celebrating 
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their culture and tradition as a visible social group manifesting all their symbols 
and identity markers, the wider society has not yet come to grips with this cultural 
and religious diversity and as a result, Muslims face problems in areas mentioned 
above on a daily basis as acknowledged and confirmed by evidences presented in 
the previous section, particularly the Home Office Research Study 220. In the 
following pages, issues such as those mentioned above will be discussed. 
5.3.1 Muslims Being Seen as ‘Other’ 
Historically speaking, the notion of Muslims being seen as ‘other’ can be 
traced back in the socio-political encounter Europe had with Muslims when 
Europeans were a colonial power as highlighted in the previous chapter. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to explore the historical evolution of the notion of 
Muslims being seen as ‘other’ in the European context. Nevertheless, a brief 
account of it is important as it seems to be one of the main factors that tend to 
influence western understanding of Muslims and who they are. If contemporary 
Muslims encounter problems and issues vis-à-vis their presence in Britain, either 
at an individual or collective level, whether it may be headscarf or veil problems, 
for example, it is only a symptom of a deep-rooted problem, which is embedded 
in seeing Muslims negatively as ‘other’429. Indeed it is a deep-seated issue which 
has long occupied the western mind
430
 as contended by Mohammad Siddique 
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Seddon. It raises it head mostly at times of social unrest and political upheavals. 
Seddon notes that the former Home Secretary for the Labour Party, David 
Blunkett, made the following comment ‘immigrants should try to feel British’ and 
“This comments comes in the light of the summer race riots of 2001 in the North 
of England and the 11th September 2001 US terrorist attacks.”431  
It is worth noting that this type of comments, particularly by people in 
power can fuel the fire which has been already set in motion and tear communities 
apart. Particularly, such comments can create suspicion towards Muslims in the 
West. It is within this backdrop that an important question arises in relation to 
identity and belonging for Britain’s contemporary Muslims, as Seddon asks, “are 
they British Muslims or simply Muslims in Britain?”432 By asking this question, 
Seddon seeks to shed light on some of the root causes of Muslims being 
marginalised and relegated to exclusion in the contemporary British society. This 
exploration might help us to understand some of the unanswered questions raised 
by Lords and Judges in the previous section as for deprivation of legal protections 
for Muslims as a religious minority.   
In order to identify some of these root causes, Seddon traces the “politics 
of racism and the development of ‘national identity’, ‘Britishness’, myths and 
realities, etymological and geographical definitions, the making of England and 
the development of so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon Britishness’.”433  In the process of 
examining these notions through such concepts as ‘Reformation’, ‘Nationalism’, 
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‘Anglo-Saxon Britishness’, and under subtitles: ‘the politics of racism’, 
‘Orientalism and the perpetuation of otherness’, and ‘ethnicity, race and national 
identity’, Seddon notes that “many observers have alluded to Muslims being 
isolated and disadvantaged by what they express as anti-Muslim sentiments, 
xenophobia and Islamophobia.”434   
It is against this background that the Runnymede Trust Report gains its 
currency as well as importance. The report has evidently identified this underlying 
cause when scrutinising the roots of the problem of the socio-political 
phenomenon called ‘Islamophobia’. The report went onto say that “in recent years 
a new word has gained currency… ‘Islamophobia’. It was coined in the late 
1980s, its first known use in print being in February 1991, in a periodical in the 
United States. The word is not ideal, but is recognisably similar to ‘xenophobia’ 
and ‘Europhobia’, and is a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of 
Islam – and therefore to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. Such dread and 
dislike have existed in western countries and cultures for several centuries. In 
the last twenty years, however, the dislike has become more explicit, more 
extreme and more dangerous.”435  
Drawing on the discussion made above, one may come to a conclusion 
that most of the problems and challenges Muslims faced in the beginning of their 
settlement with their families in 1960s and 1970s and ensuing exclusion and 
disadvantage they had to suffer and still continue to suffer to large extent as 
evidently seen in the previous section of this chapter have been the result of they 
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being seen as ‘exotic other’436. Seddon contends that “the social and political 
inclusion of this large Muslim population as full, equal and participating British 
citizens is primarily hindered by external perceptions and projections rather than 
internal conflicts that may occur as a result of shifting identities experienced 
through the migration process.”437   
It is against this background that one may rightly locate most of the 
negative media coverage about Muslims: printed as well as electronic. The 
portrayal of Muslims in the media has been mostly unfair and biased. The 
phenomenon of Muslims being portrayed negatively in the media, particularly in 
the printed one may be traced in the British history as far back as 16th century as 
Matar contended
438
. Therefore, this has been the case for centuries as it was 
established with evidence in the previous chapter when discussing the historical 
context of problems faced by William H. Quilliam and his nascent Muslim 
community in Liverpool. This negativity has intensified in the aftermath of the 
Satanic Verses affair 1989, and it reached more or less its peak in post 2001 
September 11 attack in US and 7th July 2005 bomb attacks in the London 
underground.  
However, it is not to deny the fact that a tiny minority of Muslim 
communities whose method of resolving problems is not other than resort to 
violence should also be held responsible for constructing such image. Yet, as an 
influential source of information, media’s responsibility is greater in creating such 
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a negative picture.
439
 The biggest concern for Muslims as far as media coverage of 
events related to Muslims is concerned, its tendency to generalise such incidents 
and portraying it as if the whole Muslim community is doing so or Islam and its 
teachings are inherently inspiring people to act so. Mostly, this has been the case 
with almost all the events and incidents that took place locally, nationally, and at a 
global scale, particularly such incidents such as 9/11, 7/7, and Mumbai attacks in 
2008. Malik observes that “over the past decade, Muslims in Britain have been the 
focus of increasing public attention. One widespread form of such attention has 
been highly negative: Muslims have been portrayed in all kinds of media in very 
derogatory and vilifying ways. Among the effects of depiction, which has 
contributed to what is now widely referred to as ‘Islamophobia’, Muslims in 
Britain have been subject to considerable discrimination and even violence. The 
media portrayal of Muslims that Steven Vertrvec
440
 is referring to is just one 
component of a pernicious form of xenophobia that has seen alarming levels of 
growth over the past decade.”441   
In view of the above, it would not be wrong to assume, as confirmed by 
Weller, Feldman, and Purdam, that surveys and reports explored Muslims’ 
concerns in the contemporary Britain in various strata of the society which 
exemplify assertions made in the previous paragraph that Muslims have been seen 
as ‘other’ and treated as such. Under the heading: Muslims and media in their 
report commissioned by the Home Office, Weller and other authors points out a 
quotation of an interviewee, which shows how Muslims feel they have been 
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demonised by media: “ever since the Gulf War, Chechnya – people have been 
portrayed as terrorists. No one ever asks why they became terrorists”. In their 
survey findings, the authors highlight the severity of the issue: “the proportion of 
Muslim organisations reporting unfair treatment from the media exceeded the 
proportion of Muslim organisations saying their members experienced unfair 
treatment in other areas of life. The number of Muslim organisations reporting 
‘frequent’ unfair treatment from national newspaper journalists and national 
newspaper coverage greatly exceeded the number saying that unfairness was 
‘occasional’ or non-existent. 80 per cent (44 out of 55) Muslim organisations 
answering the question said that unfair treatment in the way that national 
newspapers cover their religion was frequent.”442 The following summarised 
account given by the authors as examples of unfair treatment by the media amply 
indicates how prevalent the media bias is: “lack of coverage of specific religion, 
or religion in general; misrepresentation and bias; emphasis on the negative 
aspects of religion; ignorance and indifference; racial and religious stereotyping; 
offensive material and coverage; and lack of access to broadcasting licences.”443    
The other section of their survey has covered local interviews. An interviewee 
noted, the authors maintain, that “the media creates a particular obstacle for the 
Muslim community” in achieving the levels of trust and interaction needed to 
move toward positive change. It was pointed out that the manner in which 
newspaper articles are written may also help perpetuate inaccurate perceptions 
about different communities. One young person asked: “…why do news headlines 
have to say ‘Black/Asian/Muslim male did x’ in the headline and never say 
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anything like ‘white Christian male did x’?”444 Against this background, a 
plethora of questions arise: whether Muslims also have a fair share of 
responsibility in constructing such negative image about them directly or 
indirectly? If so, is it because they live in clusters in inner cities and as a result, 
they do not interact with or ‘integrate’ in the wider society and this give others a 
chance to construct images out of it? Or is it because they also perceive non-
Muslims as ‘other’ and as a counterproductive, they are also seen as ‘other’ by 
them? It is not to deny the fact that Muslims also do have negative perceptions 
about others like others have about them and this notion has been brought into 
sharp relief by many a historians, sociologists, and anthropologists
445
. A fair 
discussion of this has been made in the previous chapter under the subtitle of 
‘Muslims in Britain since 18th C to Second World War as Migrants and Settlers’.  
It is true that Muslims live in places of their own choice as communities 
mostly in inner cities and it was how they moved in during their migration process 
as highlighted in the previous chapter when discussing the demographic landscape 
of Muslims’ settlement in Britain. In fact it is not to deny that this settlement 
approach might have given others a chance to imagine them so. Yet, is it 
admissible for the host society to treat them the way they have been treated, only 
because they see them as ‘other’ despite there being in place a number of 
legislative tools and measures to protect them as seen before? At the same time, it 
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is undeniable that Muslims also have a vital role to play in order for them to 
remove prejudice, stereotype, myth, and negative images from the hearts and 
minds of people in the society. Muslims, even after being in this county for more 
than half a century and having third generations who proudly claim to be British, 
have no justification to cocoon themselves from integrating
446
 in the wider society 
and live in isolation from the mainstream society. If they have a duty to serve and 
contribute to the wellbeing of the society they live in, then this is the way forward. 
Yet it will never be possible unless they feel they are welcome in the same society 
they are willing to participate and contribute to. In other words, it should be a give 
and take process by both parties concerned. However, this is a test not only for the 
wider society but also for Muslims as they have to find a way out for some of the 
pertinent theological issues they confront with when they live in a society which 
is not Muslim. One of the main issues as such, which will be discussed in the 
following subtitle, is whether permissible or not for a Muslim to live in a non-
Muslim society. 
5.3.2 Permissiblity for the Presence of Muslims in Non-Muslim 
Society 
This has been a crucial question for a Muslim as far as his choice to live in 
a non-Muslim secular society is concerned. The magnitude of this problem lies in 
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how he or she maintains relationship as well as interaction with the society at 
large at times of war as well as peace. This is a situation, which has no reference 
in existing fiqh, particularly Muslim minority context. In fact, there are references 
in Islamic jurisprudence as to whether it is permissible for a Muslim to take 
residence in a non-Muslim territory putting his identity as a Muslim at risk while 
upholding allegiance to global Muslim community where he originally belongs to. 
In approaching this major issue, the classical jurists held two different views. 
Upon classifying the territories as abode of Islam and abode of war or hostility 
(dār al-Islam and dār al-harb), some of the jurists oppose to take residence in dār 
al-harb or dār al-kufr, while some others are in favour of it with certain 
conditions.  
This problem had received a wide range of discussion among jurists when 
Spanish Muslims, overrun by the Christian forces, chose to stay in Spain. Their 
residence in dār al-harb (abode of war) became the subject of divided legal 
discourse among Maliki jurists. The focal point of this discourse was on the 
Muslims’ obligation to migrate to Islamic lands (dār al-Islam). There are legal 
rulings issued by jurists in Granada, the Magrib, and Ifriqiya in this connection. 
Some of them supported their residence, while some others opposed it. In her 
lengthy article ‘Muslim minorities and the obligation to migrate to Islamic 
territory: Two fatwās from fifteenth century Granada’ Kathryn A. Miller 
undertook an enormous effort to analyse the juristic discourse on Muslim 
minorities living in non-Muslim lands
447
.  In his article ‘Islamic law and Muslim 
minorities: The juristic Discourse on Muslim minorities from the Second/Eighth 
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to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries’, Khaled Abou El Fadl discussed in detail 
the juristic discourse on Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim lands.
448
   
He has presented the jurists’ debate on the ethical and legal principles that should 
guide the behaviour of these Muslims and demonstrates how the positions of legal 
scholars gradually became more entrenched. Abū Hanīfā and Mālikī jurists, in 
particular, rigidly disapproved of Muslim residence in non-Muslim territory on 
the ground that Muslims subject to non-Muslim laws could not “manifest their 
religion.”449 As Abou El Fadl points out, jurists did not explain what they meant 
by ‘able to manifest their religion’. Whether they had referred to acts of worship 
or the capacity to govern their minority community by the Sharī‘ah and the laws 
of Islam in their totality is unclear. Shāfi‘ī, on the other hand, believed that 
Muslims could stay behind in former Muslim lands, provided they could practice 
Islam and were not subject to conversion efforts by non-Muslims.
450
   
In the 8th century, by contrast, Ja‘ufer al-Sādiq underlined that Muslims might 
perhaps serve Islam better when living among non-Muslims away from home. Al-
Māwardi agreed on this opinion in the 11th century. The Hanafi school of thought 
later on became even more flexible. They accepted the idea that there might be a 
pocket of dār al-Islam even inside non-Muslim territories. And they have gone 
                                                 
448
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449
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450
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the East African countries and countries like India (South Indian coasts), Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
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interesting area of study that may be undertaken by researches who study fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt from a 
historical perspective with special reference to influence of juristic views on taking residence in 
non-Muslim territories.  
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further to exempt emigrant Muslim from observing certain areas of the Sharī‘ah if 
this seemed necessary because of ikrāh (duress) or darūrah (necessity) or for 
reason of maslahah (public welfare).
451
 Having examined the relationship 
between Muslim minorities and the Islamic polity, Abou El Fadl concludes that 
that “all schools claimed that a bond unites Muslims wherever they may be and all 
schools affirm a Muslim’s moral inviolability.”452   
The question arises here is how can this bond between Muslim minorities 
and the Islamic polity can be approached, let alone its preservation, in today’s 
modern political climate with all its complexities and realities within the context 
of international relations on the basis of which Muslim and non-Muslim states are 
committed to be bound by certain treaties? On the other hand, another question 
arises as to how these minorities can get themselves to formalise their relationship 
between them and Islam? To what extents are these Muslims bound by Islamic 
law? How should they conduct themselves in non-Muslim land? If Islamic law 
applies to them does it apply as a moral imperative or does it have jurisdictional 
force? On such questions Abou El Fadl points out that “the extent to which 
Islamic law is applicable to Muslims in non-Muslim states and the permissibility 
of residing in such states are interrelated issues. Many jurists made the 
permissibility on such residence contingent on the ability to practice Islam, 
without specifying the extent to which Islam must be manifested or practised.”453   
                                                 
451
 El Fadl, Khalid Abou, ‘The Common and Islamic Law of Duress’, in Arab Law Quarterly, 6:2, 
1991, 121-59  
452
 El Fadl, Khalid Abou, ‘Islamic law and Muslim minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim 
minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries’, Op. Cit.,  p. 170 
453
 Ibid. p. 172 
 211 
The question in this regard is: does the phrase ‘the ability to practice 
Islam’ mean to implement Islamic law: the Sharī‘ah in its totality or partially? If 
so, who is expected to be responsible to apply it to these Muslims in today’s 
political realities? If an Islamic polity exists, does it have coercive power over 
Muslims outside its territory as it is under obligation to abide by the treaties 
entered with states in which these minorities reside? If not, what is the position of 
these Muslims when accepting and acting upon laws of non-Muslim state? To 
what extent are minorities obliged to abide by laws of their host state and what 
defines the terms of their conduct? This is an area where, undoubtedly, fresh fiqh 
approaches are needed.  
This discussion brings into focus two practical questions. First, what are 
the obligations and duties of Muslim minorities towards their place of residence 
and what defines the terms of the de facto compromise? Second, what happens if 
corruption is so widespread that an ideal Islamic life is not possible anywhere?  In 
other words, to what extent Islamic obligations are subject to be altered by 
widespread corruption? Abou El Fadl argues that “Muslim jurists do not explain 
what Muslims are to do in case of a conflict between the laws of non-Muslim 
territory and Islamic law.”454    
The other issue in relation to the residence of Muslim minorities in non-
Muslim territory is migration to Muslim territory, if an Islamic life is impossible 
in non-Muslim social context. Based on formal classifications of territories as dār 
al-Islam and dār al-harb or dār al-kufr, jurists were engaged in dealing with this 
issue from different perspectives. Bringing their arguments and justifications into 
                                                 
454
 Ibid. p. 178 
 212 
focus, Abou El Fadl observes that “although scholars often have claimed that 
Islamic law divide the world into two basic categories: dār al-Islam and dār al-
harb (alternatively, dār al-kufr or dār al-shirk), these categories do not reflect the 
complexity of Islamic thought on the issue. Muslim jurists did attempt to find a 
way to distinguish between the jurisdiction of Muslims and non-Muslims, but they 
could not agree on a definition of dār al-Islam or on the number of categories into 
which the world is divided. Consequently, the classification of territories in 
Islamic law is laden with ambiguity.”455   
The question is how far these classifications are relevant today? On what basis an 
identification of a dār al-Islam is possible, if migration is the case? Is it rational to 
argue that a larger Muslim minority community should migrate to dār al-Islam in 
case of its inability to live up to the teaching of Islam? These questions are needed 
a thorough investigation and underline the need for a scrutinised review of 
existing fiqh system, which will be made in the following chapter. However, the 
picture that emerges from the jurists’ stand on the issue in question, as contented 
by Abou El Fadl, “does not lend itself to essentialist position. The response of 
most jurists in the early centuries of Islam was cryptic and ambivalent. Early 
jurists recommended that a Muslim should reside among Muslims in a place in 
which religion could be learned and practised.”456 Despite the intense debate on 
hijrah
457
 and despite the fact that about one-third of Muslim communities live in 
non-Muslim territories, few modern Muslims endeavoured to deal with ethical or 
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legal principles that should guide the behaviour of Muslims residing in non-
Muslim territory.    
Despite these legal deliberations, there is a persistent presence of a considerable 
proportion of Muslim minority population in non-Muslim territories in the 
modern-day world. This is not so vividly manifest than in North America and 
Europe, particularly in contemporary Britain where Muslims are grappling with 
such problems and issues which have become a centre point to social, political, 
and legal discourses and deliberations. As a result, they found themselves 
confronting with many ideologies, doctrines, value systems…etc. that are alien to 
their social ethos, values, traditions, and cultural norms. The dilemma, Muslim 
minorities face with at this juncture is how they can contextualise Islam and its 
teachings in a non-Muslim social context and also, how they can formalise their 
relationship with the Muslim community, while they have no option but to 
subscribe to a certain political orientation and goal by virtue of their presence in 
nation states. It is against this background that some of the major challenges and 
issues would be discussed in the following pages.  
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5.3.3 Issue of Headscarf (hijāb) and Muslim Woman in Britain 
Among the problems Muslim women face in contemporary Britain, to a 
lesser degree, is wearing the headscarf (hijāb). While to a greater, deal the 
wearing of its sister associates namely khimār458, niqāb, jilbāb, burqā459…etc, 
also rouse problems.  
Wearing the headscarf has become quite normal in non-Muslim societies; 
particularly in Britain (although not completely without controversy) however 
quite astonishingly it had also been banned in some Muslim countries such as 
Tunisia and Turkey
460
 let alone the banning of wearing the niqāb. Nevertheless, it 
is worth noting that wearing the niqāb has indeed sparked more controversy in 
many non-Muslim societies especially in Europe including Britain. As commonly 
understood the topic of hijāb and more so the concept niqāb is not much of a 
controversy in Britain than it is in France
461
, Denmark
462
, and Belgium
463
, for 
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example. However, the controversy of wearing the hijāb or niqāb or jilbāb…etc. 
whether  it is to a lesser degree or to a larger scale in Britain and other countries 
respectively, it has become potentially problematic enough to create a great deal 
of social as well as political division in societies as far as it is concerned. The 
issue has been largely picked up the Western media – namely BBC, CNN, Sky 
News, and Al-Jazeera, and is becoming a common topic to be discussed during 
talk shows, interviews, and specifically documentaries.  
Hence, the debate on wearing Islamic headscarf and other features, particularly 
jilbāb and niqāb has entangled Britain, as mentioned above, whether to recognise 
it as a manifestation of religious freedom and right or just a religious and cultural 
symbol imposed by traditional patriarchal family system i.e. it is neither required 
by religion and its teachings nor does it compatible with democratic and secular 
values cherished in the West. However, the opinions of those who have been 
involved in this debate are divided. Those who support the right to wear it argue 
that the ban infringes human right provisions, whereas the opponents argue it is an 
oppression of Muslim woman and therefore, against freedom of choice. This 
section of the chapter, therefore, would seek to examine the issue in question by 
choosing one example, which is wearing jilbāb, from the British experience from 
both the legal and Islamic perspectives, which is R (on the application of Begum 
(by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School (Appellants) (hereafter referred to as the Begum case).   
Before exploring this sample of the issue in question, it is appropriate to briefly 
examine the plausibility of the argument against Muslim woman wearing dress 
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covering her head and body including face
464
: hijāb, jilbāb, niqāb…etc. that it 
symbolises oppression of Muslim woman, it is against her freedom of choice, 
“visible indicator of religious extremism and is associated with religious 
fundamentalism and proselytism.”465   
In order to examine this argument, this section of the study would use some recent 
scholarly writings, reports, literature based as well as empirical studies, and 
websites. One of such scholarly works that this study would make reference to is 
Dominic McGoldrick’s book entitled Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic 
Headscarf Debate in Europe.
466
 The book tackles a number of issues related 
Islamic headscarf: hijāb. The author not only explores related issues ramified by 
wearing the dress around the globe but also scrutinises thoroughly court cases and 
puts them into context the arguments that were debated before the judges. Using 
data quite extensively ranging from statistics on Muslim population concerned, 
court cases, legal deliberations, to discourses on human rights, assimilation, 
immigration, extremism, terrorism…etc. the author unfailingly presents an in-
depth discussion of various perspectives advocated by legal experts, political 
stakeholders, and academia on legal, social, and political legitimacy of the Islamic 
headscarf, and its acceptability for Muslim communities and its implications in 
the wider society.  
However, this section of the study will refer only certain sections of this book 
where necessary to discuss the issue in question. In this respect, as for the notion 
of hijāb being a symbol of oppression of Muslim woman, the author points out 
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that in the Western eyes the Islamic headscarf, particularly “the veil is commonly 
seen as an instrument and a symbol of the oppression and inequality of women 
under Islam.”467  He further notes that “women veil because men in general, and 
male religious leaders in particular, tell them they have to. Thus ‘the veil has been 
a key symbol used by patriarchy to mark and identify women’s bodies and 
identities.’468 Then the author brings a quotation for the French philosopher 
Bernard-Henry Levy which mentions that ‘the fight against the veil is for the 
liberty of women and therefore human rights.’469  Commenting on this quotation, 
although he emphatically mentions that it represents only one concept of human 
rights among the other “which is necessary to override the autonomy and agency 
of some women”, he does seem to accept implicitly the notion of Muslim woman 
being subject to patriarchy.  
It is not far from the truth that Muslim women are subject to some kind of 
patriarchal restrictions as contended by Gilliat-Ray yet, for her, the patriarchy’s 
role is played out more in “labour market across the generations”470 than in 
wearing Islamic headscarf, which is also more culturally oriented than religiously 
motivated.
471
 Therefore, the previous interpretation given by Levy for the 
motivation behind wearing the veil is not unqualified and may fall under the 
category of prejudice and stereotype as argued by Gilliat-Ray: “A discourse of 
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secularism and feminism which assumes that Muslim women require liberation 
into the supposedly ‘progressive’ ideologies of the West develops from a 
viewpoint that seems to take it for granted that ‘Western women are secular, 
liberated and in total control of their lives when this is not the case’.”472  
Moreover, Levy’s statement is disrupted by the recent findings of empirical data 
collected by Open Society Foundations probing into “Why 32 Muslim Women 
Wear the Full-Face Veil in France: Unveiling the Truth.”473  In its forward, the 
report observes that aim of this project was to know the reasons for wearing the 
full-face veil and their experience in public before and after the debate over the 
banning the veil in 11 April 2011. The report further says that “it is an attempt to 
distinguish the real-life experience and perspectives of the women who wear the 
veil from the popular myths and misperceptions promulgated by the media and 
national figures.”474   
As findings of the project, the report presents the views of interviewees: “For 
most respondents, the decision to wear the full face veil occurred through a 
gradual evolution from the hijāb or jilbāb to the niqāb…The public debates over 
wearing the veil attempted to delegitimise its spiritual significance. Yet in most 
cases, the women interviewed said they adopted the full-face veil as part of a 
spiritual journey. Many desired to deepen their relationship with God and draw on 
the actions of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives for guidance. They recalled their 
feeling of extreme joy and well-being on the first day of wearing a 
niqāb/seetar.”475 Similar kind of motivations may have been the underlying causes 
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for many a respondent in the Weller report as well. The same tendency can be 
gleaned in other recent surveys that studied Muslim women experience in Britain. 
Some Muslim women in Britain, for example, had emphasised that although the 
media “dehumanise Muslim women who wear hijāb or headscarves, Muslim 
women are not oppressed…But wearing hijāb is part of the identity of some 
Muslim women. It is spiritual or personal choice.”476     
Hence, in the Begum case which was referred to before, is it possible to unearth 
the rationale behind the controversy? Was the motivation religious or cultural? 
Can the case be taken as an example of infringement of human rights, particularly 
violation of the right to education and/or violation of freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or belief? Was it to be dealt with wisdom and farsightedness by the 
person as well as the related people concern: Muslim community in Luton in 
particular and the Muslim leadership if there is any in general? Before endeavour 
to answer these questions, it is appropriate to present a brief background of the 
case in question in brief. 
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5.3.3.1 The Begum Case
477
: Background
478
  
“Shabina Begum was a Muslim, born in the UK to parents who came from 
Bangladesh. In September 2000, at the age of nearly 12, she enrolled at the 
Denbigh High School in Luton, a multi-cultural, multi-faith, secular secondary 
school for children (from 11 to 16 years of age) of both sexes. About 80% of the 
pupils at this school were Muslims and most of them were Bangladeshi or 
Pakistani heritage, but a number of other religion and ethnic groups were also 
represented. For her first two years at the school, Shabina wore the shalwar 
kameeze without complaint.
479
  At some stage, however, she decided that it did 
not accord with her religious beliefs, because “she had a genuine belief that the 
tenets of Islam required her, in her approach to womanhood, to wear a jilbāb [a 
long coat-like garment] when in public and that the school shalwar kameeze did 
not suffice.”480 The school authorities demanded the respondent to wear the 
correct school uniform before attending school.
481
  Shabina ( a school girl nearly 
14) contended that the decision of the head teacher and school governors not to 
admit her to the school while wearing the jilbāb (the only garment which met her 
religious requirements because it concealed the contours of the female body) 
                                                 
477
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breached two of her rights under the ECHR: the right to “manifest [her] 
religion…in…practice and observance” (Article 9)482  and the right not to “be 
denied the right to education” (Article 2 of the Protocol No. 1). Bennett J., ruling 
on Shabina’s application for judicial review at first instance, dismissed the 
claim
483
 but the Court of Appeal made a declaration that her rights under Article 9 
had been infringed.
484
  The school appealed to the House of Lords…”485  
 5.3.3.2 The Begum Case and Freedom of Religion 
Exploring the case Ssenyonjo
486
 observes that the Court has accepted that “the 
respondent sincerely held the religious belief which he professed to hold…Article 
9(1) is engaged or applicable.”487  However, House of Lords’ position was 
different. Their Lordships’ reasons for their different stand were two fold, 
according to Ssenyonjo, : “(i) the school’s refusal to allow Shabina Begum to 
wear a jilbāb at school did not interfere with her Article 9 right to manifest her 
religion (according to the majority) and, even if it did, (ii) the school’s decision 
was objectively justified. While there was consensus on the second finding 
(justification), there were differences in the opinion about the first one (whether 
there was interference). The majority in the House of Lords found that “there was 
no interference with the respondent’s right to manifest her belief in practice or 
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observance,”488 because she had “chosen to attend this school knowing full well 
what the school uniform was. It was she who had changed her mind about what 
her religion required of her, rather than the school which had changed its 
policy.”489  Lord Hoffmann’s statement in this case is as follows: “I accept the 
wearing a jilbāb to a mixed school was, for her, a manifestation of her religion. 
The fact that most other Muslims might not have thought it necessary is irrelevant. 
But her right was not in my opinion infringed because there was nothing to stop 
her from going to a school where her religion did not require a jilbāb or where she 
was allowed to wear one. Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to 
manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s own choosing.”490   
How far this legal reasoning by Lord Hoffmann has been justifiable in 
relation to the notion of interference with Shabana’s right to manifest her religious 
beliefs by a jilbāb isquestionable. Ssenyonjo491 notes that the reasoning has been 
based on ‘the existence of other school where she could wear a jilbāb’. But, 
according to him, “this does not appear to be convincing because the existence of 
other schools can only serve to justify the interference as opposed to the absence 
of the interference. The reasoning also indicates that the majority were reluctant to 
protect the rights of more marginalised individuals within the minority religious 
groups. As Lord Hoffmann stated, “people [minorities like Shabina] sometimes 
have to suffer some inconvenience for their beliefs” (para. 50).  
                                                 
488
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Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale of Richmond, the only female member of the 
Appellate Committee, took a different opinion. Lord Nicholls noted: “I think this 
[the view that her right to manifest her religion by a jilbāb was not infringed] may 
over-estimate the case with which Shabina could move to another, more suitable 
school and under-estimate the disruption this would be likely to cause to her 
education. I would prefer that in this type of case the school is called upon to 
explain and justify its decision, as did the Denbigh High School in the present 
case.”492 Lady Hale of Richmond also agreed, as contended by Ssenyonjo, with 
Lord Nicholls that “there was an interference with Shabina Begum’s right to 
manifest her religion.”493    
Further elaborating the case, Ssenyonjo
494
  notes that the law Lords 
justified the school’s refusal to allow Shabina Begum to wear a jilbāb at school 
for a number of reasons: (1) the school’s right to adopt a policy on school 
uniforms. In this case, “the school had taken immense pains to devise a uniform 
policy which respected Muslim beliefs…”495 (2) the existing policy largely 
conformed with, and acceptable to “mainstream Muslim opinion”496  (3) girls in 
the school had “subsequently expressed their concern that if the jilbāb were to be 
allowed they would face pressure to adopt it even though they do not wish to do 
so”497 (4) the school wished to avoid clothes which were perceived by some 
Muslims (rightly or wrongly) as signifying adherence to what was described as an 
“extremist version of the Muslim religion”498  (5) the school relied on a statement 
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made by the Muslim Council of Britain on the “Dress code for women in Islam” 
which stated that in Islam “there was no recommended style; modesty must be 
observed at all times; trousers with long tops or shirts for school wear ‘absolutely 
fine’.”499 (6) three schools in the area “whose rules would permit her [the 
respondent] to wear a jilbāb”500 (7) Shabina “had chosen to attend to this school 
knowing full well what the school uniform was”501 (8) the notion that the shalwar 
kameeze school uniform would not accord with essential requirements of Islamic 
modesty for teenage girls seems to me an extraordinary one”502  
Articulating these justifications put forward by Law Lords, Ssenyonjo
503
  
questions: “whether the reasons mentioned above made it “necessary” to interfere 
with the applicant’s freedom to manifest her religion by a jilbāb at school. In 
particular, several questions can be raised with respect to some aspects of the 
Court’s reasoning. First, does the wearing of a jilbāb (which was considered to be 
“extraordinary”) signify adherence to an “extreme version” of the Muslim religion 
so that it is necessary to limit it in school? Is it for the Courts to determine the 
ordinary and extraordinary requirements of a particular religion in a given 
context? Furthermore, is it “irresponsible” of any Court to overrule the judgement 
of school authorities on a matter involving dress in schools according to one’s 
religious beliefs? 
Ssenyonjo, responding the questions asked, maintains that: “in democratic 
societies, in which several religions coexist within one and same population, it 
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may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s belief are respected.”504  The limitation clauses in article 8-11 of the 
ECHR demand that interferences must be “necessary ina democratic society”. The 
term “necessary” has been found to connote a high burden to be discharged by a 
State (in this case, the school). Necessity is “not synonymous with ‘indispensable’ 
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, 
‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’.505  A measure does not become “necessary” 
simply because it has the support or approval of a majority of the population – as 
is appropriate with a human rights instrument, the court must also consider the 
rights of minorities. The adjective “necessary” requires that any interference must 
on the particular facts of the case be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” 
and be designed to meet a “pressing social need” and the reason(s) given for the 
interference must be relevant and sufficient.”506  
Finally, evaluating the Begum case, Ssenyonjo stresses that there was no 
sufficient evidence to justify the “perception” that wearing a jilbāb signified 
alleged adherence to an “extreme version” (a term that was not defined) of the 
Muslim religion or to link extremism to Shabina Begum’s conduct. Indeed, there 
was no evidence to show that Shabina was a “extremist” or supported any 
extremist group…However, the application of high degree of deference to the 
school authorities (the head teacher, staff and governors), as the House of Lords 
did in this case, effectively lessened the court’s role to determine whether the 
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limitation in question was “necessary” under Article 9. Indeed, according to the 
majority, there was no interference in the first place. To state that it would be 
“irresponsible” for the court to overrule the head teacher, staff and governors in a 
case of a jilbāb at school effectively undermined the court’s “supervision” in 
terms of intensity of scrutiny with which the margin of appreciation is supposed to 
work “hand in hand”. It also suggests that experienced school authorities can 
make no errors of judgment, which does not appear to be always the case.
507
   
“Deferring to the school authorities granted to the school an almost 
unlimited “margin of discretion” thereby enabling the court to avoid the 
“difficult” jilbāb question and its failure to recognise the rights of the most 
marginalised individuals within minority groups- in this case being the rights of a 
female Muslim pupil wearing a jilbāb at school.”508  This indifference towards 
marginalised individuals is clearly manifest in the statement of Lord Hoffmann 
when he stated that “people [minorities like Shabina] sometimes have to suffer 
some inconvenience for their beliefs”. Implicit in this assertion is the question: 
why did she choose to wear “extraordinary” religious clothing linked to an 
“extremist version of the Muslim religion?”509  
5.3.3.3 The Begum Case and Right to Education 
The right to education is guaranteed by Article 2, Protocol No. 1. as noted 
by Ssenyonjo.
510
  The article 2 “confers no right to go to any particular school. It 
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is infringed only if the claimant is unable to obtain education from the system as a 
whole.”511  Ssenyonjo argues that in the present case, it was pointed out that, she 
could choose to attend a school where she could wear her jiplbab, and there was 
nothing to suggest that Shabina could not have found a suitable school if she had 
notified her requirements in good time to the local education authority. This 
approach does not consider another dilemma in that if gorls are moved from State 
to private, religious schools, they leave an environment where they can experience 
tolerance, friendship among all people, ethnic, national and religious groups, 
persons of indigenous origin, diversity of culture, ethnicity and religion. Lord 
Scott added that: “if the conclusion that the school was entitled to have a school 
uniform policy that did not allow Shabina to wear a jilbāb is right, as in my 
opinion it is, it must follow that the school did not by requiring her to wear the 
school uniform commit any breach of her convention right to education”512  
Ssenyonjo further observes that “general bans on the Islamic dress in 
schools might lead to further discrimination against girls and women in education. 
In States where Muslims are the ethnic, racial and religious minorities, this is 
likely to lead to the “intersectionality” of racial, sex, and religious discrimination. 
Freedman observed: “In the case of the headscarf, the exclusion of Muslim 
women from school and other public spaces, places them further from arenas of 
debate, discussion and participation, and thus pushes a real resolution of this issue 
even further beyond reach.”513 Therefore, the hijāb should not be used to deny 
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Muslim women education. In the words of Kutty: “Hijāb, when understood in the 
proper Islamic context can naver be associated with oppression of women, for 
women during the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) never 
stayed behind anyone; they were assertive and participated fully in society.”514   
Hence, this final observation by Ssenyonjo, leads this section of the 
chapter to consider whether the Islamic headscarf and its sister affiliates: niqāb, 
khimār, and jilbāb, are cultural expressions or religious obligations. Scrutinising 
the Qur’ān and the Sunnah515of the Prophet, one may discover that it is a religious 
obligation. The Qur’ān says: “…And say to the believing women that they should 
lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty 
and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should 
draw their veils (Khumur) over their bosoms and not display their beauty except 
to their husbands, their fathers…”516   
The Qur’ān further says: “O Prophet, tell thy wives and daughters, and the 
believing women that they should cast their outer garments over their persons 
(when abroad); that is most convenient, that they should be known (as such) and 
not molested…”517 From these two Quranic teachings it becomes clear that 
Islamic religion makes it obligatory upon women for the age of puberty to veil 
when in the presence of men who are not closely related to or whom she is 
allowed to marry.  
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Although there is no fixed way of covering her body in terms of type, 
colour, and style, the minimum requirement for Muslim woman is to cover the 
entire body, with the exception of the face and the hands according to vast 
majority of Muslim jurists as interpreted in the light of the verses mentioned 
above.
518
  Therefore, it may not be exaggeration to say that the hijāb is not just a 
religious symbol but rather it is a religious obligation for Muslim women who 
attained the age prescribed. In this respect, Ali Jumah, Mufti of Egypt, stated in 
2004: “ a Muslim woman is obliged to wear hijab as soon as she reaches 
puberty…Hijāb is known to be essential and necessary in religion; it is not merely 
a symbol that distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims. It is an obligation that 
forms part and parcel of the Islamic religion.”519   
Drawing on the discussion made above, it can be concluded that the 
Islamic headscarf inherently religious and it is an obligation on Muslim woman. 
Therefore, it may be said it is her religious obligation as well as her human right 
sanctioned by Human Right Conventions. Compared to many  western countries, 
the opportunity to enjoy this freedom and to practice this right by British Muslim 
Women is enormous despite being subject to many discrimination in practicing it 
in their daily life as seen in the Begum case. It is undeniable that the issues 
revolving around hijāb, niqāb, jilbāb…etc. particularly banning them can amount 
to violation of a number of international human rights. According to McGoldrick, 
the ban on the Islamic dress and similar prohibitions of any of the above types of 
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the Islamic dress can involve the intersection of a number of international human 
rights including the right to freedom of religion, racial and gender discrimination, 
minority rights and the right to education.
520
    
In this respect, what is apparent form the discussion done so far is that 
there seems to be some fundamental issues revolving around certain definitions 
such as ‘religion’, ‘freedom’, ‘right’,’ responsibility’, ‘necessary’…that have been 
quite extensively used not only in this controversy in particular but also in similar 
cases as well. Particularly, when an issue occurs within a society where diversity 
is a persistent reality in terms of culture, religion, ethnicity, race, colour, 
language…etc. i.e. multi-faith  and multicultural society, a question arises as to 
who has the authority to define these terms, whose interpretation is accurate, 
under what criterion it can be right…etc.? Is it not true that the definitions of the 
concepts of ‘human rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘value’, ‘ethics’, are given and interpreted 
as the West understands them. Can there be other understandings and 
interpretations as well which can contribute to define these terms? How far is it 
reasonable to impose a certain understanding of a concept on ‘others’ who are not 
consulted and not party to it? In order to find answers to these and similar 
fundamental questions, it is appropriate to quote Wael B.Hallaq: “In studying the 
role of the Qur’ān in so-called Islamic law, we have imposed - among much else – 
our distinctly and distinctively modern notions and standards of law and morality, 
separating the inseparable and joining together that which cannot or never could 
be joined. Our scholarship has been tainted by conceptual categories, distinctions 
and binarisms that originated in modern Europe, mainly from the time of Kant, if 
not that of Hobbes. We have, unconsciously, taken these categories and applied 
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them to other nations and communities, to other histories and anthropologies. Our 
struggle now is to free ourselves of our controlling and hegemonic ideas whose 
vehicle is our language, our conceptual slave-driver.”521    
The significance of this quotation lies in the fact that its call for a 
epistemological revisit to the origins of the western concepts and deconstruction 
of them aiming to understand other societies and communities in their proper 
contexts. In that sense, the present multicultural pluralistic social context of 
contemporary Britain is a blessing for all the communities in Britain, which 
means that, with getting everyone’s participation and contribution towards 
deconstructing concepts and terminologies, a true model multicultural society can 
be built. Hence, it is with this aim in mind, the following chapter will strive to 
outline some of the strategies of Islamic approach towards achieving this goal 
within a Muslim minority situation, which is called fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt.      
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Chapter 6: Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt (Jurisprudence for Muslim 
Minorities) 
6.1 Definition, Concepts, and the Status of Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt - 
Past and Present  
Fiqh, literally, means understanding and comprehension
522
, and technically, it 
means acquiring profound knowledge of legal rulings of the Sharī‘ah that are 
deduced and derived from its detailed sources. Thus, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
(Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities) means the profound and comprehensive 
understanding and knowledge of a Muslim Minority at a given social context at a 
given time from the perspective of Islamic Jurisprudence.  
According to the 12
th
 session of European Council for Fatwa and Research, the 
following definiton for Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt has been unanimously reached by the 
members of the council headed by Yūsuf al-Qardāwi the president of the Council: 
“It is a kind of Fiqh which deals with laws or rulings pertaining to Muslims reside 
in non Muslim societies or countries”523. Further explaining this point, al-Qardāwi 
stressed that it is a special kind of fiqh especially for Muslims reside in non 
Muslim countries where a Muslim is surrounded by an un-Islamic social set up in 
which every sphere of life is totally alien to Islamic norms and ethos. The 
presence of a Muslim in that social atmosphere is, therefore, not like a situation of 
his fellow Muslim in an Islamic environment or in an Islamic social set up. As 
such, there should be a separate approach to address the issues related to this sort 
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of a situation and find a way out to seek solutions to the problems aroused out of 
this unique context. 
Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt is, thus, a concept, which deals with issues related to Muslim 
minorities from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, In other words, it seeks 
to understand, comprehend, and asses the issues of Muslim minorities in the light 
of the Sharī‘ah  and to offer guidelines to address the issues through the Qur’an 
and Sunnah taking the objectives and end goals of the Sharī‘ah  into account. 
Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt is, however, a new terminology coined by modern Muslim 
scholars like al-Qardāwi and al-Alwāni and a subject matter, which is being 
discussed and debated in International forums and Research councils like 
European Council for Fatwa and Research. As such, this has no reference in early 
works of jurists. In his online rulings, al-Qardāwi524 rather prefers calling this fiqh 
as Fiqh al-Ightirab, which means the jurisprudence for Muslims who happened to 
be living in the West and outside the abode of Islam (Dār al-Islam) or in rather 
than using the term Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt. When he argues about his preference to 
use this term in his articulation of Muslim minority issues in the West, al-Qardāwi 
emphasises that “we prefer defining this as Fiqh al-Ightirāb in spite of its 
irrelevance to denote Muslims to live in their own homelands like in India and 
Philippines as they belong to these lands. Hence, how can we consider them as 
Mughtaribīn (people of the West) except for the strangeness of Islam (in their 
lands) is the yardstick, as in the Prophet’s tradition: Islam emerged as a stranger 
and it will become stranger again. Blessed be those who are felt to be strangers”. 
Al-Qardāwi, nevertheless, in his latest writings has little reservation in using the 
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term al-Aqalliyyāt (minority) against his preference: al-Ightirab. His using of the 
term al-Aqalliyyāt is not more apparent than in his recent works on fiqh for 
Muslim minorities. His articulation of this term can be widely seen both in 
electronic and print media.
525
 Especially, in the third volume of his book: Fatawa 
Muasirah
526
 (Contemporary Legal Rulings), the issues and problems of Muslims 
living in the West have been dealt with and articulated extensively. Similarly, the 
term al-Aqalliyyāt has been widely and vividly used by him in his ever first book 
on Muslim minority issues form the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence: Fi Fiqh 
al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslimāt527.  
As such, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt is a specific kind of fiqh, which is mostly concerned 
about dealing with special circumstances and sitiuations of people who happened 
to be living in non-Muslim lands or societies from the perspective of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  
Tāha Jābir al-Alwāni observes that it is a fiqh of a certain group of people whose 
context is special and whose situation is peculiar. The person who seeks to come 
up with this fiqh has to be acquainted with social sciences, economics, political 
science and international relations. Hence, he stresses that the definition of fiqh al-
Aqalliyyāt is an accurate and acceptable definition. There is no restriction in the 
use of this terminology.
528
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It does not mean, however, that the benefit of this fiqh is confined only to Muslim 
minorities, as contented by al-Qardāwi. He argues that the people who live in their 
homelands
529
 too can benefit from the rukhas (Concessions) of this fiqh.
530
It is 
apparent from al-Qardāwi’s stand on this issue that the outcome and benefits of 
this fiqh can possibly be benefited by the rest of the Muslim community. But for 
al-Alwāni, this fiqh does not mean only the concessions for minorities. “on the 
contrary” he argues “we aim at , through forming this fiqh, creating examples and 
models from within minorities, and efficient Muslim men and representatives of 
their own home countries. Hence, it is a fiqh of the cream or models, and fiqh of 
firm obligations (Azaim), not a fiqh of just concessions (Rukhas) and 
interpretations (Tawilat).
531
  
From the above explanation, it seems there is a contradiction between al-Qardāwi 
and al-Alwāni in defining fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt. But a close scrutiny of their views 
will show that both of them express their views from different angles and to 
different people. While al-Qardāwi’s opinions were expressed through his 
answers to questions posed towards him through the internet by people around the 
globe especially by Muslim minorities from non-Muslim societies, al-Alwāni put 
his views through his writings. Furthermore he speaks about the concepts and 
theories of this fiqh aiming at addressing specialised people in this field. While al-
Qardāwi, speaks about this fiqh focusing on addressing contemporary issues of 
Muslim minorities, particularly the people of the west in a practical way, al-
Alwāni attempts to achieve a comprehensive outlook for this fiqh including its 
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concepts, principles, fundamentals (Usul), scope, and the methodological means 
of implementation of this fiqh on a theoretical basis. As contemporary Muslim 
minorities face problems in conducting their day to day life, it goes without saying 
that these problems should be dealt with in no time, in order to achieve amicable 
solutions, which is what seems to be in al-Qardāwi’s views on fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
whose most scholarly discourses largely focus on seeking priorities in dealing 
with problems and challenges of contemporary Islamic awakening.
532
 
As this situation is a new phenomenon which was not identified by early jurists, a 
new approach, a sound methodology, and a firm foundation should be laid down 
to deal with it in a creative and constructive manner. Al-Alwāni views fiqh al-
Aqalliyyāt as an effort to shed light on this inevitable need. As such, on one hand 
fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt is concessions and facilitating on the basis of prioritisation. On 
the other, it is nothing but general rulings, firm provisions, and clear-cut 
obligations on the basis of conceptualisation. Given the contemporary situation of 
Muslim minorities, there is an immediate need to address their problems. Hence, 
there should be scholars who are committed to respond to this unique and 
unprecedented situation whenever need arises. Similarly, a profound long-term 
procedure also should be devised so that issues of Muslim minorities could be 
addressed amicably. As such, although there seems to be a contradictory stand 
represented by both al-Qardāwi and al-Alwāni on the definition of fiqh al-
Aqalliyyāt literally, it is evident from the above analysis that both of them strive, 
in real, to find a sound and solid methodological fiqhi approach to seek solutions 
to the problems of contemporary Muslim minorities.    
                                                 
532
 al-Qaraawi, Yūsuf, fi fiqh al-Awlawiyyat (fiqh of priorities), Maktabat Wahbah, Cairo, 1996. & 
Awlawiyyat al-Harakat al-Islamiyyat fi al-Marhalat al-Qadimat (Priorities of Movement in the 
Future Stage), 13
th
 ed., Muassasat al-Risalat, Beirut, 1985.   
 237 
 
6.2 Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt - Past and Present 
In dealing with the unique situation of contemporary Muslim minorities residing 
in non-Muslim societies in various parts of today’s world from the perspective of 
Islamic jurisprudence, one can hardly find any concrete methodological approach 
to do with their diverse and multifaceted issues and problems that have erupted in 
their current and unprecedented context in the existing classical fiqh. The fiqh 
which we have inherited from generation to generation, although it has passed 
through various socio-political and cultural contexts proving its capability to 
overcome any social set up and to cope with any sort of a situation, has never 
been put on test like it undergoes today. Of course, it is undeniable that even 
during the Prophet’s time in the early Makkan period; there came a Muslim 
minority situation in Habasha. It was the first ever Muslim migration in the 
history of Islam from Mecca to the now Ethiopia. Nevertheless, no one would 
dare to argue that the situation at that time was anything like today in terms of 
social context, issues, and problems. The response to this particular context, 
therefore, was not needed as comprehensive as we need it today. This explains, 
why the Quranic or prophetic guidance to deal with a peculiar and unprecedented 
situation prevailing in today’s Muslim minority social contexts is too general than 
specific. At the same time, it is undeniable that this divine guidance has been an 
inseparable source of reference for scholars of fiqh to deal with all such situations 
that followed the early formative stage of Muslim communities. Hence, this 
explains why there has been always some sort of effort exerted by Muslim 
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scholars towards seeking solutions to issues faced by Muslim minorities 
throughout the centuries.                              
In fact, there are references, undoubtedly, in Islamic jurisprudence as to whether it 
is permissible at all for a Muslim minority, for instance, to reside in non-Muslim 
domain in terms of his obligatory commitment to preserve his identity as a 
Muslim and to uphold his allegiance to his larger community. If so, what kind of a 
relationship these Muslims should have towards dār al-Islam whilst existing 
alongside other faiths and communities outside the Muslim territory? What are the 
ethical and legal duties that these Muslims owe to their host non-Muslim polity or 
to the society? These are some of the basic issues, which one might find 
references in the classical works. Nevertheless, the same or similar issues have 
been persistently challenging Muslims giving an impetus for an ongoing debate 
among the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, the debate is, undoubtedly, 
multifaceted and multidimensional, not only because of the diverse nature of the 
same issues but also the varied contexts and circumstances in which the Muslim 
minorities reside in terms of territory, society, and polity nationally as well as 
internationally.  
From the second century Hijra, the scholars of fiqh have been constantly 
concerned about the fate of Muslim minorities as regards to their status of residing 
in non-Muslim territory or coexisting with non- Muslims. In fact, there were 
several historical and doctrinal reasons underlining this debate. As mentioned 
before, there has been an argument from the early period of Islam that a just life is 
possibly materialised if lived under the guidance of the Sharī‘ah , which, in turn, 
is possible only if there is an Islamic polity dedicated to the application of the 
Sharī‘ah .  
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The core issue of this debate is that a Muslim cannot possibly live a just life or 
positively enjoy a true life unless he lives in an Islamic polity that applies the 
Sharī‘ah  dutifully.  
What makes this situation problematic is the demarcation of the world as an abode 
of Islam (Dār al-Islam) and the abode of un-Islam or disbelief (Dār al-Kufr, Dār 
al-Harb, or Dār al-Shirk). The abode of Islam is where it is possible to live an 
ethical life under the guidance of Sharī‘ah , while the abode of un-Islam is where 
the Sharī‘ah  is not possible to be applied and Islamic justice therefore, does not 
prevail. On the other hand this situation becomes more problematic, difficult, and 
complicated by the fact that there are certain Quranic injunctions, which instructs 
not only Muslims but also Jews, and Christians to govern themselves by what God 
had decreed for each of them. 
One of them reads as follows “Those who do not judge by God’s revelation are 
disbelievers indeed” (5:44) and (5:49) for Jews; (5:44-45) for Christians; 5:47-
48). In addition to that, the Qur’ān calls upon Muslims not to ally themselves with 
Christians or Jews “O believers do not hold Jews and Christians as your allies. 
They are allies of one another and anyone who makes them his allies is surely one 
of them, and God does not guide the unjust” (5:51). 
In another place the Qur’ān calls upon Muslims to escape oppression by migrating 
in the cause of God: “As for those whose souls are taken by the angles (at death) 
while in a state of injustice against themselves, they will be asked by the angles: 
“What state were you in?” they will answer: “We are oppressed in the land”. And 
the angles will say: “Was not God’s earth large enough for you to migrate?”… 
But those who are helpless, men women, and children, who can neither contrive a 
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plan nor do they know the way, may well hope for the mercy of God: and God is 
full of mercy and grace. Whoever migrates in the cause of God will find many 
places of refuge and abundance on the earth (4:97-100). 
Undoubtedly, these Quranic verses and those that are similar to these Quranic 
injunctions raise some important and serious questions:  
1. What did the Qur’ān mean by those who “Were oppressed”? does 
oppression synonymous with living in non-Muslim land? 
2. What if a Muslim encounters oppression in an Islamic land and the only 
haven is non-Muslim territory: in that case, what becomes of the 
injunctions not to take Christians and Jews as allies? 
3. How is one to govern by what God is has decreed if one escapes (from 
wars or any other danger) to non-Muslim territory?     
In addition to this, there are certain prophetic traditions that forbade Muslims 
from living in the lands of disbelief. One such tradition states: “Whosoever 
associates with disbelievers and lives with them he is like them”. Some other 
traditions say that hijra (Migration) is an ongoing obligation. For instance, the 
Prophet is reported to have said: “The hijra will not come to an end as long as the 
disbelievers are fought”. In contrast, however other traditions assert the duty of 
hijra to have ended with the conquest of Mecca.
533
 Answering these questions 
necessitates exploring the validity of arguments surrounding the concept of 
territory in the classical fiqhi discourse and its relevance in today’s socio-political 
realities.  
 
                                                 
533
 Al-Nawawi, Majmu, vol.19, 262-3. 
 241 
 6.3 Concept of Dār in the Pre Modern Period  
This title seeks to throw light on classification of territories perceived by classical 
scholars. In doing so, the focus is mainly set on major fiqhi (law) schools of 
thought: Hanafi, Māliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. Examining the scholarly discourse 
of these schools, the title seeks to unearth the causes that led to such dichotomous 
positions held by these schools of thought on the issue and to find out how their 
judgments can still withstand to the scrutiny of objective reading of the main 
Islamic texts and the contemporary context.           
6.3.1 Definition of Dār 
Linguistically the term dār has array of meanings. According to Lisan al-Arab, 
dār means the residence (mahal), location (al-mawdi`), the country (al-balad), the 
homeland (al-watan), and the tribe (al-qabīlah). Its plural is diyār, duwar, 
diyarah, and adyār…534  
In the terminology of scholars of Islamic law (al-fuqahā), the term dār has been 
dealt with various definitions, particularly when it is linked with terms such as 
“Islam”, “harb” (war), or “kufr” (disbelief)…etc. 
Primarily, the diversity of definitions articulated by fuqahā in relation to these 
terms has been, largely, because of their individual fiqhi (law) perspectives 
regarding the nature, essence, and features of territories (dār). Secondly, the 
underlying reason for such varied views has been mostly due to the vague 
implications of primary Islamic texts upon which the whole debate of the issue 
engaged in by scholars of Islamic law has been embedded.  
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Abou El Fadl observes that the “Qur’ān and early Islamic sources do not speak 
unambiguously about the meanings and relations of such terms as “territory of 
Islam” (dār al-Islam), “territory of associationism” (dār al-shirk), and other terms 
used in juridical discourse”.535 Moreover, the necessity of the contexts faced by 
fuqahā forced them to exert effort, when they witnessed the Muslim territory 
continued to expand beyond the boundaries of Arabian Peninsula, to differentiate 
between territories which belonged to Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, 
“reflecting their sense of political realities, jurists expressed an “us” versus 
“them” mentality, especially with reference to the dichotomous terms mentioned 
above”.536            
What follows is, however, the juridical discourse articulated by pre-modern jurists 
in an attempt to come up with definitions that distinguish territories between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.  
It should be noted, at the outset before highlighting their opinions, that it was not 
an easy task for them to provide a consensus definition to a term like dār al-Islam 
due to the reasons mentioned above.
537
 Although it has been an illusive issue for 
them to define it as such, “they have often claimed that Islamic law divides the 
world into two basic categories dār al-Islam and dār al-harb…”538 Pondering 
over this juristic claim and deep rooted debates surrounding it, one might wonder 
whether the world can be classified like this in a simplistic manner. In contrast, 
what emerges from probing such claim is that there has been an open-ended 
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debate articulated by scholars of law (fuqahā) over the issue since early centuries 
of Islam till today. Hence, the claim, which has been purely an outcome of law 
scholars’ understanding of their context based on Islamic texts, has been put into 
test of the history. Having been confronted with realities as well as challenges of 
their historical contexts, the fuqahā have been under pressure to find ways and 
means to seek reconciliation between contexts and the texts. As a result, a wealth 
of fascinating deductions (istinbātāt) as well as exertion of scholarly efforts 
(ijtihādāt) made by fuqahā on the subject sprang up throughout the centuries of 
the history of Islamic law. It is against this background that one might find 
reasons why some Jurists not only did extra effort to classify territories other than 
dār al-Islam and dār al-harb but also encounted enormous difficulties to provide 
content to a term like dār al-Islam itself. 539   
6.3.2 Dār al-Islam and Dār al-Harb     
As observed by Abou El Fadl, many jurists, without discussing the issue at length, 
just dealt the term dār al-Islam “as though its definition were self-evident”. On 
the contrary those who engaged themselves articulating the issue in detail, he 
further explains, provided a wealth of opinion with a great deal of diversity in 
their approach
540
. As a prelude to a detail discussion of juridical opinion on the 
issue, it can be said, generally, that some jurists held the distinguishing feature of 
dār al-Islam as the application of Islamic law. Others had the opinion of the 
existence of a Muslim majority to be the decisive factor for a territory to be 
designated as dār al-Islam. Others argued that dār al-Islam requires a Muslim 
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head of state.
541
 Some considered that in particular cases an area might be neither 
part of dār al-Islam (Muslim territory) nor of dār al-harb (non-Muslim territory), 
but “something in between”542  
Specifically, dār al-Islam, as held by majority hanafi scholars, is “a designation to 
a place under the jurisdiction of Muslims and, as an indication to that, they should 
enjoy safety in it”.543  
According to this view, the application of Islamic law has not been seen as a 
requirement for a place to be designated as dār al-Islam. It seems, therefore, that 
those who held this opinion might have counted the dominion and the jurisdiction 
of Muslims over a territory as an adequate condition for it to be considered as 
abode of al-Islam (dār al-Islam). Moreover, it may be said that the jurists might 
have looked at the fundamental principle of Islam, which says that a territory 
under the jurisdiction of Muslims should be governed by the Islamic law, which is 
considered to be an established consensus of Muslim community, and a well-
known Islamic code of conduct practiced by Muslims since the establishment of 
Islamic rule by the Prophet in Medina in the 7
th
 century AC. Hence, the hanafi 
jurists do not possibly rule out the application of Islamic law as an integral 
component of domain of Islam (dār al-Islam), as this assumption has been 
elevated to a confirmed position by a prominent hanafi jurist al-Sarakhsi (d. 
1107). In his monumental work, al-Sarakhsi emphasises: “a conquered territory 
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does not become dār al-Islam unless the laws of Islam are applied”.544 
Highlighting the majority opinion of hanafi scholars, both Abū Zahrah and Zuhailī 
observe that dār al-Islam: “is a territory under the jurisdiction of Islam where 
Muslims have both power and authorities in their hands, Islamic laws are 
implemented, and Islamic rituals are established”.545 
Justifying their approach hanafis argue that no “dār” (territory) can be attributed 
to “Islam” or “kufr” so that it can be designated as dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr 
unless that territory is prevailed by Islam or kufr respectively. If Islamic laws are 
applied, then it is dār al-Islam and if the laws are un-Islamic which is kufr, then it 
is dār al-kufr.546 Explaining further, al-Kāsānī (d. 1211) observes that there is no 
dispute among hanafi scholars that even if the territory is dār al-kufr, it can 
become dār al-Islam by applying Islamic laws in it, Nevertheless, Abū Hanīfah 
(d. 774) under whose name the hanafi school of thought (hanafi madhhab) is 
designated, is of the opinion that dār al-Islam does not become dār al-kufr simply 
because the laws of kufr are applied in it, rather it should fulfil three conditions 
which are: the laws of kufr should be applied, the territory should be adjacent with 
dār al-kufr, neither a Muslim nor a dhimmī (non-Muslim citizen in dār al-Islam) 
should be able to enjoy the protection provided by the previous protecting body 
which is dār al-Islam. As for his both disciples Abū Yūsuf (d. 806) and 
Muhammad (d. 813), as contended by al-Kāsānī, dār al-Islam becomes dār al-
kufr simply by applying laws of kufr in it. According to both of them, designating 
a territory as dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr depends on it being associated with Islam 
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or kufr and it cannot be materialised, therefore, without Islam or kufr being 
apparently manifested in there. Justifying their position, both argue, that it is as 
same as naming the paradise dār al-Salām because its contents are peace, safety, 
and security, and the hell as dār al-bawār as it has nothing but ruin and 
destruction. The manifestation of Islam or kufr, therefore, cannot be actualised, 
they continue to argue, unless respective laws are applied. Hence, if a particular 
territory is ruled by laws of kufr, it becomes dār al-kufr. A territory would become 
either dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr by virtue of applying Laws of Islam or kufr in it. 
As for Abū Hanīfah, al-Kāsānī further explains, the rational underpinning of a 
certain territory as dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr is not just because Islam or kufr 
exists in it; rather it depends on the guarantee of safety one can enjoy in it or the 
risk of insecurity someone could feel. If there is enough safety, according to Abu 
Hanīfah, for Muslims in a particular territory and disbelievers are in fear, then it is 
deemed to be dār al-Islam. On the contrary, if non-Muslims feel secure and enjoy 
safety in it and Muslims do not, then it is considered to be dār al-kufr. As such, 
legal rulings are not based simply on ground of Islam or kufr, but on safety or 
fear.
547
  
What is apparent from the above discussion is that the leading Hanafi scholars are 
divided in classifying territories and are far from reaching a consensus position in 
this regard. Hence, the dispute revolves around the question of what it should be 
the rational for judging a territory as dār al-Islam or dār al-Harb. As for Abū 
Hanīfah’s two prominent students Abū Yūsuf and Muhammad, the rational 
underscores this classification as both application as well as superiority of Islamic 
laws in a particular territory. If that territory is ruled by laws of kufr, then it is to 
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be considered as dār al-kufr. If the laws of Islam are dominant in it, then it should 
be treated as dār al-Islam. 
In the view of Abū Hanīfah, the stipulated condition for such classification is the 
prevalence of either safety or fear someone can feel in a particular territory. In 
other words, as contended by al-Sarakhsi, if Muslims living in a territory, for 
instance, are powerful and enjoy full authority, then it is considered as dār al-
Islam and if the territory is under control and authority of non-Muslims, then it is 
to be treated as dār al-Kufr. If dār al-Islam is conquered by polytheists (al-
Mushrikūn) and, as a result, their laws are applied, then that territory does not 
become dār al-kufr simply because of this new situation, rather it becomes as such 
only by their fullest domination and superiority in it. According to Abū Hanīfah, 
the superiority does not materialise unless the three conditions mentioned, are 
fulfilled. Commenting on these conditions, al-Sarakhsi observes that the reason 
why Abū Hanīfah considers the fullest superiority and power as a criterion for a 
formal part of dār al-Islam to become dār al-harb is, a particular territory would 
not be deemed lost by Muslims unless it is under the fullest authority of 
polytheists. It will not be actualised without those three conditions because if that 
territory is not adjacent with a non-Muslim territory then its people are 
overpowered by Muslims surrounding them. If a Muslim or a dhimmi enjoys 
safety and security in it, then it is an indication that it lacks fullest power and 
authority of non-Muslims.
548
 What makes the debate between Abū Hanīfah and 
his two disciples on the above issue clear is that both parties meet together in 
defining dār al-kufr and dār al-Islam in terms of application of laws belonging to 
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each of them in each ones’ territory. Although they agree on this aspect, as the 
core of the definition, one might assume that both disciples disagree on other 
aspects, which Abū Hanīfah lays emphasis on. A close scrutiny of the discourse 
would not suggest that assumption. It is not far from reality to suggest that the 
application of laws cannot be materialised unless there being enough power and 
authority to make it possible, which is included in Abu Hanifa’s definition and not 
mentioned in his two disciples’ opinions. Despite not mentioned by them, on the 
basis of the above reality regarding application of laws, it is not irrational to argue 
that both of them do not rule out the necessity of including this condition to agree 
with their teacher. The only remarkable distinction between the two parties in 
their definitions, however, is the third condition of Abū Hanīfah, which says the 
territory should be adjacent with dār al-Islam in order for it to be considered as 
dār al-Islam as noted before. Apart from this aspect one might not see that there is 
a substantial difference between leading hanafi scholars as such. To sum up the 
above discussion it can be said that hanafi scholars are in agreement, apart from 
the third condition, that dār al-Islam is a territory in which Islamic laws are 
applied with enough authority and power in the hands of Muslim while feeling 
secure and protected physically. It is worth mentioning in this regard that this 
position held by hanafi scholars has been echoed by majority scholars of fiqh (al-
jumhūru min al-fuqahā’ wa al-‘ulamā’).549 Emphasising this point, Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyyah observes that “the majority of scholars are of the opinion that dār al-
Islam is a territory in which Muslims reside and laws of Islam are applied. A 
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territory in which laws of Islam are not applied cannot be considered as dār al-
Islam even if it is adjacent to dār al-Islam.”550  
Therefore, in the view of majority law scholars, the application of laws of Islam as 
a criterion for a territory to be designated as dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr is more 
important than any other considerations, particularly when comparing the third 
condition of Abū Hanīfah to other aspects mentioned above.  
It may be said that the condition of inseparability between two or more territories 
in order for them to be considered as dār al-Islam as claimed by Abū Hanīfah, 
though it might sound practical during pre-modern time, is not something 
pragmatic for this modern age when huge technological advancements in warfare 
mechanisms are unimaginably on the increase as a demonstration of power and 
superiority which can be used from continent to continent at a time of war which 
gives little consideration to boundaries between countries. It can be noticed that 
because of the impracticability of this condition many of those who have written 
on International relations in Islam
551
 have given little consideration of it. “Even if 
Abū Hanīfah were to live to see what we see today he would have dropped this 
condition. The difference is not that of evidence and proof, rather that of time and 
circumstances.”552 Moreover, some contemporary scholars who have embarked 
upon the issue in question have dealt with the second condition of Abū Hanīfah, 
which is “al-amān” and suggested that it is no longer a valid component of dār al-
Islam. Assuming it as an absolute characteristic of domain of Islam, they argue 
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that even in the formal territories of war (dār al-harb) that never came under the 
jurisdiction of Islam before, one might feel secure and safety, and still no one 
would dare to designate it as dār al-Islam. It is, undoubtedly, far from reality and 
against the consensus of law scholars.
553
 
Responding to this argument, ‘Abd al-Qādir observes that Abū Hanīfah did not 
intend it at all from this condition. What he intended, rather, by “al-amān” was 
the protection a Muslim deserves to be offered by virtue of being a resident of dār 
al-Islam and which, is guaranteed for him for being a Muslim by the Islamic law 
before dār al-Islam was conquered by non-Muslims.554 Exploring the benefit of 
this condition, Abū Zahrah comments that territories conquered by Muslims and 
their inhabitant were offered enough protection, and then, as a result of war or for 
some other reasons, they are forced to leave them, will not be deemed as dār al-
harb if Muslims and other residents of those territories are allowed to live by the 
protection they used to enjoy before. This positive situation cannot come through 
for Muslims unless the new governing body makes peace with them and that 
peaceful situation should continue to exist without being interrupted by war. If the 
protection is ceased to exist and Muslims are fought by the ruling body, then the 
territory is dār al-harb despite the fact that they were offered a fresh protection 
agreement by that new governing body.
555
   
As for the Mālikī school of thought, one might not see much discussion being 
articulated by its scholars on this particular issue of the definition of dār al-Islam 
and dār al-harb as other schools of fiqh have. Their concentration on this issue 
has been less in amount comparing to hanafīs and other schools of thought, 
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especially shāf‘īs. One of the reasons, it might be that, as Abou El Fadl contended, 
the strict position mālikī school held regarding the status of Muslims residing in 
non-Muslim territories, particularly the issue of permissibility of such residence in 
those lands and their obligation to migrate to dār al-Islam if necessity arises. 
“Abū Sa‘id Sahnūn (d.854) reports that Mālik (d.796) strongly disapproved of 
Muslims travelling to non-Muslim territory even for purposes of trade.”556 
Although this uncompromising approach has been the special feature of the mālikī 
school since mālik: the pioneer of the school, through Ibn Rushd (d. 1122) till al-
Mazāri (d.1141), it does not mean that the issue in question has been completely 
overlooked by them. It is noticeable that there are few reflections some mālikī 
scholars had on this regard when they engaged themselves in discussions on the 
issue of hijrah (migration) from non-Muslim territories to Muslim territories. 
Particularly, when they found themselves confronted with such situations in the 
twelfth century CE, they could not avoid dealing with issues related to dār al-harb 
and dār al-Islam while reacting to issues of hijrah. 
As a foremost mālikī jurist, Ibn Rushd, for instance, discusses about dār al-harb 
and  dār al-Islam when he responded, in a legal opinion (fatwā), to an issue raised 
by a Muslim of his time regarding the legality of entering or living in dār al-harb, 
for which he advised him not to enter or live in dār al-harb.557 The similar 
uncompromising position is best represented in two famous fatāwa of al-
Wansharīsi (d. 1508) who deals with issues confronted by Muslims who accepted 
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mudejar status in al-Andalus.
558
 Arguing that hijrah from a non-Muslim territory 
is an absolute duty, while rejecting the argument that corruption had become 
widespread and that all lands therefore are equal in status, al-Wansharīsi stresses 
that, “the territory of Islam (dār al-Islam), even if unjust, is superior to non-
Muslim territory, even if just.”559 What could have prompted him to define dār al-
Islam in such a way that mere association of dār with Islam can be a decisive 
factor to outweigh any consideration of substantive justice was, perhaps, the 
social and political consideration that prevailed and preoccupied him during his 
time.  
According to Abou El Fadl, al-Wansharīsi confronted with a context 
contaminated with social unrest and political turmoil in Andalus after its conquest 
by non-Muslim. As a result, Muslims were under pressure to find a safe haven for 
them as well as their families to live a safe and secure life. This uneven situation 
prompted them to make migration from Andalus to North Africa where they 
encounted financial difficulties, because of which, they not only regretted their 
migration but also they mocked Muslims of North Africa “claming that the 
Christian land from which they came was superior.”560 It was against this social 
background that al-Wansharīsi built his argument about “territory” (dār) and 
condemned those who mocked the Muslim lands and preferred the non-Muslim 
ones (dār al-harb) to them. “How could anyone say Christian territory is 
superior? How could anyone prefer the company of non-Muslims?”561 For al-
Wansharīsi, it is immaterial whether or not the territory is just as long as it is 
formally associated with Islam. Notwithstanding his position on the issue in 
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question, the jurists, on the contrary, generally argue, “that the material issue is 
safety and justice and that if corruption spreads, there is no duty to migrate 
because all lands become equal in status.”562 Further arguing the nature of the 
territory, al-Wansharīsi does not seem, as Abou El Fadl observes, to be 
differentiating between lands which were originally non-Muslim and lands which 
were conquered by Muslims. “Some have argued that there is a material 
difference between a Muslim finds himself or herself in land that historically has 
been non-Muslim and land that used to be Muslim but was conquered by non- 
Muslims”.563 Despite the rational behind this argument is not clear from both 
parties, one can find, however, the typical Mālikī position on the superiority of 
Muslim lands over others has been best reflected in al-Wansharīsi’s 
indiscriminating approach mentioned above towards non-Muslim lands. 
“Although al-Wansharīsi dismisses this argument” Abou El Fadl contends “as a 
distinction without difference, other jurists argued that conquered Muslim 
territory generally remains Muslim territory despite non-Muslim rule.”564  
What emerges from above discussion is that the argument that conquered lands 
remain Muslims as long as the laws of Islam are applied is a typical hanafi 
position. It appears, therefore, that the debate between hanafis and mālikīs on the 
definition of territories revolves around the centrality of how far Muslims can 
practice or “manifest their religion” in non-Muslim territory. Whereas hanafis do 
not bother what type of territory Muslims reside as long as they feel 
accommodated and comfortable to practice their religion, mālikīs too, on the other 
hand, hold seemingly the same point, despite the ambiguity embedded in their 
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discriminative approach towards classification of territories. In other words, 
mālikīs although prefer Muslim territories to be the ideal as well as legitimate 
residence for Muslims to that of non-Muslims, do not entirely rule out the 
permissibility of such residence in territories either originally belong to non-
Muslims or belong to Muslims initially but were conquered by non-Muslims. 
What stands out from their position is the fear they demonstrate about Muslims 
residents of non-Muslim territories lest they “lose their mastery over the Arabic 
language and will be influenced by Christian manners, habits and fashion.”565 
Moreover, they fear that “Muslims inevitably are reduced to subjugation and 
invariably end up losing their culture and religion”. Al-Wansharīsi,566 assumes, as 
contended by Abou El Fadl, “that it is impossible for Muslims to practice or 
“manifest their religion” in Christian territory.”567 Since al-Wansharīsi’s argument 
is based on empirical assumption, it is not irrational to question what if Muslims 
can, in fact, “manifest their religion” in a particular non-Muslim land? 
Particularly, what would be his position if he were to live to see the present 
situation of Muslims minorities who live in non-Muslim societies practicing or 
manifesting their religion either in the West or East? It can be said that “the mālikī 
position, which predominated in al-Andalus and Sicily, was heavily influenced by 
its own historical experience.”568 It will not be unrealistic to say that if mālikī 
jurists like al-Wansharīsi were to experience different social situations in which 
the risk of apostasy and assimilation was far from real, their response would be 
more flexible as well as realistic. Significantly, in contrast to Andalusian mālikī 
jurists, the Egyptian mālikī jurists adopt typically hanafi position reflecting their 
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own environment. This precisely explains why mālikī jurists of Egypt like al-Sāwī 
(d.1825) argue that “occupied Muslim territory remains Muslim despite non-
Muslim sovereignty, as long as laws of Islam applied by Muslims remain 
respected.”569  
Similarly, another Mālikī jurist al-Dasūqī maintains that Muslim territories 
captured by non-Muslims should be recaptured by Muslims if it is possible, as for 
those territories do not become non-Muslim simply because they are occupied by 
non-Muslims. They do so only if Muslims are unable to establish the rituals of 
Islam (iqāmatu sha‘ā’ir al-Islam). Those territories do not become, therefore, 
abode of war (dār al-harb) as long as the rituals are established.570  
Al-Rafi observes that some contemporary scholars tend to understand from al-
Dasūqī’s view that Muslim territories that are conquered and dominated by non-
Muslims do not become dār al-kufr as long as Muslims are able to practice and 
manifest respectively some of the religious rituals and laws of Islam. Commenting 
on this point, al-Rāf‘ī argues that this understanding is inaccurate from the mālikī 
point of view, which is, in essence, nothing but the same, more or less, both 
disciples of Abū Hanīfah do maintain, nevertheless, the scenario al-Dasūqī 
presents is different from what both of them bring forth.
571
 As for both disciples, 
Muslim territories become non-Muslim by virtue of prevailing non-Muslim laws 
in them. In al-Dasūqī’s portrayal the situation is different in which a Muslim land, 
though becomes conquered by non-Muslims, is not prevailed by them. 
Consequently, Muslims not only overcome and drive them out, but also, 
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repossessed what they lost for them. In this scenario, Muslim territories did not 
become non-Muslim as the rituals of Islam are already in place. 
It is palpable that al-Dasūqī does not seem to be contradicting the opinion of both 
disciples, as the situation he describes is same as both in essence not in form. Here 
the essence is laws of non-Muslims which do not prevail in both situations. There 
seems to be no reason what so ever as to why a territory of this nature would not 
remain dār al-Islam as long as the rational for such reasoning that is “the 
dominance of Islamic laws” does remain. 
The daily religious rituals Muslims perform in their daily life do not serve, al-
Rāf‘ī further argue, as a basis for a territory to be designated as Muslim or non-
Muslim. “These countries of disbelief (contemporary non-Muslim countries) 
where Muslims are allowed to perform prayer and fasting, and some other daily 
rituals of their religion have not been viewed by a single scholar that they have 
become dār al-Islam ”.572 It is not difficult to understand that the above discussion 
evidently reveals that, although most prominent mālikī jurists demonstrated an 
essentially strict approach in locating territories as Muslim or non-Muslim, this 
issue was not left uncontested even within the mālikī school. Secondly, the legal 
ruling (fatwā) can be differed in accordance with differences which materialize in 
time, place, and circumstances, which manifested in different juristic approaches 
of mālikī scholars to the same issue. Thirdly, it brings home the point that the 
scholarly attempt for exerting any effort to find solutions for issues of any 
circumstances is not bound by certain time and place rather it is an ongoing 
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exercise to be executed by appropriately qualified scholars called al-mujtahidūn573 
in any time to come.  
The third major school of thought that engaged itself in this debate was al-
shāfi‘iyyah (Shāfi‘i school of thought) represented by the disciples of Abu ‘Abd 
Allah al-Shāfi‘ī (d.819-820) and their followers. Al-Shāfi‘ī and his school 
represented the opposite of what mālikīs perceive of the issue under discussion. 
Generally speaking, unlike mālikīs, their position is not rigid in dealing with 
issues related to domain of Islam (dār al-Islam) and domain of war (dār al-harb). 
To one’s astonishment, they even made it obligatory to take residence in non-
Muslim territory. According to Abou El Fadl, the striking feature of shāfi‘ī school 
in its early formative stages was to maintain the idea of “continued residence in 
non-Muslim territory might at times be either recommended or obligatory”.574 It is 
patent, therefore, that shāfi‘īs are more lenient than mālikīs in positioning 
themselves into the debate under discussion. This pertinent position of al-
shāfi‘iyyah (shāfi‘ī school of thought), more or less, continued to be uncontested 
within the circle of shāfi‘ī scholars even at its developed stages. Significantly, this 
was what supported through by them and best reflected in the eleventh centaury 
by one of the leading pioneers of shāfi‘ī school.           
Al-Nawawi, one of the prominent authorities of al-shāfi‘iyyah, reports that al-
Māwardi (d.1058) who is reported to have said, “if (a Muslim) is able to manifest 
(his) religion in one of the non-Muslim territories, that territory becomes a part of 
dār al-Islam. Therefore, residing in there is better than making migration as it is 
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hoped that others will revert to Islam (through him)”.575 Shāfi‘ī school adds, 
undoubtedly, a new dimension to the debate. It is quite remarkable to see the idea 
which says that the residence in a non-Muslim territory may be preferable to 
migration, when it is compared to other schools of thought especially mālikīs. The 
other significant aspect that emanates from al-Māwardi’s opinion is the revisited 
paradigm of the same question of what is dār al-Islam and dār al-kufr. Moreover, 
Al-Māwardī’s position reflects the idea that it is not just the formal association of 
a territory to Islam or kufr that constitutes the quintessence of its designation as 
Muslim or non-Muslim, rather the social and political realities are the matters that 
determine the inner formation of one’s territory. Hence, it may be said that the 
rights, all sorts of freedoms, and civil liberties accorded to a Muslim residing 
outside the geographical location of Muslim territories play a vital role in 
classifying the territories whether Muslim or non-Muslim. It is noticeable that al-
Māwardī’s flexible approach became an outstanding feature of shāf‘ī school of 
thought throughout the centuries. 
Reflecting the same position in its most developed form, al-Ramali (d.1595-96) 
and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d.1566-67), both of whom were prominent scholars of 
al-shāfi‘iyyah and lived in Egypt, maintain in two different fatāwā that Muslims 
do not have to emigrate from non-Muslim territory to Muslim one if they can 
manifest their religion. Going one step further, al-Ramali argues that it is not 
allowed for them to leave because their residence might be the mechanism by 
which Islam could spread.
576
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Advising the Muslims who asked about the permissibility of residence in one of 
the Andalusian countries called Aragon, al-Ramali,
577responded that “the area in 
which they reside is part of dār al-Islam and that if they left it would revert to 
being dār al-kufr. The long period during which Muslims have been able to enjoy 
their religious freedoms creates the presumption that they will be safe from forced 
conversion or oppression in the future”.578 Similarly, Muslims of Malibar who 
were under the jurisdiction of non-Muslims and faced rather different social 
condition than that of their compatriots in Aragon asked Ibn Hajar al-Haytami 
about the permissibility of providing shelter and protection to Christians wishing 
to revert to Islam in Malibar. Significantly, the judgment was, unmistakably, 
similar to that of al-Ramali coupled with an extra ordinary reasoning that added a 
new dimension to the ongoing debate. The focal point of the problem faced by 
Muslims was the rule of the land that prevented them from providing protection to 
those who wished to revert to Islam. Failing to comply with such prevention 
would mean painful repercussion for Muslims. Muslims of Malibar, asking about 
their inability to execute their religious obligations towards other Muslims, were 
unmistaken in figuring out their real situation in it. It may be said that the situation 
was, mostly parallel to that of Muslims who happened to be the foundation stone 
of Islam in Makkah where they faced enticement away from Islam (al-fitnatu fi 
al-dīn) by non-Muslims and yet, the duty of migration was still not prescribed by 
God. Ibn Hajar responded unequivocally that “if sheltering the reverted entailed 
Muslims being forced to abandon their homes, then they should not afford him 
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protection”.579 What emerges from above discussion is that contexts similar to this 
would bring, unfailingly, the relevance of one of the fiqhi principles to such 
situations into sharp relief, which is “consequences of the actions (ma’ālāt al-
af‘āl)”. Like the principle which says “actions are determined by intentions” the 
underlying rational for the above mentioned principle is the determination of the 
legal ruling for an action to be executed in certain situations depends largely on 
the fulfilment of purposes of Islamic law for which the law itself has been 
legislated. If such an action, for instance, would be detrimental to the fulfilment of 
legitimate purposes of Islamic law or it will bring negative consequences that are 
more harmful to the individual or society than some benefits it could bring forth, 
then such actions should not be encouraged and permitted. It may be said that Ibn 
Hajar’s judgement also might have been based on this legal principle, which is 
considered to be one of the important legal tools that can be used to deal with 
exceptional situations such as the one that Muslims of Aragon found themselves 
in. Had those Muslims been given the opposite verdict by him to the issue seen 
before based on general rulings of the sharī‘ah, which would oblige them to offer 
protection and loyalty to their fellow men or women as prescribed by the Qur’ān, 
they would have faced an undesirable social condition and it will impact upon, in 
turn, the very reason they were allowed to take residence in it, which was the 
spread of Islam. Thus, in order to avoid such sombre repercussions, Ibn Hajar has 
favoured that fatwā over this general ruling of the sharī‘ah, as the social context 
was alarmingly not normal and the situation was extremely exceptional. His 
judgment has vividly demonstrated that this vital principle of the Islamic law can 
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be of immense use and instrumental for Muslims in non-Muslim societies, as it 
has been utilised so well by scholars like al-Shātibi580 throughout the history of 
Muslim community, to resolve such social conflicts that could emerge time to 
time triggered by exceptional social conditions.  
Moreover, shāfi‘ī jurists maintained that “whether or not a Muslim may continue 
to reside in such territory depends on whether he or she can contribute to its 
Islamization.”581 If these Muslims are optimistic enough because of their 
residence in non-Muslim territory, they might be able to play a positive role in 
spreading Islam, then it is highly preferable, in the opinion of al-shāfi‘iyyah, that 
they do not migrate. Going one step further, shāfi‘īs maintain that if Muslims are 
able to seek the status of autonomy (al-imtinā‘u) and stand on their own feet 
independently (al-i‘tizāl) in non-Muslim land, and need no, by making hijrah, 
other Muslims’ assistance, then their stay in dār al-kufr is obligatory upon them, 
because their place of residence is considered to be dār al-Islam. On the contrary, 
if they make migration, then it becomes dār al-harb.582 Nevertheless, “shāfi‘ī 
jurists do not explain what is meant by autonomy or independence”.583 Similarly, 
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the other aspect of their position which is left unexplained and is relevant to the 
issue in question is the phrase “able to manifest or practice religion”. In their 
perception, a non-Muslim territory in which Muslims are able to “manifest or 
practice their religion” is considered to be a dār al-Islam or part of dār al-Islam. 
Although this is an expression used quite often by them, they do not specify, 
unfortunately, what they mean by it. Abou El Fadl observes that Muslim jurists 
use a variety of expressions to refer to this idea including Iqāmat amr al-dīn 
(establishing affairs of the religion), izhār al-dīn (making religion prevaile), izhār 
sharā’i‘ al-Islam (making the laws of Islam prevaile), and al-Qiyāmu bi wājibāt 
al-Islam (performing the obligations of Islam).
584
 One would argue that these 
expressions more or less imply nothing but the same in contents or something that 
those Muslims are able to put in practice in order to “manifest their religion”. A 
possible justification for these expressions could be that the historical contexts 
these jurists faced had had its imprints in their conceptualisation of the situation. It 
was not simply the case that Muslims were able to take residence in non-Muslim 
territories and to easily practice their religion. They were not allowed to do so by 
non-Muslim rulers. Having confronted with such social phenomenon, the jurists 
may have thought to define dār al-Islam as “a territory in which Muslims are able 
to manifest the rites of religion” (sha‘ā’ir al-dīn) and its laws”. In those days 
Muslims were not able to practice their religion freely except in their own 
territories or where they had power and Muslim territories were ruled by Islamic 
law. The freedom to practice religion in non-Muslim territories was not in place. 
This sort of a social context might have influenced those jurists to come up with 
those expressions.  
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What this explanation would imply is that rulings differ with the difference of 
time and space. Otherwise, “al-Habashah” (Abyssini) would be deemed as ever 
first dār al-Islam on the earth for the facilities and freedom offered by non-
Muslims for Muslim migrants in terms of manifesting the religion. But, no scholar 
so far ever dared to designate it as dār al-Islam and similarly, if some one would 
hold the same position in today’s contexts as jurists had in their own time, most of 
the non-Muslim territories would be considered as dār al-Islam for freedom and 
rights Muslims enjoy in these territories to practice their religion. It would be far 
from reality and truth to hold such view in today’s context.585  Nevertheless, what 
they mean by the notion of “manifest the religion” is still ambiguous and it needs 
clarification, as the phrase “the religion” can imply the whole aspects of Islam as 
a way of life or it can be understood as basic tenets as well as obligations of 
Islam…etc. It is important to seek distinction between those phrases as some of 
the expressions of jurists seem to be heavier for Muslims in non-Muslim territory 
to shoulder than the other. The application of laws of Islam in non-Muslim lands, 
for instance, may not be as easier to make it possible as performing acts of 
worships such as prayer or fasting. Although it is not difficult to put those ‘ibādāt 
(acts of worship) into practice in those territories, nevertheless, it is not easier to 
apply Islamic criminal or commercial laws. As for the personal laws are 
concerned, it was not the case with each and every Muslim minority societies of 
the past or present that they have been deprived of accessing to such laws. Muslim 
minorities of Sri Lanka, for instance, have been able to enjoy the benefit of such 
legal provision for more than ten centuries. The minority status in there has been 
and continues to be more or less semi autonomous. Bernard Lewis is of the 
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opinion that Muslim jurists envisaged a kind of communal autonomy similar to 
that given to non-Muslim (dhimmīs) in Muslim lands. Confirming the same, Abou 
El Fadl observes that “Muslim minorities in different ages and localities often 
enjoyed a semi-autonomous status. Frequently, they had their own judges and 
governors who managed their affaires and applied some Islamic laws.”586 
Muslims of Sri Lanka have their own Muslim judges who deal with their own 
problems related to marriage, divorce, and other issues related Muslim personal 
law, which have the constitutional guarantee of the Sri Lankan government. The 
judge is called “Qādi” and the premises these judges function are called “Qādi 
Courts”. It should be noted that the Sri Lankan Muslim minority is not the only 
historical as well as current precedence that can be considered as a fitting example 
for Muslim minorities which “manifest their religion” in this manner, rather 
Indian as well as Singaporean Muslims too have their own historical as well as 
current social status which is mostly no different to that of their Sri Lankan 
compatriots as regards to personal laws and other legal provisions are concerned. 
Historically speaking, Indian Muslims had been manifesting the religion more 
than what is termed as personal laws. They were rulers of the land more than eight 
centuries while they were minorities in a non-Muslim society. It may be said that 
a territory resided by Muslim minorities whose socio-political situation is 
characterised by more than what is called “acts of worship” and demonstrates a 
sort of autonomy and a degree of independence, as viewed by shāfi‘ī jurists,587 
which has to be considered a part of dār al-Islam. Although, these jurists do not 
explain what is meant by “autonomy and independence” (al-imtinā‘u wa al-
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i‘tizāl),588 and “manifesting Islam”, hanafīs specify that the latter means the 
manifestation or application of Islamic laws.
589
 Some other hanafīs are of the 
opinion that a Muslim judge should be appointed and that Muslims should 
demand a governor.
590
 Moreover, the hanafi school maintains that if a locality has 
a Muslim judge and applies Islamic laws, then it is a part of dār al-Islam. 
Whereas shāfi‘īs are concerned, they are of the opinion that wherever “the duties 
of religion “(wājibāt al-dīn) or worship (‘ibāadah) are possibly practiced, then it 
becomes dār al-Islam. 
Abou El Fadl observes that “wājibāt al-dīn” or “‘ibādah” commonly refers to 
“‘ibādāt” and not “mu‘āmalāt”, which is acts of private worship such as prayer 
and fasting and not commercial or criminal laws”591  
It has been reported by some of the hanafi scholars
592
 that al-shāf‘i does not 
entertain the idea of classifying the world into two as dār al-Islam and dār al-
harb, and for him, it is only one territory (dār). Some contemporary scholars593 
attributed this opinion to al-Shāf‘i, as well. According to al-Rāf‘ī, attributing this 
opinion to al-Shāfi‘ī is incorrect and “it has been proved that al-Shāfi‘ī maintained 
the opposite”.594 In order to justify his position, al-Dabūsi brings the following 
legal debate into discussion. Exploring the issue of leaving one’s spouse behind in 
dār al-kufr to dār al-Islam as a Muslim migrant or as a dhimmi, al-Dabūsi 
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maintains that the separation should be made between the two, but in Shāfi‘ī’s 
opinion it will not take place simply because he or she leaves the other. It should 
be noted that al-Dabūsi based this argument on his assumption that according to 
hanafīs the world is classified as dār al-Islam and dār al-harb and for al-Shāf‘ī it 
is nothing but one territory. Based on this argument, he further explains that 
according to our scholars, if a Muslim drinks alcohol, fornicates or takes part in 
any un-ethical activity and in dār al-harb he will not be penalised, but for al-
Shāfi‘ī, he would be liable for punishment.595 Refuting al-Dabūsī’s opinion, al-
Rāf‘ī argues that al-Shāfi‘ī’s view does not provide any indication that the world 
cannot be classified into to two; rather it denotes that al-Shafii does not accept the 
change of laws along with change of territories. Whereas hanafīs view that 
penalties do not take effect in dār al-harb, al-Shāfi‘ī, on the other hand, considers 
the application of those penalties in it including the laws that underpin them 
would not change with the change of territory. In his view, the penalties are to be 
implemented without distinction in both territories. Al-Shāfi‘ī, therefore, sees no 
difference between territories in terms of application of laws of Islam. In this 
sense, the world is one in Shāfi‘ī’s opinion. Hence, it does not mean that he 
negates the classification of the world.
596
    
Hence, the difference of opinion itself between hanafīs and shāfi‘īs amply implies 
that it is acceptable to both parties that there is a reasonable ground for the world 
to be classified into two territories. Further explaining, al-Rafii argues that if the 
classification is not acceptable with al-Shāfi‘ī, the comparison made by him 
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between the issues mentioned above based on territories does not make any 
sense.
597
  
What is crystal clear from above discussion is that al-Shāfi‘ī, although asserts 
unequivocally that the obligations and laws of Islam remain applicable regardless 
of the categorisation of territories, has no objection to classify the world or 
territories according to one’s readings of the texts of Islam as well as the contexts 
of his time. In fact during the historical stages after al-Shāfi‘ī through which al-
Shāfi‘ī school underwent considerable developments, the very idea al-Shāfi‘ī 
regarding the classification of territories had been carried through over the 
centuries after him by his disciples and followers, and improved drastically adding 
more dimensions, that are unique only to Shāfi‘ī school, to the ongoing 
discussion.   
It is against this background that one can see al-shāfi‘iyyah even maintains that 
there is another type of domain classified as dār al-harb (domain of treaty) in 
addition to dār al-Islam and dār al-harb, which is “ not conquered by Muslims 
and its residents made treaty with them upon paying tax for their lands while 
being exempted from paying Jizyah (poll tax) since their residence is not in dār 
al-Islam”.598 Those who reside in this type of territory are free to apply their laws 
and the Muslim territory (dār al-Islam) has no right to interfere in the dealings of 
their affaires except for what they are bound by the treaty with Muslims.
599
  
Drawing on the above discussion, it can be concluded that shāfi‘ī and hanafi 
schools have been more flexible in their approach towards the definitions of dār 
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al-harb and dār al-Islam than mālikīs. The former did not wish to handle Muslim 
minority situations with rigid and un-compromised rulings that could be 
detrimental to the very reason why they were allowed to reside in non-Muslim 
territories which is of course the spread of Islam amongst their non-Muslim 
counterparts, while the latter maintained an uncompromising and strict position as 
the historical circumstances they faced forced them to adopt a non-negotiable 
position. As mentioned before having confronted with specific contexts in which 
Muslim territories came under siege, most mālikī scholars had to respond to such 
situations resorting to no concession rules (‘azā’im), “for most malikis” Abou El 
Fadl observes that “choosing to reside in a non-Muslim land was a religious and 
ethical decision as well as a political one. Muslim lands, Islam, and a moral life 
became inseparable”.600  
It may be said that if mālikīs were not encountered with such social contexts, they 
would have approached it rather differently and would not have demonstrated 
such a rigid and strict position. This is evident in the articulation of Egyptian 
mālikī jurists who dealt with such issues in a way that narrows the gap down 
between schools of thought and brought them closer to each other. Nevertheless, 
the influence of flexibility has been, it seems, overtaken by the rigidity. The proof 
of this can be found in scrutinising the history of spreading Islam beyond the 
boundaries of traditional Muslim territories, especially in the Muslim minority 
societies of Asia and South East Asia that are predominantly hanafīs and shāfi‘īs. 
Examining the root causes how Islam came in to shores of these societies, when it 
was introduced to them, and significantly, why they are shāfi‘īs and hanafīs and 
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not mālikīs, one would come to a conclusion that the uncompromising approach 
of mālikīs towards the classification of territories including the issue of Muslim 
residence in non-Muslim territories has led, on one hand, the mālikī school 
confined only to the main lands of Islam, while the flexible approach of both 
hanafi and shāfi‘ī schools on some issues, on the other, paved the way for their 
followers to take residence in non-Muslim territories by which they could spread 
Islam through manifesting it in their day today life. If this approach demonstrated 
by the latter were not existed, it would not have been possible for territories 
outside the dār al-Islam to receive the message of Islam. This would explain to a 
certain extent why Muslims in Asia and South East Asia are mostly shāfi‘īs for 
centuries.  
The hanbali school of thought considers dār al-Islam as the one in which the 
superiority is for laws of Islam. Al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā al-hanbali maintains that “any 
territory in which laws of Islam are superior that the laws of disbelief, that 
territory is to be considered as dār al-Islam. If it is the opposite, then it is regarded 
as dār al-kufr”.601 According to al-Buhuti,” dār al-harb is a territory in which the 
rule of disbelief is rampant”.602  
The two opinions mentioned above imply that superiority of laws is the basis on 
which hanbali school build the edifice of their definition. It may be said that 
hanbalis mostly do not contradict other schools, particularly mālikīs and shafiis in 
pursuit of the rational for their judgment on the nature of a particular territory, 
which is the prevalence of law in it. As for these schools, designating a territory as 
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dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr largely depends on the type of law that prevails in that 
territory. 
6.3.3 Contemporary opinions on Definition of Dār al-Islam and Dār 
al-Harb 
This part of the discussion mainly focuses on contemporary opinions on concept 
of dār al-Islam and dār al-harb in the light of modern discourse which is in 
favour of the concept and against the concept. Hence this section seeks to examine 
the current debate on how far the classical concept of dār al-Islam and dār al-
harb is still valid to classify the territories of the world in the context of 
contemporary socio-political challenges and realities. It attempts to find whether 
the pre modern approach directed by classical fuqahā (Muslim Jurists) to figure 
out territorial classifications is still to be maintained and sought after at the 
expense of demographic changes that have taken and still taking place in the 
modern world, what, if so, are the socio-political implications and if not, what sort 
of alternative move one can undertake to determine the relationship between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in general, and Muslim minorities and non-Muslims in 
particular. In so doing, it seeks to locate the role of fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
(Jurisprudence of Muslim minorities) in finding reconciliation between the 
classical texts on the basis of which the classical approach has been established 
and the realities of modern contemporary socio-political and religio-cultural 
context, and to suggest also to Muslim minorities as to how to position themselves 
within their societies and the Muslim ummah as a whole in terms of their 
relationship with both without contradicting their loyalties within and without.  
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As a prelude to this discussion, it is worth noting that the opinions on the issue in 
question are divided into two categories:  
1. There are those who maintain that dār al-Islam and dār al-harb are still in 
existence in their classical form and essence, and the classical definition 
for them is still in operation. 
2. Some others are of the opinion that the classical classification of the world 
as dār al-Islam and dār al-harb is no longer valid either in form or essence 
and the territories should be redefined and classified in line with 
contemporary socio-political, religio-cultural, national as well as 
international realities and contexts.             
Those who are in favour of the first opinion may be identified as extreme Islamic 
movements and its advocates originated and gained ground in modern day 
Muslim world. After seeing their countries being ruled by Muslim rulers who 
were not in favour of the implementation of Islamic Sharīah even after the 
liberation of their lands from colonial powers, some Islamic movements and 
individuals stepped into launching a struggle hoping to bring their countries into 
their previous status. To put what they thought into practice and to legitimise their 
cause of action, they sought legal provisions in the Islamic law. This was how 
they sought refuge in the idea of classical classification of the world by the early 
scholars of Islamic law. Hence, in 1976, as observed by Abd al-Rahman Al-
Haj,
603
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issue of becoming of dār al-Islam into dār al-kufr.604 Exploring further, he 
stresses that the organization was heavily influenced by the concept of 
“contemporary jāhiliyyah” of Sayyid Qutb605, which was inextricably interwoven 
with the concept of “al-hākimiyyah”606 coined by al-Mawdudi.607 The fact why 
dār al-kufr has been used in the place of dār al-harb was that, according to the 
organization’s constitution608, the struggle it launched was not against countries 
beyond Islamic territories (dār al-Islam), rather it was against a Muslim 
government. The organization sought to this idea through its view on the issue of 
implementation of Sharī‘ah  and condemnation of secular systems as disbelief. 
According to this view, the Muslim societies whose system of governance and 
laws are secular are deemed to be secular and un-Islamic. The preference of dār 
al-kufr to dār al-harb given by the organization to deal with the problem was a 
matter of internal rather than external. In other words, it was more of a national 
issue than an international one.
609
 Although this classification of territories was 
largely confined to address internal issues, as noted before, in 1970s and 80s, it 
took a new turn expanding its horizon extraterritorially to embrace external issues 
with the attack of twin towers in New York in 11
th
 of September 2001. The 
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paradigm of the issue has been shifted drastically from its being a national issue to 
a trans-national providing a new dimension to the classification of territories in 
the Islamic law. Hence, “The legitimacy sought (by the perpetrators) for this 
suicidal operation” Al-Haj observes “was based on the fiqhi classification of “dār 
al-harb” and “dār al-Islam” and America is a “dār kufr”, and the blood of the 
people of war (dimā’u ahl al-harb) should be shed off! This is what it appeared to 
be indicating by the first speech delivered by Usama Bin Laden right after the 
incident: “Indeed this incident had classified the world into two fustat for sure”610. 
It is an indication by him to dār al-harb and dār al-Islam or dār al-kufr and dār 
al-Islam and Imān (as indicated in his other speeches and messages). This 
classification has been derived by him form a prophetic tradition.  
From the discussion above, it can be noticed that some individuals and 
organisations still maintain the validity of separation of land into two entities 
along the line of classical fiqh. Yet, their opinion did not go unchallenged. There 
are strong reservations in accepting the classical classification of territory among 
Muslim scholars. They see little relevance of this concept in modern day socio-
political realities and international relations between countries and societies. In 
this connection, Faisal Moulawi can be considered as one of the pioneers who 
voiced reservation in accepting this concept. In the following pages he argues that 
dividing the world into two territories is no longer valid. He presents his argument 
posing some serious questions if the concept has to be accepted by Muslims 
today.  
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6.3.4 The Concept of Dār and Its Relevance in Today's Muslim 
Minority Context – Faisal Mowlavi 
Classifying the world into dār al-Islam (abode of Islam), dār al-kufr (abode of 
non-belief) or dār al-harb (abode of war) has not been something prescribed by 
the Qur’ān or Sunnah of the Prophet. It has been purely an exertion of effort by 
early Muslim scholars of Islamic law (fuqahā). After the Prophet’s demise, when 
the boundaries of Muslim rule expanded dramatically beyond the Arabian 
Peninsula in the first three centuries, the issues regarding Muslim and non-Muslim 
relations within the Muslim community and without, have been intensified. 
Particularly, the issues of how to identify the territories of Muslims and non-
Muslims and what are the features and characteristics of such domains became 
one of the heated debates ever articulated by the scholars of Islamic law. As they 
felt that it was their responsibility to shoulder the burdens to guide Muslim masses 
after the Prophet, the Muslim jurists have been under immense pressure because 
of their living conditions as well as their own contexts they were facing with, to 
exert effort to understand and explain the issues mentioned above and to make 
legal rulings and judgements on them during their time under those circumstances. 
As a result, the concept of classification of boundaries and territories based on 
Islamic legal understandings and purposes of Islamic Sharī‘ah  came into being.  
Early Muslims when they were confronted with other people, there came a 
situation where the lands they could not bring under their rule had to be identified 
and designated. This was how the designation of territories as dār al-Islam and 
dār al-harb found its place in the early Islamic legal terminologies which helped 
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the classical jurists to deal with complicated, conflicting, and contrasting social 
contexts.  
As for dār al-Islam, it is a land, which comes under the jurisdiction of Islam and 
where the Islamic laws are implemented, and also Islamic rituals are freely 
observed and established. This sort of a land is also called as dār al-‘adl (land of 
justice) and dār al-tawhīd (the land of monotheism). As for dār al-harb, it is a 
land in which the laws of Islam are not implemented, as it does not come under 
the jurisdiction of Islam or the authority of Islam. The lands of this nature is called 
also dār al-shirk (abode Polytheism). 
According to al-Shāf‘i, there is another category, which is called dār al-ahd 
(abode of covenant) or dār al-sulh (abode of truce). These lands belong to non-
Muslims and they would enter into agreements with Muslims that the jizya (poll 
tax) would not be levied from them. Hence their lands are not ruled by Islamic 
laws, and they are neither Muslim lands nor abodes of war as there are no 
conflicts between Muslims and them.  
When one looks at the discourses of the early legal scholars, it would be apparent 
that the yardstick for the identification of the boundaries as abode of Islam and 
abode of war has been the dominance of Islamic political authority over those 
lands and the implementation of Islamic laws in such territories. As Muhammad 
Ibn al-Hasan: one of the closest disciples of Abu Hanīfa contended, “The 
consideration of the status of a territory depends on the authority and the power to 
make the laws prevailing”.  
It is obvious from the above discussion that the division of the world into two or 
three entities has been a fiqhi-oriented divisions deduced by fuqahā’ from the 
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sharī‘ah laws to deal with a particular context which prevailed at that time, which 
was the war that Muslims were engaged against their enemies.  
The question arises that is it possible to maintain the same position and to stick to 
the same division now and also to implement the laws that jurists have come up 
with, out of that context? Certainly the implementation of the division of lands in 
today’s contemporary contexts will create, undoubtedly, enormous problems, 
which are as follows: 
1. What is the yardstick that can measure the authority of Islam, 
implementation of Islamic laws, and the establishment of its rituals? Is it 
the total implementation of Islamic laws? If so, it means that many Islamic 
countries today are not abodes of Islam. 
2. Is it sufficient to implement Islamic personal laws at the expense of other 
civil laws to consider a particular county dār al-Islam, which means that 
some traditional Islamic countries have to be excluded from abode of 
Islam like Turkey while some other traditional Muslim minorities would 
be included in the abode of Islam like Sri Lanka …etc?  
3.  Is it enough for Muslims to practice Islamic rituals like prayers, fasting, 
zakat, and haj freely without any hindrance in order for their residence in 
any part of the world to be considered as abode of Islam? If that is the 
case, what is the legal ruling on many non-Muslim countries that have 
become not only a safe heaven for Muslims but also they face no problems 
in practicing those rituals more freely and securely than in their own 
countries of origin? 
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It is apparent, of course, that those countries cannot be considered as abode of 
Islam. Nevertheless, considering the real situation and the context, there seems to 
be no difference between those countries and the many Muslim countries that are 
not implementing Islamic laws, although the rituals are allowed to be practiced. 
Such issues aroused out of today’s Muslim minority context, will be strong 
enough to grab our attention to the reconsideration of division as dār al-Islam and 
dār al-harb. 
Besides, what could be the yardstick to measure a country as abode of war? Does 
it mere presence of non-Muslims in a particular place designates it as dār al-harb?      
It does not help us in anyway to consider that territory as abode of war as non- 
Muslims of that land could enter into a pact or truce with Muslims that they do not 
pay jizyā and to come under the rule of dār al-Islam. The countries of this nature 
could be considered as dār al-ahd as observed by al-Shāf‘ī. 
Drawing on above discussion, is it possible to consider today’s international 
treaties signed by countries around the world through the mediation of UNO are 
sufficient enough to treat non-Muslims countries as dār al-‘ahd as far as Muslims 
are concerned?      
Answering this question, some would argue that since Islamic countries do not 
implement Islamic law: the Sharī‘ah, the pacts or treatises they sign with other 
countries do not oblige Muslims to abide by them. As a response to this argument, 
it can be said that: 
1. It is one of the agreed principles of Sharī‘ah that even the deviated 
Muslim ruler can hold Muslims liable for his deeds as long as those deeds 
are not sins, which means that Muslims are bound by the actions of their 
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rulers unless they are unambiguous sins. According to this principle, 
signing treaties with non-Muslim countries that are not in conflict with 
Muslim interests and are helpful to make peaceful co-existence between 
people is acceptable in the light of Sharī‘ah and if the deviated ruler 
undertakes this sort of activities, then it binds all Muslims without 
exception. 
2. The presence of Muslims in the West may be for many individual reasons: 
study, employment or may be for international treaties of refuge and 
displacement. Whatever the reasons there may be, it is not acceptable and 
reasonable to accept some of these conditions and covenants when 
Muslims accept to live in the West and to refuse some other as it is not 
allowed for them to behave double standard at all, and this is what called 
cheating. It has to be both accepting these covenants and standing up to 
their requirements and obligations while enjoying their rights and fruits or 
they should not be accepted at all and not to be enjoyed by any means.  
3. Even If one assumes that these treaties are not binding Muslim individuals 
as they are not supposed to accept the legitimacy of the governing bodies 
that rule their countries, and also if he or she assumes that there is no such 
a thing which is called treaties between him or her and those non-Muslim 
countries, if this is the case then who would say that there is a war between 
him or her and them? 
Is it allowed in the sight of sharī‘ah for an individual Muslim to decide on 
his own volition that there is a war situation between Muslims and others 
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or is it a collective decision that should be taken by the Muslim ruler on 
behalf of his fellow Muslims?  
If Muslims are not in a position to accept the right for their deviated rulers 
to sign treaties, and if there does not exist a legitimate Muslim ruler who 
can declare war, then how is it permissible for an individual Muslim living 
in those countries to consider him to be at war with people of non-Muslim 
countries? 
4. It is little wonder that the Quranic verses and the sayings of the prophet 
emphasise the legitimacy of fighting with non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the 
declaration of war is not without Sharī‘ah  limitations. If the declaration 
has been done without considering these limitations and legitimate 
justifications, it is not permissible at all for Muslims to treat non-Muslims 
under war ethics as it is considered to be an act of treachery and disloyalty. 
Allah says in the Qur’ān: “And if you fear treachery from any people (with 
whom you have a covenant) then publicly throw their covenant at them. 
Allah does not love the treacherous” (al-Anfal: 58). This means that 
Muslims should publicly announce that the treaty is no longer valid as it is 
being violated by the other party. 
Drawing from the above discussion, it may be concluded that this classification of 
the world based on fiqhi concepts has no way to fit into the contemporary context. 
Muslim minorities in dār al-da‘wah, therefore, resemble the context and the 
situation of the Prophet and Muslims when they were in Makkah before their 
migration to Madīnah. During that time Makkah was not a dār al-Islam or dār al-
harb, but it was a dār al-da‘wah i.e. inviting people towards Allah. The Muslims 
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at that time considered the Arabian Peninsula as dār al-da‘wah. Hence, it can be 
said that the whole world is dār al-da‘wah according to following Quranic verses: 
“We have sent you forth as nothing but mercy to people of the whole world” (al-
Anbiya: 107). “We have sent you with the truth to proclaim good news and to 
warn. Never has there been a nation but a Warner came to it” (Fatir: 25). 
If some people accept the invitation of the Prophet and establish the rule of Islam 
among them, the rest of the world is considered to be dār al-da‘wah. If some 
countries declare war on Muslims or Muslims declare war on them, then they 
become dār al-harb. When the war is stopped by a truce or a treaty and they do 
not accept Islam, then their countries become dār al-‘ahd (abode of truce). 
If there is neither war nor truce, then the whole world is dār al-da‘wah: abode of 
inviting people towards Allah, as da‘wah is the fundamental feature of Muslims’ 
relations with non-Muslims, not the war and fighting. Hence, Muslims can enter 
those countries through agreements seeking protection or safety or asylum. Even 
during the classical period when the above-mentioned divisions were in practice, 
the jurists permitted non-Muslims who were at war with Muslims to enter Muslim 
lands under treaties of protection and safety. Similarly, Muslims were allowed to 
enter non-Muslim lands with similar agreements. When a non-Muslim was 
entering a Muslim land having this agreement signed, he was allowed to sell, buy, 
deal with business, possess, and to obey the laws of Muslims, and when he 
finishes his business, he would return home. On the other hand Muslims were 
obliged to stick to the agreement as long as the other party was upholding it. This 
was the case with Muslims as well. They were entering non-Muslim lands with 
similar bonds and treaties for business purposes or to fulfil any need… then they 
were allowed to enter those lands and obey the rules of the land as long as they 
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were not in conflict with the Sharī‘ah and they were dealing with them with just 
and piety. When they finish their business, they returned to their own lands.  
This was the attitude and the relationship the Muslims had with non-Muislims for 
centuries and it has been not only a well known fact but also a practice throughout 
the centuries, and this was the reason why Muslim merchants went into far lands 
and became sources of guidance and role models of Islam attracting many 
indigenous people towards the fold of Islam. It was not the armies who entered 
these lands and turned them to Islam, but the Muslim merchants journeyed 
through land and sea that invited people to the fold of Islam. This was the case in 
Indonesia and the parts of South, and south East Asia, and many countries in 
Africa.   
 6.4 Seeking fiqh al-aqalliyyāt to Address the Problems of Muslim 
Minorities 
Discussions made in previous chapters, unequivocally shows that there is a 
pressing need to find ways and means to address the problems of contemporary 
Muslim minority in Britain. Although there are writings in Islamic literature on 
the status of non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim majority states, the works on 
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states are very few. These works too do not 
touch the problems of these minorities from the perspective of Islamic 
jurisprudence, but all these studies more or less focus on their problems from the 
educational, social, economical, and political perspectives. Despite the 
significance of studying their problems from the perspective of Islamic 
jurisprudence, as these problems pose enormous challenges towards these 
minorities, efforts from the part of Muslim scholars to tackle with these 
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challenges from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence are poor. In this respect, 
al-Qardāwi, al-Alawani, Abdul Qadir Khalid, and Faisal Moulawi are few among 
the others who pay attention in bringing the concerns of Muslim minorities into 
the focus. To address these problems from the perspective of jurisprudence, one 
has to understand the nature and the scope of this fiqh. 
6.5 The Nature and the Scope of fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
To understand the nature of fiqh al-aqalliyyāth, one has to answer the following 
questions. What is the position of existing fiqh on addressing the problems of 
contemporary Muslim minorities in general and Muslim minority in Britain? 
Given the situation of contemporary Muslim minorities, generally speaking, it is 
obvious that existing fiqh is inadequate to address these problems in a required 
manner. A situation like this, which is unique, was unknown, to the early jurists 
and unheard of in the context in which they exerted their efforts to address the 
problems of their times. It is unreasonable, therefore, to expect from them to 
address the context of contemporary Muslim minorities with all its complexities. 
Hence, it is obvious that the existing fiqh practised in a Muslim majority social 
and historical contexts that are totally unlike the contemporary contexts of 
Muslim minorities, is inadequate to effectively address these problems. 
As a dynamic and proactive way of life, Islam is able to guide people in any given 
historical context. It can cope with any given situation as it has guidelines in 
abundance on the basis of which the early scholars of jurisprudence played their 
role, responding to the challenges they faced. As a result, the four major schools 
of thought emerged which were the outstanding outcome of their admirable 
scholarly efforts. However, it is worth noting that Islamic jurisprudence is the 
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human interpretation of the Sharī‘ah  at a given context611. In other words, it is the 
output of the human understanding applied to grasp what Islam is all about in a 
particular social, political and historical context and what is the spirit, objective 
and goals of Islamic guidance in these matters. It has legal principles and 
fundamentals on the basis of which the early scholars deduced legal rulings from 
their sources: the Qur’ān and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s way of life). Yet it is 
undeniable that their understanding and interpretations do not go beyond their 
contexts and limitations of space and time. The obvious example is Shafi`’s legal 
rulings, which he changed to suite different circumstances in his own lifetime. 
Abou El Fadl observes that “the traditional criteria worked out by earlier 
generations of Muslim jurists pose difficult questions for the modern age, when 
the application of Muslim personal or family law in a secular state has become a 
difficult matter. Although law and ethics do not always correlate in Islamic 
jurisprudence legal solution imply ethical choices. The rulings and decisions of 
pre-modern Muslim jurists will not necessarily resolve the dilemmas facing 
modern Muslim minorities. They do, however, provide examples of ethical 
choices made in response to particular historical challenges. Whether the choices 
of the past will inform the discourse of the present is for Muslims to explore”.612 
This explanation gives impetus to a fresh reading of the divine texts and a new 
understanding of goals and objectives of the Sharī‘ah  in order to respond to the 
issues and challenges of our times as the early scholars did. This signifies to a 
great deal the necessity of finding an adequate alternative system of jurisprudence 
within the purview of the Sharī‘ah , to cater for this timely and inevitable need. 
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6.6 Scope of fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
Contemplating the discussion made in the chapter of problems of Muslim 
minorities, it is apparent that their problems are not confined only to their day- to-
day life but they surpass to include some other problems that are related to their 
attitude and conduct, policies and ideologies, and plans and strategies. As such, 
the following areas may be identified as covering the scope of fiqh al-aqalliyyāt. 
6.6.1 The Sub-Rulings of Fundamental of Islam 
As emphasised by al-Qardāwi, the fundamentals of Islam i.e. belief system, five 
pillars of Islam, rituals (al-sha`āir al-ta`abbudiyyah), the inner rituals (al-`Ibādāt 
al-bātinah), code of conduct (sulūk), fundamentals of moral values, and 
fundamentals of vices do not come under fiqh al-aqalliyyāth in general.613 
Nevertheless, the sub-rulings (furū`) may well be included in this fiqh, such as 
combining the prayer in the summer in western countries…etc.614 
6.6.2 Sub-rulings of Islamic Provisions (al-ahkām al-Islamiyyah) 
“For the fundamental provisions are concerned” al-Qardāwi argue “there is no 
dispute on them, the dispute (khilāf) is in sub-rulings and particulars that can be 
varied from country to country and time to time. It is the grace of God that He 
made this religion with two sections. One is unchangeable, which is fundamentals 
and definitive texts, which constitute the essence of Islam. Moreover, the other is 
flexible, which can change according to the changes in circumstances. Moreover, 
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it is His grace that He made the fixed section, which is unchangeable as a 
restricted section, whereas the section of flexibility is unrestricted. If it were not 
for the flaxibility, the one Islamic community (ummatun wāhidah) would have 
become communities. Therefore, we should not call Islamic communities, but 
Islamic nations. The community is only one. “This is your community, which is 
the only one” (Qur’ān)615 
Al-Qardāwi, further adds that it is the grace of God that He made this section 
flexible as it has been reported in the prophetic tradition: What Allah has made 
lawful in His Book is halal and what He has forbidden is haram, and that 
concerning which He is silent is allowed as His favor. So accept from Allah His 
favor, for Allah is not forgetful of anything. He then recited, “And thy Lord is not 
forgetful.”616 (19:64) In another narration the Prophet said: "Allah, the Exalted, 
has laid down certain duties which you should not neglect, and has put certain 
limits which you should not transgress, and has kept silent about other matters 
out of mercy for you and not out of forgetfulness, so do not seek to investigate 
them.''
617
 
Al-Alawani observes that the subject in question raises number of 
methodological questions. 
1. Which of the Islamic sciences this fiqh belongs to? 
2. With which of the social sciences this fiqh to be connected and to what extent 
both sciences can be interacted? 
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3. How can we deal with the issues that have been raised by the existence of 
Muslim minorities in huge number outside the aboard of Islam geographically 
and historically? 
If it is to answer these questions, al-Alawani argue, it is inappropriate to include 
fiqh al-aqalliyyāt within the definition of what is known today as fiqh al-furū` 
(sub-rulings of jurisprudence). On the contrary, it is more appropriate to include 
it in a comprehensive meaning which includes every section of the Sharī‘ah  in 
terms of theory and practice which was meant by the Prophet in his saying: “To 
whomsoever God wishes good, He gives him fiqh (true understanding) of the 
religion”. Alternatively, it may be called al-fiqh al-akbar (great fiqh) as called by 
Abu Hanifa and named his book as such. We find, therefore, the necessity of 
attaching this fiqh with fiqh al-akbar (great fiqh) to lend a wider sense to a 
smaller part and to fill the void in the legislation or in the jurisprudence.
618
 It 
appears from al-Alawani’s discussion that the scope of fiqh al-aqalliiyyāt is wide 
and comprehensive as far as the enormity of the concerns and problems of 
Muslim minorities are concerned. It does not mean, however, that it includes the 
fundamentals of Islam too, as al-Qardāwi maintains, for it is clear from al-
Alawani’s wish to place this fiqh in a wider sense naming it fiqh al-Akbar to 
indicate the magnitude of the subject although it constitutes a smaller part (furū`) 
of the Sharī‘ah . 
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6.7 The Ways and Means to Seek fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 
6.7.1 The Role of Ijtihād (Legal Reasoning) 
The above discussion apparently manifests the crucial nature of this fiqh. It 
requires laborious effort to work out the framework of this fiqh, as it had to cover 
not only the day-to-day life of contemporary Muslim minorities, but also their 
conceptual and ideological problems. This explains the importance of ijtihād and 
its role in devising this fiqh
619
. According to al-Alawani, ijtihād plays a pivotal 
role in devising this fiqh
620
.  
“In fact, the problems of Muslim minorities cannot be addressed except through a 
new ijtihād based on generalities of the Qur’ān (kulliyyāth), its goals, values, 
objectives of the Sharī‘ah  and its methodology. In addition, it should be guided 
by the authentic life style of the Prophet, his practices of the Qur’ān, his 
implementations of its values and generalities in his life. This will characterise 
the methodology of following him and make his way of life a crystal clear 
evidence by which the pious men are able to follow him and his system in every 
time and place”.621 
6.7.2 The Use of Existing fiqh 
From the existing fiqh, one can find many lessons and fundamentals on the basis 
of which the early jurists exerted their effort to respond to the issues they faced. 
The contemporary jurist can amply make use of these legal treasures inherited 
from early jurists. Through using their legal precedence in fiqh, the contemporary 
jurist is able to find what might not be able to find without them. This exercise 
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should lead him to find lessons from their rulings and fundamentals to deduce 
rulings from which they deduced.
622
 
Apparently, this system was in practice when ottomans were regulating the affairs 
of the state. As such, al-majallah al-ahkām al-`adliyyah, which was the civil code 
of the ottomans in 1876 is an example as to how to deal with earlier fiqh work and 
its need to contemporary times, as it some times preferred a secondary verdict to a 
weightier one, because it is more suitable for the present times.
623
 The striking 
manifestation of this approach can be seen in the enactment of majallath al-ahkām 
al-`adliyyah (The book of rules of Justice), or the Ottoman Civil code, in 1876. “It 
was a valuable work of standardization that was much needed throughout the 
Muslim world. Al-majallah was confined to the hanafi-school of law, which was 
the official school of the state”.624 Its great importance is, however, derived from 
two factors: Although it was based on hanafi jurisprudence, it was not confined to 
the dominant opinions of the said school but on an eclectic choice between the 
opinions of a wide spectrum of hanafi jurists.
625
 Eclectic choice means the choice, 
“not only as between different opinions within one and the same madhab, but 
across the board as between all accepted schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
emerged as an increasingly prominent feature of subsequent efforts at codification 
and modernization of fiqh”.626 The second one is “it showed the way of how to 
deal with earlier fiqh work and its applicability to contemporary times, as it 
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sometimes preferred a secondary verdict to a weightier one as it is more suitable 
for the present times”.627  
The prevailing complex modern problems in Muslim states like Egypt and Syria 
has necessitated the formulation of laws in those states. Scholars and legislators 
charged with this task have found it necessary to resort to views of different 
schools of law. One of such early attempts was fiqh al-Sunnah by Sayyid Sabiq. 
“Although it follows al-Mughni by ibn Qudama of hanbali school to a 
considerable extent, it breaks away from commitment to one school, and adopts 
views of other schools where the evidence is stronger or the verdict is more 
applicable to our times. This trend was followed by such scholars as Mustafa al-
Zarqa, Ali al-Tantawi of Syria, Muhammad Shalthoot, Muhammad Mustafa 
Shalabi, Ali al-Khafeef, Muhammad al-Ghazzali, and Yusūf al-Qardāwi of Egypt. 
What such scholars have identified as necessary for such approach is: 
1. Looking for strong evidence in support of a view before endeavouring to seek 
solutions. 
2. Ability to evaluate conflicting evidence, so as to choose the best supported 
view. 
3. Ability to resort to ijtihād in a particular question, even though it had no ruling 
by earlier scholars. 
This trend also, looks at making matters easier for people to follow. In this, they 
look at the numerous verses and hadith calling for ease, rather than hardship. They 
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also consider the nature of our age, when strong power tries hard to turn people 
away from Islam.”628 
6.7.3 Example of New Fiqh Approach in Contemporary Muslim 
Minority Context: Fatwa on Taking part in Fighting against 
Muslims by Faisal Mowlavi 
Mr.Muhammad Abd. Al-Rashid, the most senior chaplain in the American armed 
forces asks how far it is permissible for Muslim soldiers in the American armed 
forces to take part in fighting tasks and other relevant duties in Afghanistan and 
other Muslim countries. In his question, he specifies the expected goals of these 
operations as follows:  
1. Taking revenge of those who are thought to have taken part in planning the 
suicidal attack perpetrated against civilians and military targets both in New York 
and Washington on 9 11 2001. (with the detail description of these attacks)  
2. Eliminating the extreme elements who sought refuge in Afghanistan and in 
other territories, and deterring other governments who are complacent in 
harbouring such people and enabling them to get trained on fighting skills and to 
attack their targets in the world.  
3. Restoring the awe and the respect for USA as the sole global superpower.  
Concluding his question he says: Muslim soldiers in the American Armed forces 
in its all three branches are not less than 15 thousands. Should they refuse to take 
part in the above mentioned operations, the outcome is not other than their 
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resignation from their posts and the consequence of that situation is obvious in the 
current climate.  
Finally he asks whether it is permissible for them to request the relevant 
authorities to transfer them to some other duties other than fighting tasks in the 
battle field.  
All praise is due to Allah and His peace and blessings be upon Allah’s Messenger 
and his companions and his followers…I have studied the fatwa of Dr. Salim al-
Awwa in which he mentions that Dr. Al Qardāwi, the Judge Tariq al-Bishri, Dr. 
Muhammad Haytham al-Khayyat, and Mr. Fahmi Huwaudi have agreed on it. 
And also I have studied the interpretation of Dr. al-Qardāwi as for why he has 
accepted the Fatwa mentioned aove. Similarly, I have read the fatwa of Dr. 
Ahmad al-Raysuni who is the Prof. of Sharī‘ah  in Morocco and the fatwa of Dr. 
Ali Jumuah a professor at Al-Azhar University. I have already responded to a 
similar question in a live fatwa on the web site “Islam on line”. In fact, I have 
become more satisfied with that fatwa after I have come across the fatwa of my 
respected brothers. Nevertheless, as a response to the request made by fatwa 
section I am presenting the legal basis for that fatwa in light of the detailed 
question mentioned above which I have not come across of it before. I would say, 
thus, Firstly there are two characteristics for an American Muslim soldier. He is 
an American citizen hence; he has to abide by the laws of America to protect his 
country when it is subjected to an external attack. Secondly, he is a Muslim and 
therefore, he has to follow the laws of Islam in order to obey Allah and His 
Messenger. 
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It is quite obvious firstly, that America is now entering a fierce war against 
terrorism. It may be a decisive war as far as her continuous pursuit for the 
leadership of the new world order is concerned. Secondly, what are the Islamic 
rulings in this regard as far as American Muslim soldier is concerned?  
1- Is it primarily permissible for a Muslim to be a soldier in a non-Muslim army?  
The answer is in fact that this matter is related to his being a citizen in a non-
Muslim country. If this citizenship is permitted, then its obligations that ought to 
be permissible should also follow accordingly. Practically speaking, one third of 
Muslims today live as minorities in non-Muslim countries. Most of them are 
indigenous populations. While many of the Muslim countries do not appear to be 
committed to implement Islamic Sharī‘ah, there is no country among them would 
like to welcome Muslims from another country if they are willing to emigrate to 
them. On the other hand, these indigenous Muslims are the one who are capable 
enough to do dawah to their own people by being in their own countries. Indeed 
Allah has chosen all His messengers from among their communities for this sheer 
reason. Allah says: “We have never sent a messenger except in his nation’s 
language so that he would be able to explain to them...”  
On this basis the majority of scholars agree with the permissibility of a Muslim 
being a citizen of a non-Muslim country. Hence, he being a soldier in the army of 
that country, as a result, is what can be expected as a natural outcome.  
2- The contemporary Islamic dawah has been keen enough to call Muslims to 
engage, while they are a minority, in the societies where they live in. It is because 
a Muslim, by his nature, is a positive person in any society he lives in and 
Muslims, by their positive integration in their societies, would be more capable to 
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spread dawah as long as contemporary societies grant them freedom to do dawah 
on the basis of freedom of religion which is considered in all countries of 
contemporary world as one of the basic human rights and has been also prescribed 
protection by constitutions of most countries. Hence, it would never be possible 
for this integration to bear fruits via spreading dawah unless a Muslim could 
possibly preserve his distinct Islamic personality through its main features of 
creed, thought, and conduct, and then he would be able to apply them in his 
secondary issues. It is a mercy from Allah on a Muslim that He would not burden 
him more than what he can not bear. This is an undisputed position among all 
scholars irrespective of their schools of thought. It is based on the verse: “Allah 
will never burden any soul except for what in its capacity” “Fear Allah as much as 
you can” There are many other Quranic and Hadith verses to this effect. 
3- One of the basic Islamic laws which a Muslim is not permitted to violate is that 
it is permissible for him to join his country’s army to fight alongside it when on 
fighting for his homeland and his rights. Today, the purpose of most armies is 
solely confined to defend their countries and a Muslim also would defend for the 
truth and fight for oppressed even if that involves the defence of those who do not 
share his religion or ethnicity. Hence, it goes without saying that he would indeed 
defend the rights of his country in which he lives and his fellow citizens whom he 
lives with. There is clear evidence in the life of the Prophet in Makkah and his life 
with Jews in Madina. Yet, when the army goes beyond the premises of defending 
the country and the rights of its inhabitants to commit aggression on other 
countries and their rights, then, it is not permissible for a Muslim to take part in 
this aggression regardless of the victim being a Muslim or a non-Muslim.   
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Allah says: “Be not the hatred of a people because they have prevented you 
entering the sacred Mosque, persuades you to egress on them and help each other 
on piety and God conciseness and do not help each other in sin and aggression” It 
can be understood from the context of the verse that there can be cooperation with 
non-Muslims on matters that are considered to be piety and God consciousness by 
our religion and non-Muslims too can accept it for some other considerations. 
And also it follows that there can be Non-cooperation on things which are 
considered to be sin and aggression by our religion if it is acceptable for non-
Muslims as well.    
 Thirdly, diagnosing the current situation of fighting of the American forces in 
Afghanistan and the Islamic legal ruling about it:  
The question has forwarded the goals of the operations of American army in 
Afghanistan in brief, which are: taking revenge of those who are assumed to have 
partaken in the attacks of 9/11, eliminating the perpetrators who sought refuge in 
Afghanistan, deterring other governments from sheltering them and giving space 
for their training camps and helping them, as a result, to fulfil their goals in the 
world, and restoring the authority of the USA as a sole global super power. On the 
basis of these clarifications we would like to say:  
1- The fighting of American forces in Afghanistan cannot be considered as a 
defence of America, but it is an aggression on another country which is 
Afghanistan in this case. The defence cannot be undertaken except against 
aggressors and the Afghan nation is not an aggressor in this case. It is not 
established yet even with the American government that who is the real culprit so 
that he or she could be punished. We believe that the explosions in New York are 
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an aggression on innocent people and it is imperative to bring the perpetrators to 
justice. Yet, the attacking of the American forces of Afghanistan is also an 
aggression on innocent civilians. Hence, it is not permissible for partaking in it. 
The argument for hitting the bases of terrorists and those who support them does 
not justify the attack on innocent civilians.  
Similarly, the argument of American bias, its injustice, and its share of aggression 
does not justify the attack on innocents in New York as well. The aggression is 
rejected regardless of whom the perpetrator was. A Muslim in the American 
armed forces is not allowed to take part in the acts of aggression even if they were 
against non-Muslims.   
If the American forces attack, for example, China or Japan or Europe it is 
imperative for the Muslim American soldier not to take part in that aggression. 
Because the matter is not a religious one based on sectarian foundations, rather it 
is a matter which a Muslim soldier fights in defence of rights and he can not 
commit egression on any other human being regardless of his belief for Allah 
says: “Do not aggress, for Allah indeed does not like aggressors”  
2- The impermissibility becomes certain for a Muslim to partake in the army of 
his country when the egression aims at a Muslim country. There are many clear-
cut texts reported in this regard for which a heart of a Muslim trembles, such as 
“When two Muslims are engaged in a combat against each other with their 
sword's and one is killed, both are doomed to Hell, I (the companion of the 
Prophet) said, "O Messenger of Allah! As to the one who kills, it is 
understandable, but why the slain one?" He (PBUH) replied: "He was eager to kill 
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his opponent" So, it is obvious that this warning has included Muslim in his all 
situations. 
As such, we would clearly say that fighting of a Muslim soldier under the banner 
of American Army against his fellow Muslims in Afghanistan being subjected to 
aggression is Islamicaly not allowed.  
3- It may be difficult for a Muslim soldier to be committed to fulfil this religious 
duty. Yet, it is essential that this matter should be clear for him so that he can 
clarify it before the American society and the American government. Indeed, 
there were demonstrations in front of White House condemning the war in 
Afghanistan. And also there raised certain important voices against these 
operations as they tend to kill innocent people and do not eliminate terrorism. 
Rather it may increase it because of enmity as a consequence of this war. 
Therefore, it would not be difficult for Muslims in America, while they all have 
condemned the 9/11 attacks, not to agree on the war on Afghanistan. What is 
apparent from the question is that if a Muslim solder does not agree to join the 
fighting in Afghanistan he would be compelled to resign from his post. If this has 
been the consequence of it, I would say: it is imperative for Muslim American 
soldier to resign and it is not permissible for him to take part in an unjust fighting 
against his fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. If this position tends to result in some 
other more harming consequences which cannot be borne as far as he is concerned 
personally or for the Muslim diaspora as a whole, then necessities would allow 
prohibitions. Hence, he has to weigh up between the two matters, and to choose 
the lesser evil. It is only him who would bear the consequences in this case.  
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4- It is only Muslim’s loyalty towards his religion and his adherence to laws of 
Sharī‘ah is considered to be basis. It does not mean that his loyalty to his country 
is secondary, but it is of course a part of his loyalty towards his religion. 
Nevertheless, the loyalty to country does not mean loyalty to government in all its 
policies. Otherwise, the political opposition would be accused of lack of loyalty to 
the country. This would definitely contradict the political pluralism and principles 
of democracy itself. It may be the reason why it is allowed for American solder 
not to participate in fighting if he does feel uncomfortable in fighting and this 
would not be considered as a failing in his loyalty to his country. The issue 
presented today is not the condemnation of 9/11 attacks, rather the issue is how to 
face terrorism. And this is a matter on which viewpoints may differ. Muslims also 
should be allowed to exercise their right to express their viewpoint that terrorism 
can never be fought except by establishing justice in the world, the acceptance of 
civilization and cultural pluralism, and ending all sorts of injustice and bullying.     
The loyalty of a Muslim to his Islamic country itself does not permit him to carry 
out the order of the ruler if it is a sin. On the contrary, It is obligatory upon him to 
oppose it as ‘there is no obedience to the created one in committing sin against the 
Creator’. When this sort of opposition comes from a Muslim it does not serve to 
tarnish his loyalty to his Islamic country. Islam strives for the prevalence of moral 
and human values which Allah has prescribed for all societies and makes every 
Muslim the guardian of these values whether he lives in a Muslim society or in 
another society. Hence it is obligatory upon him to oppose the ruler even if he is a 
Muslim when he tends to transgress these values.   
This fatwa of Faysal Mawlawi can be treated as an example of striving to seek 
reconciliation between Islamic teachings and the modern-day liberal democratic 
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secular values in a non-Muslim society. It can be considered as an attempt to 
harmonise, contemporise, and indigenise Islam in the West. It unfailingly reflects 
the growing interest among scholars who deal with problems of Muslim 
minorities in the West from a fiqhi perspective. As a familiar person to the West, 
particularly to Europe where he had stayed and taught and as a senior member of 
European Fatwa Council, Mawlawi, by dealing with this issue, has given an added 
value to the ongoing debate around the issue of Muslim and non-Muslim 
relationship in the West. In fact, his contribution tends to represent a balanced 
approach a growing number of scholars who deal with Muslim minority affairs 
have been taking up since recent past. It can be said, therefore, it strives to seek a 
middle path between two extreme standpoints on the compatibility of practicing 
Islam and its teachings in a non-Muslim society. While one of them is represented 
by some groups and scholars from the Muslim community itself who see no 
meeting points between Islam and liberal democratic social system, the other 
approach, on the other end, is equally represented by some groups and scholars 
from the non-Muslim community who are also not prepared to reconcile between 
the two. What makes it interesting here is that both stand in two extreme polarised 
positions arguing notion of compatibility of values, principles, and way of life 
while sharing the same platform with a single voice which is ‘no coexistence 
between Muslim and non-Muslims in the West’. Between these two there exist a 
third way which is represented by vast majority of scholars and intellectuals form 
among Muslim and non-Muslim communities who tend to seek to find a common 
platform where every community can coexist on equal basis while being critical 
of extreme trends which emanate form both Muslim and non-Muslim sides of the 
society.       
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6.8 The Problems of Seeking fiqh al-aqalliyyāth 
Despite the silver linings in the horizon of contemporary Muslim minority in 
Britain in its quest to find the best methods by which they can endeavor to relate 
their realities and experiences to the normative guidelines of the Qur’ān and the 
Sunnah, there are some gray areas that serve as obstacles standing in the path of 
addressing their problems. 
The contemporary Muslim community witnesses the evolution of fiqh along with 
three different trends. These are namely modernism, traditionalism, and 
revivalism. Although these trends emerged largely to respond to the spread of 
colonialism, and to meet the challenges and issues created by it, the first two 
remain as obstacles in the path of responding these challenges.       
The first trend, which was represented by modernists, tried to interpret Islam so 
that it seemed appealing, rational, and more acceptable by modern standards. In 
their search for this “new look”, they largely ignored the role and importance of 
tradition in Islamic history and thought.
629
 Dazzled by the glitter of western 
civilization they cannot visualize the intrinsic superiority of Islam, nor can they 
appraise the real value of its laws. Overawed by the idol of western civilization, 
they justify whatever it brings, call for it, and stand for it passionately. Those are 
the people who in the words of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi: they want to renovate the 
religion, the language, the sun and the moon.
630
 As far as fiqh and the related 
institutions are concerned, the modernists not only advocate the rejection, but also 
encourage complete disregard of the past experience dismissing such experience, 
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as irrelevant to modern conditions.
631
 Thus, this trend renders a big challenge to 
find fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, as the contemporary Muslim minority societies have been 
immensely influenced by this trend.  
The traditionalists on the other hand, are just opposite to the Modernists. Although 
they have rendered a great service to the Muslim community by preserving 
tradition, particularly at times when the danger of erosion of values was present, 
they have, unfortunately, over-emphasized preservation. Thus, the preservation 
became, the goal, and the challenge of recreation and transformation was often 
lost.
632
 They advocate strict adherence to the four main schools of law. They 
claim that Islamic jurisprudence has attained perfection at the hands of the great 
Imāms (masters) of the past and that there is no need for innovation or 
improvement whether in general principles or in its detailed rules. They usually 
attach great importance to the literal meanings of the texts, give disproportionate 
attention to trivial details and pay only lip service to the ends and purposes of the 
Sharīah. Some of these scholars go even further and defend the outdated theory of 
strict adherence to the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, thus discouraging any 
meaningful form of individual or collective ijtihād.633 According to Qardāwi, they 
pay little attention to the objectives of the literal texts, have little understanding of 
trivialities in the light of general conceptions, and no wonder to see them staging 
wars against petty things in religion. They are overprotective of a fixed form of 
Islamic jurisprudence, very much like the mother who brings about death to her 
infant by locking it up lest the scorching of the sun and the searing of the wind 
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injure his health. They have been named by Qardāwi as modern literalists 
(Zāhiriyyah al-judod).634   
The traditionalists try to apply the rulings and views applied in earlier centuries to 
present day questions. This is seen in a variety of situations, which merit new 
considerations and rulings. Scholars belonging to this trend have always preferred 
following earlier scholars, issuing the same verdicts without careful re-
consideration of issues, despite the changing circumstances. 
The special feature of this trend is sticking to one school of thought with rigidity. 
What makes this trend even more rigid is the insistence by scholars on following 
their particular school of law, without looking into what other schools say on the 
same question, even though it may be better supported. In fact, some scholars tend 
to right off certain schools, as do the salafi scholars when they speak about the 
hanafi school of law. “This group is frozen in its fixed opinions concerning the 
halāl (Lawful) and the harām (Prohibited), following a statement in a text which 
they assume to be Islam. They do not budge a hair’s breadth from their position, 
nor do they try to weigh their opinion against the arguments of others, and to 
arrive at the truth after a comparison and critical evaluation of all opinions. If one 
of them were to be asked his opinion concerning music, singing, chess, women’s 
education and similar matters, the most likely word to come out from his tongue 
would be harām”.635  
The other side of the coin of this trend is the little understanding of contemporary 
issues. The lack of profound understanding of the contemporary age and its issues 
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coupled with the generally limited education among those who belong to this 
trend hampered the development of Muslim minorities. This situation is more 
visible in European countries than anywhere else, particularly in Britain. The 
quality of religious leaders (imāms) now found in many local mosques in Britain 
exemplify this pathetic situation. “Many imāms, particularly those originating 
from Pakistan have, in general, a limited or non-existent command of English, in 
many cases a poor educational background and little understanding of the society 
with which young Muslim in particular have to engage”636. It is common for an 
imām to be sent from the country of origin of the particular Muslim community 
and also, from the particular jmā`ath (sect). This means that an imām may be well 
trained in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and the cultural norms of the home country. 
As far as his knowledge about his surroundings is concerned, he is unaware of the 
real-life situation of the people of the community. “Many of the imāms will have 
received little information about the European religious and secular scene and are 
consequently not well prepared for dialogue”637. Mohammad Raza observes, “The 
majority of imām lacks a thorough knowledge of Islam. Traditional leadership has 
no communication with the younger generation for they cannot provide answers 
to the questions asked by the latter. Such ignorance in highly industrialized 
societies neither helps the young nor builds their confidence in traditional 
leadership (Imāms) who have only a ritualistic and literal understanding of their 
faith. Lacking conceptual knowledge, they cannot see Islam in its wider global 
context…”638     
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Between these two, there is a third approach, which is represented by a middle 
path. This could be termed as revivalist option, which seeks to reform the area of 
fiqh and its related institutions. This trend is seen as flexible and striking a middle 
path between the two extremes of either breaking completely with the past or 
sticking to it rigidly. This trend is what is immensely needed today to overcome 
these obstacles in the quest of finding fiqh al-aqalliyyāth. It is to achieve this aim 
that Muslim minorities should find the ways and means. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The summaries and concluding remarks of our studies will be made here precisely 
in order of each chapter. In our introductory chapter, we have indentified that the 
Muslim minority law is a relatively new legal studies yet no one has systemically 
studied this legal concept. We have noticed that classical legal theories of Islamic 
law are not always viable and applicable in modern conditions. We also 
concluded that following one of four legal school of Islamic law is also sometime 
not feasible in modern contexts in European countries. Furthermore, our study 
reveals that our imported Muslim clerics and scholars do not fully comprehend the 
cultural and social set ups of western nations in our modern context and their 
Islamic legal knowledge is confined to some Islamic ideological and sectarian 
teachings. Our study shows such Islamic clerics cannot gauge the legal and 
religious problems of Muslim minority community fully and thoroughly and for 
this reason, we argued that a new legal approach is needed to address these 
challenges. In our second chapter, we have outlined the method and methodology 
of this research and we have followed the qualitative research method in 
accomplishing this research due the time constraints.   
          Our third chapter reveals that there is no conclusive definition for the 
concept of minorities in the world. The term minority has been used vaguely and 
differently in different contexts. It can be evidentially concluded that a unanimous 
definition of minority is not yet developed by academics and out of all the 
yardsticks used to define minority, Muslims are to be identified with their 
religiosity and thus Muslims are a ‘religious minority’. However, they are not 
perceived as such by the British establishments. British administrative 
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departments and institutes identify people as ‘coloured’: blacks and whites, as 
‘race’: Jew and Sikh, as ‘ethnic’: Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Arab. The ethnic 
minority groups are classified in this way in British administrative department. 
With the increase in the British Muslim population and the influx of other 
minority groups in the country, there was a tendency to identify them as 
‘culturally distinct groups’. Because of this population increase in ethnic minority 
groups, the question of ‘multiculturalism’ has been widely debated in academia in 
Britain. After the attacks on twin towers in New York in 2001, precisely after the 
London bombings in 2005, the viability of multiculturalism as a social bridge 
connecting between communities has been questioned. The only way to recognise 
them as a part of the British society, it is being argued in far and wide, is to ask 
them to ‘integrate’ or ‘assimilate’ in the wider society. This is one of the reasons 
why Muslims are widely subject to various types of discriminations as they are 
not included in any of the categories listed in the British legislation and 
consequently, they are not protected by law as the chapter five identifies. This is 
one of the reasons why Muslims are being subject to various types of attacks and 
harassments by far right groups. They are aware that Muslims are an easy target 
and not protected by law as a legally protected minority.  
Consequently, Muslims on the other hand also tend to identify themselves 
as ‘Muslims’ reacting to the pressure from the wider society. This is one of the 
crucial challenges theoreticians face when defining Muslims as a minority group. 
Hence, The Muslim minority laws can be used to reconcile the difference because 
Muslim minority laws guide us to come to terms with difficult situations like this. 
Local issues such as a controversy around hijāb, beard, jilbāb, Muslim schools, 
and accommodation for practicing faith in public places and international issues 
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such as cartoons about the Prophet (pbuh), Palestine conflict, and war in 
Afghanistan can be examined and reconciled in the light of Muslim minority law 
taking into account the general philosophy of Islamic law into account.  
It would not be appropriate to issue legal verdict on these matters merely 
based on certain scriptural texts on legal opinion of some Islamic legal schools. 
The Muslims in general, Imams and scholars in particular face the challenge of 
understanding the problems in the British context. Understanding them incorrectly 
can have wider implications, which are detrimental to the peaceful coexistence of 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the society. This may explain the root causes of 
social disharmony created by the Salman Rushdi affair and the way Muslims 
approached it. Muslim minority law should help us to reconcile these differences. 
The fourth chapter of our research reveals Muslim migration patterns into 
Britain in a historical perspective. Moreover, it also tells about the migration 
disperse of Muslim minority communities in Britain. It further discloses that 
Muslim minority communities have greatly contributed to the wider British 
society politically, economically, socially and culturally and Muslims have 
become part and parcel of the British society now than ever before. Muslim 
minorities feel that they have a lot to offer to this British society educationally, 
academically, culturally, and economically. The third generation of Muslim 
minority feel that they are a part and parcel of this wider society and they no 
longer feel that they have been marginalised. They also have a responsibility to 
contribute to the society in times of difficulties and ease. They are morally, legally 
and religiously duty bound to serve the country they live. They feel that they are 
fully integrated into this British society yet how they preserve their religious, 
identity is a big question and as we have explained before, the Muslim minority 
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laws explore the ways and methods of saving and preserving our identities as 
Muslims. Newly converted indigenous people of this country could play wider 
role in this British context. They understand the mentality, customs, and tradition 
of British society than migrants and therefore, they could play a wider role to 
identify and solve many of Muslim minorities’ issues.  
The chapter five exposes some of the major legal and religious problems 
Muslims in Britain so far faced. These problems are complex and complicated. 
Apparently these issues seem to contradict with basic teaching of the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah. Yet, our study shows that many problems Muslim minority community 
face in Britain can be reconciled and solved if we read them in the light of general 
philosophy of law and legal theories of Muslim minority law is devised as 
problem solving mechanisms. Moreover, our study shows that legal concept of 
religious loyalty is different from law binding to the democratic constitutions of 
Western countries. Our study makes a distinction between the loyalty to 
ideologies and procedural democratic systems of the countries. We find that the 
concept of citizenship in Britian expects everyone to obey the set of laws that are 
equal and just for all. This does not contradict Muslim faith or religious 
expression.  
 Furthemore, our research shows that Muslim minority communities in 
Britain have been facing many socio-economical, political, cultural, legal and 
religious problems at various levels and identification of the problems of Muslim 
minorities has not been done sufficiently and scientifically from Islamic juristic 
point of view. Our research further reveals that there are not enough scientific and 
methodological studies have been undertaken yet by Muslim and Non-Muslim 
social scientists about Muslim minorities in Britain comprehensively. Many socio-
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economics, educational and legal issues of Muslim minorities are ignored and 
neglected because of the lack of research on these areas. In addition, our study 
further explores inherent relationship between the concepts of equality laws and 
Muslim minority laws. Under the concept of equality law, minority rights should 
be protected and preserved. Our study shows that there is a compelling need in the 
British society to undertake an in depth research on this area comparing Muslim 
minority rights under the concept of equality laws.   
Our sixth chapter recognizes that Fiqh is not Sharī‘ah , which is the 
immutable. The fiqh is the interpretation of the divine guidance to humanity, 
which is the reflection and interpretation of Islamic jurists and scholars. It is prone 
to change according to change in time, space, circumstances, problems, and 
people attitude. The contemporary social context in Britain and the problems 
emanated from it is unprecedented in Islamic legal history. Our classical scholars 
could not visualise these social changes in their legal writings. This does not mean 
that their legal contributions are useless. Rather, their contributions are 
insufficient for today’s needs and demands. That is why scholars such al-Alwāni 
and al-Qardāwi have devised this new approach called fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt for 
Muslim-minorities to meet the need of our contemporary problems in the West.   
 In this respect, the Islamic legal methodological tools and principles, which are 
called Usūl al-fiqh pioneered by scholars of Islamic law, were the signposts for 
any future works in this field. Nevertheless, the verdicts and edicts issued by them 
based on these tools have been time-bound and contextual. They reflect the socio-
cultural, relegio-political climate of their time. Hence, it is undisputable that the 
methods introduced by them to deduce rules from texts are an invaluable 
contribution to Islamic fiqh. Yet, their rulings are inadequate to be used as 
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answers to issues faced by contemporary Muslim minority in Britain. This entails 
that it is imperative to develop a viable fiqh mechanism, which is based on not 
only the text and precedence inherited from the Islamic legal legacy but also on 
the comprehensive knowledge of the context with all its complexities and issues 
as highlighted in previous chapters. In so doing, the universalities of Islamic legal 
texts: the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, purposes of Islamic Sharīā‘ah: maqāsid al-
Sharīah, maxims of Islamic law: al-Qawā‘id al-fiqhiyyah and other sources and 
principles of Islamic law need to be consulted before arriving at a solution for a 
particular issue. This arduous effort, which is to be done by scholars, is called 
Ijtihād.  
 A body of fiqh scholars should undertake this effort collectively, which is called 
al-Ijtihād al-Jamā‘i. This body should be divided into two institutions: one can 
deal with purely religious issues including personal law and the other one can deal 
with issues needed high calibre of expertise in respective fields and should be 
guided by experts in each aspects of human life, as it has become a practice in 
ECFR (European Council for Fatwa and Research). The role of the Muslim 
community and the government is crucial in order for this project to be 
materialised in real life. Muslim community should initiate capacity-building 
projects to produce scholars of Islamic law and it is imperative for the community 
to focus on it. It is a fard ‘ain unlike Muslim chaplain scheme, which is a fard 
kifāyah. If Muslims aspire to be role models of their religion for the wider society 
as they in the capacity of the witness for the humanity, it is an obligation upon 
them to concentrate on this. As far as the government is concerned, its role is not 
less imperative than the Muslim community itself is. By supporting this project, 
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the government can place the British society in the eyes of the world as a role 
model for the rest of Europe and the Western world at large.     
The resource persons who teach the Islamic subjects need to be either home 
grown or trained in the West. Mostly, the problem in the apparent failure of our 
system may be attributed to the incompetency and inefficiency of resource 
persons mainly in terms of mastering the language namely English and right 
understanding of the culture, society, and context of the country. The advantage of 
having a competent person of this calibre is that he or she would know how to 
‘speak’ to our youth. ‘To speak’ does not mean that he or she is having a PhD in 
English language, rather it is to know how to understand their mindset before 
speaking to them, to know what sort of a mentality they have, what type of issues 
and problems they face in their environment and to communicate in the same 
wave length.   
It could be the reason why Allah says in the Qur’ān: ‘and We never sent a 
Messenger except with the language of the folk, so that he might make (the 
message) clear for them…’ (14:4) It is understood that the language of the folk 
referred to in this verse means more than the language itself as it has been Allah’s 
wisdom to choose a Prophet from within the same community to whom he has 
been sent for and no wonder, of course, he speaks their language! It is self-evident 
that the mentioning of the language of the folk has deeper meaning than its face 
value which understands the culture, mentality, and mindset of the people whom 
we are talking to.  
Islamic clerics and teachers should be competent enough not only in the above-
mentioned main sources of knowledge but also in knowing how to relate them 
 311 
effectively to the current complex modern social context. In other words, he or 
she should know the text as well as the context, and know how to contextualise 
the text in order for the people to understand the guidance of the Creator: Allah in 
the context of modern day issues and problems. This successful approach will be 
effective enough to give our youth the confidence in the religion, its relevance in 
their day today life, and, as a result, a solid foundation for forming their Islamic 
identity. This will effectively help them to stand firm in the face of cultural 
onslaught they confront in the macro-environment.  
Our study shows that problems and challenges of Muslim minorities in 
Britain are enormous and they are unprecedented and unfamiliar to the available 
corpus of Islamic fiqh. It became clear how the existing fiqh is far behind to guide 
people in this crisis. Moreover, the jurists are lagging behind when it comes to 
respond to these issues for they are solely dependent on the existing fiqh 
solutions. Hence, it is vital for them to seek guidance from Islamic jurists who 
understand these issues Islamically in British contexts taking into account all 
changes that have been taking place in this new environment. This study identifies 
that there is a scarcity of Muslim legal and religious experts in this country with 
thorough knowledge in Islam and modern social sciences. As a result, Muslim 
minority communities do not possess enough intellectual resource to engage in 
Muslim issues. Some individual scholars or individual groups cannot solve these 
challenges and problems single handedly. The collective efforts of Muslim 
communities are needed to face these issues effectively. Moreover, there may be 
other relevant subjects and topics related to Muslim minority issues, which must 
be studied from different perspective. It is my humble expectation that the study 
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will attract Muslim intellectuals to engage in the subject from different 
perspectives.    
.  
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Appendix 1: UN’s Universal Declaration of Humnan Rights 
Articles: 
1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are  
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one other in a 
sprit of brotherhood. 
   2.  Everyone is entiltled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, clour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opnion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distnction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, 
trust, non-selfgovering or under any other limitation of sovereignity. 
  3.  Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
  4.  No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms. 
5.  No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatement or punishment. 
6.  Everyone has the right to recongnition everywhere as a person before the 
law. 
7.  All are equal before the law and are entiltled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Decrlaration and against any incitement 
to such discrimination.  
8.  Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law. 
  9.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
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  10.  Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
     11.  1). Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trail at which he 
has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.  
2). No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall be heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed. 
  12.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence or to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protections of law against such 
interference or attacks. 
13. 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the border of each state.  
2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
return to his country.   
14. 1) Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries from 
persecution. 
2) This right may not be invoked in the case of presecutions genuinely 
arsing from non-politcal crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
15. 1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.  
2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or denied the right 
to change his nationality.                                                                                                                
16. 1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They 
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are entiltled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the    
intending spouse. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entiltled to protection by society and the state. 
17.  1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. 
        2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
18.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, consience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
relgion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
19.  Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. 
  20.  1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
       2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
  21.  1) Everyone has the right to take part in the governement of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
       2) Everyone has the right of equal accesss to public service of his country. 
3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
  22.  Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each 
state, of the econocmic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality. 
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23.  1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment. 
2) Everyone, without any discrimnation, has the right to equal pay for 
equal work.  
3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an exsistence worthy of human 
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection. 
4) Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the protection 
of the interests. 
  24.  Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation 
of working hours and periodic holiday with pay. 
  25.  1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and nessessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special assistance. All 
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection. 
  26.  1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stage. Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the 
basis of merit. 
2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strenthering of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further 
the activities of the United Nations for maintenance of peace. 
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3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be       
given to their children. 
 27.  1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
28.  Everyone is entiltled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedom set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
29. 1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.  
2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpsose of 
securing recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be excercised contary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
    30.  Nothing in the Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  
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Appendix 2: Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
prepared by Islamic Council. U.K. 1981 
1 Right to Life 
a)  Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect 
it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under 
authority of the law. 
b)  Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person’s body shall be 
inviolable. It is the obligation of believers to see that a deceased person’s body 
is handled with due solemnity. 
II Right to freedom 
a)  Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty except the 
authority and in due process of the law.  
b)  Every individual and every people has the inalienable right to freedom in   
all its forms-physical, cultural, economic and political – and shall be entitled to 
struggle by all available means against any infringement or abrogation of this 
right: and every oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the 
support of other individuals and /or peoples in such a struggle. 
III Right to Equality and Protection Against Impermissible 
Discrimination 
a) All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal 
opportunities and protection of the Law. 
b) All persons shall be entitled to equal work. 
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c) No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated 
against in any manner or exposed to greater physical risk by reason of 
religious belief, colour, race origin, sex, or language. 
IV Right to Justice 
a) Every person has the right to be treated in accordance with the law, and 
only in accordance with the Law. 
b) Every person has not only the right but also the obligation to protest 
against injustice; to recourse to remedies provided by the Law in respect of 
any unwarranted personal injury or loss; to self –defence against any 
charge that are preferred against him and to obtain fair adjudication before 
an independent judical and tribunal in any dispute with public authorities 
or any other person. 
c) It is the right and duties of every person to defend the right of any other 
person and community in general (Hisbah) 
d) No person shall be discriminated against while seeking to defence private 
and public rights. 
e) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to refuse to obey any command, 
which is contrary to the Law, no matter by whom it may be issued. 
V Right to Fair Trial 
a) No person shall be adjudged guilty of an offence and made liable to                                                                                                    
punishment except after proof of his guilt before an independent judical   
tribunal.  
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b) No person shall be adjudged guilty except after a fair trial and after 
reasonable opportunity for defence has been provided to him.  
c) Punishment shall be awarded in accordance with the Law, in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offence and with due consideration of the 
circumstances under which it was committed.  
d) No act shall be considered a crime unless it is stipulated as suchas in the  
clear wording of the Law. 
e) Every individual is responsible for his actions, responsibility for a crime 
can not be vicariously extended to other members of his family or group, 
who are not otherwise directly or indirectly involed in the commission of 
the crime in question.  
VI Right to Protection Against Abuse of Power 
Everyperson has the right to protection against harassment by official 
agencies. He is not liable to account for himself except for making a 
defence to the charges made against him or where he is found in a 
situation wherein a question regarding suspicion of his involvement in a 
crime could be reasonably raised. 
VII Right to Protection Agaisnt Torture 
No person shall be subjected to torture inmind or body, or degraded or 
threatened with injury either to himself or anyone related to or held dear 
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by him, forcibly made to confess to the commission of a crime or forced to 
consent to act which is injurious to his interests. 
VIII Rights to protection of Honour and Reputation 
Every person has the right to protect his honour and reputation against 
calumnies, groundless charges or deliberate attempts at defamation and 
blackmail. 
IX Right to Asylum 
a) Every persecuted or oppressed person has the right to seek refuge and 
asylum. This right is guaranteed to every human being irrespective of race, 
religion, colour and sex. 
b) Al- Masjid al-Harām (Sacred House of Allah) in Mecca is a sanctuary for 
all Muslims. 
X Rights of Minorities 
a) The Qur’ānic principle “There is no compulsion in religion” shall govern 
the religious rights of non-Muslim minorities.  
b) In a Muslims country religious minorities shall have the choice to be 
governed in respect to their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law, or 
by their own laws. 
XI Right and Obligation to Participate in the Conduct and 
Management of Public Affairs 
a) Subject to the Law, every individual in the community (Ummah) is 
entitled to assume public office. 
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b) Process of free consultation (Shura) is the basis of the administrative 
relationship between the government and the people. People also have the 
right to choose and remove their rulers in accordance with this pinciple. 
XII Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech  
a) Every person has the right to express his thought and belief as long as he 
remains within the limits prescribed by the Law. No one, however, is 
entitled to discriminate falsehood or to circulate reports which may 
outrage public decency or to indulge in salnder, innuendo or to cast 
defamatory aspersions on other persons. 
b) Persiut of knowledge and search after truth is not only a right but a duty of 
every Muslim. 
c) It is the right and duty of every Muslims to protest and strive (within the 
limts set out by the law) against oppression even if it involves challenging 
the highest authority in the state. 
d) There shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does 
not endanger the security of the society or the state and is confined within 
the limits imposed by the Law. 
c) No one shall hold in contempt or redicule the religious beliefs of others or 
incite public hostility against them; respect for the religious feelings of 
others is obligatory on all Muslims.  
XIII Right to Freedom of religion 
Every person has the right to freedom of conscience and worship in 
accordance with his religious beliefs. 
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XIV Right to Free Association 
a) Every person is entitled to participate individually and collectively in the 
religious, social, cultural and political life of his community and to 
establish institutions and agencies meant to enjoin what is right (ma’roof) 
and to prevent what is wrong (munkar). 
b) Every person is entitled to strive for the establishment of institutions 
whereunder an enjoyment of these rights would be made possible. 
Collectively, the community is obliged to establish conditions so as to 
allow its members full development of their personalities. 
XV The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom 
a) In their economic persuits, all persons are entitled to the full benefits of 
nature and all its resources. These are blessings bestowed by God for the 
benefit of mankind as whole. 
b) All human beings are entitled to earn their living according to the Law.  
c) Every person is entitled to own property individually or in association with 
others. State owenership of certain economic resources in the public 
interest is legitimate. 
d) The poor have the right to a prescribed share in the wealth of the rich, as 
fixed by Zakāt, levied and collected in accordance with the Law. 
e) All means of production shall be utilised in the interest of the community 
(Ummah) as a whole, and may not be negelected or misused. 
f) In order to promote the development of a balanced economy and to protect 
society from exploitation, Islamic Law forbids monopolies, unreasonable 
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restrictive trade pratices, usury, the use of coercion in the making of 
contracts and the publication of misleading advertisements. 
g) All economic activities are permitted provided they are not detrimental to 
the interests of the community (Ummah) and do not violate Islamic laws 
and values. 
XVI Right to Protections of Property 
No property may be expropriated except in the public interest and payment 
of fair and adequate compensation. 
XVII Status and Dignity of Workers 
Islam honours work and the worker and enjoins Muslims not only to treat 
the worker justly but also generously. He is not only to be paid his earned 
wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure. 
XVIII Right to Social Security  
Every person has the right to food, shelter, clothing, education and medical 
care consistent with the resources of the community. This obligation of the 
community extends in particular to all individuals who cannot take care of 
themselves due to some temporary or permanent disability. 
XIX Right to Found a Family and Related Matters 
a) Every person is entitled to marry, found a family and bring up children in 
conformity with his religion, traditions, and culture. Every spouse is 
entiltled to such rights and privileges and carries such obligations as are 
stipulated by the Law. 
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b) Each of partners in a marriage is entitled to respect and consideration from 
other. 
c) Every husband is obligated to maintain his wife and children according to 
his means. 
d) Every child has the right to be maintained and properly brought up by its 
parents. It being forbidden that children are made to work at an early age 
or that any burden is put on them, which would arrest or harm their natural 
development. 
e) If parents are for some reason unable to discharge their obligation towards 
a child it become the responsibility of the community to fulfil these 
obligation at public expense. 
f) Every person is entiltled to material support, as well as care and 
protection, from his family during his childhood, old age or incapacity. 
Parents are entitled to material support as well as care and protection from 
their children. 
g) Motherhood is entitled to special respect, care and assistance on the part of 
the family and the public organs of the community (Ummah). 
h) Within the family, men and women are to share in their obligation and 
responsibilities according to their sex, their natural endowments, talents 
and inclinations, bearing in mind their common responsibilities toward 
their progeny and their relatives. 
i) No person may be married against his or her will. Or lose or suffer 
diminution of legal personality on account of marriage. 
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XX Rights of Married Women 
Every married woman is entitled to: 
a) Live in the house in which her husband lives. 
b) Receive the means necessary for maintaining a standard of living which is 
not inferior to that of her spouse, and, in the event of divorce, receive 
during the statutory period of waiting (Iddah) means of maintenance 
commensurate with her husband’s resources, for herself as wellas for the 
children she nurses or keeps, irrespective of her own financial status, 
earnings, or property that she may hold in her own rights. 
c) Seek and obtain dissolution of marriage (Khula’) in accordance with terms 
of the Law. This right is in addition to her right to seek divorce through the 
courts. 
d) Inherit from her husband, her parents, her children and othe rrealtives in 
accodance to the Law. 
e) Strict confidentiality from her spouse, or ex-spouse if divorced, with 
regard to any information that he may have obtained about her, the 
disclose of which could prove detrimental to he rinterests. A similar 
responsibility rests upon her in respect of her spouse or ex-spouse. 
XXI Right to Education 
a) Every person os entitled to receive education in accordance to his natural 
capabilities. 
b) Every person is entitled to a free choice of profession and career and to the 
opportunity for the full development of his natural endowments.  
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XXII Right of Privacy 
Every person is entitled to the protection of his privacy. 
XXIII Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence 
a) In view of the fact that the world of Islam is veritably Ummah Islamiah, 
every Muslim shall have the right to freely move in and out of any Muslim 
country. 
b) No one shall be forced to leave the country of his residence, or be 
arbitrarily deported therefrom without recourse to due process of Law. 
Explanatory Notes 
1- In the above formulation of Human Rights, unless the context provides 
otherwise: 
a) The term 'person' refers to both the male and female sexes. 
b) The term 'Law' denotes the Shari'ah, i.e. the totality of ordinances 
derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah and any other laws that are 
deduced from these two sources by methods considered valid in Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
2- Each one of the Human Rights enunciated in this declaration carries a 
corresponding duty. 
3- In the exercise and enjoyment of the rights referred to above every person 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law for the 
purpose of securing the due recognition of, and respect for, the rights and 
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the freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare of the Community (Ummah). 
The Arabic text of this Declaration is the original. 
Source: http://www.alhewar.com/islamdecl.html  
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